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ABSTRACT
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF SELECTED CHANGES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA 2 7 3-
A
(September 1979)
Gerald A. Croteau, B.A., Assumption College
M.A.
,
University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Thomas E. Hutchinson
Collective bargaining in public education can be a very mis-
understood and unsettling process. On the one hand, school boards are
usually very concerned about maintaining control of the school dis-
trict's educational program, and, on the other hand, many teacher
associations usually think that the collective bargaining process will
provide them with the opportunity to resolve all of the Issues which
they perceive to be problems with their local school boards.
A study of both the development and current status of collective
bargaining in New Hampshire was considered as timely if school boards
and teacher associations were to work effectively within the process.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to provide data concerning
the status of collective bargaining in New Hampshire prior to and
following the enactment of RSA 273-A. The author believed that this
study would be useful to those individuals and groups involved with
ill
the collective bargaining process in New Hampshire public school
districts. The study was designed to determine what effect the
enactment of collective bargaining legislation had on certain selected
questions.
The data that were used to answer the four questions contained
in the study were collected from those collective bargaining agreements
in effect for the 1975—1976 school year as well as those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 as either single year
agreements or as the first year of multiple year agreements. Data were
also obtained from conversations with various New Hampshire school
superintendents as well as from the records of New Hampshire state
agencies.
In general, the findings of this study demonstrate that:
1. there has been a definite increase in the number of col-
lective bargaining agreements in effect, as well as in the
number of staff members who are covered by these agreements;
2. there has been a definite increase in the collective bar-
gaining agreement clauses that provide fringe benefits;
3. there has been a definite increase in the collective bar-
gaining agreement clauses involving various working conditions
of the staff members;
4. there has been a definite increase in the clauses providing
for a grievance procedure and more importantly some form
of arbitration;
5. there has not been a substantial increase in the clauses
involving educational policy.
It would appear that RSA 273-A has had a definite effect on the
selected changes in collective bargaining in New Hampshire.
The knowledge gained through the reading of this study may enable
iv
those groups or individuals involved in negotiating collective bar-
gaining agreements in New Hampshire public school districts to make
more rational decisions during the course of the process as they
will be more knowledgeable about the status of collective bargaining
in New Hampshire public school districts.
The information made available in this study will assist these
organizations in avoiding overreactions to collective bargaining,
thereby, putting it into proper perspective. The evidence clearly
demonstrates to school boards that their fear of losing control of
the school district's educational program is unfounded as the negotia-
tion of educational policy has been minimal. The evidence clearly
demonstrates to public school staff members that the collective
bargaining process has helped them to resolve some of their concerns.
However, it has not helped them to become involved in the development
of educational policy nor in the management of the school district to
the extent that they might like.
In conclusion, the study demonstrates that the enactment of
collective bargaining legislation did not bring about radical changes
in the operation of New Hampshire Public School Districts.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Collective Bargaining ^
Collective bergelnlng Is a process which provides the employees
of an organization with the vehicle whereby they may become Involved
'^ith the employer In determining the rules and regulations that govern
their employment, A collective movement Is necessary on the part of
the employees for without such a movement they would not have the
strength to bargain on equal terms with the employer. It was not until
the enactment of the Wagner Act In 1935 that the federal government
protected the right of employees to organize for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining and guaranteed to them the procedural rights they
needed In order to negotiate with the employer on an equal basis.
The ultimate goal of the collective bargaining process Is for
the employees and the employer to reach an agreement which Is satisfactory
to both. While the collective agreement Is the end result of the process.
It must be considered as only a part of the collective bargaining
relationship because the essence of the relationship Is the spirit In
which the agreement Is adhered to on the part of both parties. It Is
^The discussion found on pages 1-8 Is an overview of the Review
of the Literature that will be found In Chapter II. As such It represents
the author's understanding of the collective bargaining process, collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector, collective bargaining in
education,
and collective bargaining in New Hampshire, and therefore,
contains no
footnotes. Specific references to collective bargaining and
related
Issues will be found in Chapter II.
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2this spirit which will determine the effectiveness of the employer-
employee relationship; amongst other things, the spirit will be very
Important in determining the success of the succeeding collective
bargaining agreement.
In the event that the two parties are unable to reach an agree-
ment, there are several procedures available to them as they attempt
to break their Impasse. These procedures are: mediation, fact finding,
and binding arbitration of contract provisions (interest arbitration).
All three procedures Involve the Introduction of a neutral third party
into the dispute. In mediation, the third party discusses the dispute
with the parties in an attempt to help them reach a voluntary settlement.
The fact finder studies the dispute; and issues a report as to what he
considers to be a reasonable and just settlement. The fact finder's
report is not binding on either party. The arbitrator also studies the
dispute; however, the arbitrator issues a decision as to what the terms
of the settlement will be, and the decision is binding on both parties.
Of the three Impasse procedures, mediation is the primary procedure used
in the private sector. Mediation is utilized as its intent is in keeping
with the Intent of collective bargaining which is the attainment of a
voluntary settlement. Employers and employees in the private sector do
not utilize fact finding or binding arbitration as they are unwilling to
conclude an agreement on terms that have been suggested or dictated by
a third party. They prefer that a strike occur rather than submit their
dispute to fact finding or binding arbitration.
3Collective Bargaining In the Public Sector
While the collective bargaining movement became an Important
part of the employer-employee relationship In the private eoctor
during the 1930’s, It was not until the 1960 ’s that It became an
Important part of the employer-employee relationship in the public
sector. Public employees for years had been less Inclined to accept
the collective bargaining process. They had accepted those advantages
of public employment which Included Job security and pensions In re-
turn for wages that were competitive with those that were paid In the
private sector. Public employees, for the most part, believed that the
collective bargaining process should not be used In the public sector.
This belief was encouraged by the public employers^ contention that
as the elected or appointed representatives of the people they did not
have the right to share their duties and responsibilities with the
public employees thru the collective bargaining process. The attitude
of public employees toward the collective bargaining process began to
shift during the 1950 's as they saw their purchasing power being
eroded continuously by periods of high Inflation, At the same time,
public employees observed that workers In the private sector, especially
those who utilized the collective bargaining process, were securing
wage gains that enabled them to maintain or Improve their purchasing
power
.
While higher salaries were of primary concern to public employees,
many were concerned also about obtaining more control over the manner
In which their services were provided to the public. As a result, the
4question of the scope of collective bargaining became a larger issue
in the public sector than it had been in the private sector. Initially,
public employers resorted to the argument that they would be negligent
in carrying out their duties to the public if they negotiated items
which diminished the authority given to them by the public in order to
carry out their responsibilities as public servants. However, as time
passed, public employers became convinced that it was not realistic to
hold strictly to the idea that items, other than those that related
directly to the economic welfare of public employees were strictly the
prerogative of the public employer, and thus were not to be shared or
even discussed with public employees. Public employers changed their
position, in part, because of political pressure arising out of
public employee strikes concerning the scope of collective bargaining.
The issue of whether or not public employees should have the
right to strike is certainly one of the more vexing questions in
public sector collective bargaining. Public employers contend that
public employees should not have the right to strike. They take the
position that the strike in the public sector is primarily a political
weapon. Further, the more essential the public considers the service
to be, the more pressure such fact will place on the public employer to
settle the dispute despite its economic cost. As a result, the public
employers believe that the right to strike places too much power in the
hands of public employee unions. Public employee unions, on the other
hand, contend that without the right to strike they will not be equals
with the public employer at the collective bargaining table, and that
of collective bargaining demands such an equality.the very essence
5They believe that as long as the public strike is illegal, it will b«
more difficult to obtain a strike vote from their membership whereas the
risk to the public employees of going out on strike will be greater.
Collective Bargaining in Education
Teachers, as public employees, had to be convinced that the
collective bargaining process was a legitimate tool for them to use
in their efforts to improve their professional and economic positions.
However, once teachers became convinced that collective bargaining
would be most helpful to their cause, the organization of the teachers
by the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) was extremely rapid. The growth of the collective
bargaining movement in education has been greater than in any other
area of the public sector.
One of the reasons for the rapid growth of the collective
bargaining movement in education was the struggle between the NEA and the
AFT for control of unionism in education. During the 1950 ’s and early
1960*8, the efforts of the NEA were directed chiefly towards a
maintenance of its professional image; thus the organization did not
promote the traditional union activities. It was not until the AFT
began to make Important gains in membership and control of teacher
organizations at NEA expense, as evidenced by the election of the AFT as
the exclusive representative of the New York City teachers in 1961,
that the NEA began to modify its position on collective bargaining.
Within a very short period of time, the position of the NEA was quite
similar if not identical to that of the AFT. The power struggle that
6ensued between the NEA and AFT was responsible to a considerable extent
for the constant escalation of teachers' economic demands and the
growth of the scope of collective bargaining. This was Inevitable as
each organization was making every effort to prove to the teachers that
It was the most effective collective bargaining agent. Partly as a
result of the NEA-AFT rivalry, the scope of collective bargaining In
education Is much broader than It Is In the private sector. Most
teachers believe that they have the right to be Involved In the develop-
ment of educational policy as a result of their training and expertise.
Teachers give far less credence to the concept of management prerogatives
than do the employees In the private sector. To date, teachers and
school boards have not negotiated educational policies to any considerable
extent at the collective bargaining table. One of the main arguments
against the negotiation of education policies at the collective bargaining
table has been that many of the Issues such as curriculum are too complex
to be dealt with In this manner; rather, the trend has been to utilize
the collective bargaining process to establish mechanisms whereby these
Issues can be discussed outside the process. Most provisions In col-
lective bargaining agreements relate to the area of personnel policies
or working conditions.
While teachers are deeply concerned about enlarging their role In
educational policymaking, their prime concern is to improve their
economic status, and most observers believe they have been successful
in this respect. Most observers also hold that the process has been
of more assistance to teachers in the initial stages of collective
bargaining and may not have a long term effect on the economic
7status of teachers.
Collective bargaining has had and will continue to have a very
definite impact on the educational administrator. The many and
varied provisions contained in the negotiated agreements will require
a certain astuteness by the administrator if these provisions are to
be administered in a uniform and equitable manner. It is inevitable
that negotiated agreements will make the tasks of the administrator
more time consuming and demanding. The importance of administrative—
staff relationships with teachers will become even greater, for, as
previously stated, positive daily relationships are critical to the
successful negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. The
successful negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is very
important to the school administrator for when the two parties are having
difficulty negotiating an agreement the tension that builds up between
them influences the administrative-staff relationships negatively. As
set forth above, if the two parties are unable to reach an agreement,
impasse procedures are available to them. As with the other areas of
public sector employment, the most difficult question is how an
effective impasse procedure can be developed without giving teachers
the right to strike.
Collective Bargaining in New Hampshire
Public School Districts
As on the national scene, there was some collective bargaining
activity during the 1950’s, but the movement did not achieve major
importance until the latter part of the 1960’s. The teachers struck
in Manchester in 1968 and 1969. They struck in Nashua in 1970. The
8New Hampshire Education Association (NHEA) sponsored collective
bargaining workshops in 1970 and 1971 as a part of its efforts to
convince teachers that the collective bargaining process was the most
effective method of Improving both their economic and professional
status. The NHEA efforts paid dividends as teachers were able to
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the school boards in
Portsmouth, Peterborough, Keene, Derry and Goffstown during the early
1970's.
Also, in the early 1970’ s, the teachers in Salem and Farmington
conducted strikes. In both Instances, the main issue in the strike
was one of recognition in that neither of the struck school boards
were willing to negotiate with the teachers. The teachers in Salem
were successful in that the school board agreed to negotiate, and a
collective bargaining agreement was reached. The teachers in Farmington
were not successful in that although the school board agreed to negotiate
and an agreement was reached by the school board negotiators it was not
ratified by the school board. The longest and most bitter strike took
place in the Tlmberlane School District. The school board asked the
Rockingham County Superior Court to issue an injunction ordering the
striking teachers back to their classrooms. The court refused to issue
the Injunction, and, in so doing, stated that if it were to issue the
injunction it would be taking sides in a dispute that should be
settled between the parties. With the school board being unable to
obtain an injunction, and the two parties being unable to reach an
agreement, the strike continued. The school board then voted to dis-
continue negotiations and replace the striking teachers. At a special
9school district meeting in the spring of 1974. the school board asked
the citizens to support its position. The school board received an
overwhelming vote of confidence. The striking teachers were advised
that if they did not return to their classrooms by a certain date they
would be dismissed. Those teachers who did not return on the specified
date were dismissed. The NHEA protested the dismissals on the grounds
that the striking teachers could not be dismissed without a hearing
before an impartial tribunal; further, that the long and bitter strike
had engendered such bitter passions that the school board did not
qualify as an impartial tribunal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
stated that the school board was not disqualified from acting as it
did; further, that the teachers had violated the terms of their con-
tracts by striking and thus were not entitled to hearings before dis-
missal.
The many problems associated with the Timberlane strike provided
considerable support for the enactment of a collective bargaining
statute that would establish legal procedures for the public collective
bargaining process. The movement itself had been initiated in the 1960 's
by the New Hampshire Education Association. In 1973 both the New
Hampshire House of Representatives and Senate passed a public collective
bargaining bill, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Meldrin Thomson.
In 1975, however, a modified version of the 1973 bill was again adopted
by the New Hampshire legislature, and this bill was signed by the
Governor. Thus, Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 273-A Public
Employee Labor Relations became law.
10
Statement of the Problem
There is reason to believe that public sector unionism is a
strong social movement that will continue to grow. Robert Doherty
and Walter Oberer supported this contention when in 1967 they wrote
Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining
. They suggested
that the collective bargaining movement amongst public employees was
only in its infancy and they further held that the trend toward
formalizing the work relationship between public employers and public
employees would continue via collective bargaining agreements.^ Thomas
Brooks reiterated the contention expressed earlier by Doherty and
Oberer that collective bargaining in the public sector would be sure
to grow during the forthcoming decade. Brooks expressed the opinion
that the number of strikes would increase also, but that if the ex-
periences of the private sector repeated themselves both sides would
3learn to live with each other. Shortly thereafter Sterling Spero and
John Capozzola wrote the Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies
and concluded that the American labor movement had not experienced any-
thing comparable to the growth of public sector unionism since the early
1930's^
If public sector unionism is to reach the present status of private
^Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards,
and Collective Bargaining (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of
Industrial Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1967), p. 119.
^Thomas R. Brooks, Toil and Trouble; A History of American Labor
(New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), p. 321.
^Sterling D. Spero and John Capozzola, The Urban Community and Its
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Lab^r
Relations (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. lA.
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sector unionism, which is one in which both sides have learned to co-
exist then a concerted effort must be made on the part of both side,
to study and approach labor relations on a rational basis. They may
then move effectively to understand and Interact with each other.
The period of time immediately following the election of a union
as the exclusive bargaining agent for the professional employees of a
school district is generally very trying and difficult. On the one
hand, the school board is usually very concerned about maintaining
control of the school district's educational program and considers the
union to be a very real threat to this control. On the other hand,
many public employees initially think that the union will provide them
with the opportunity to solve all of the problems that they perceive
that they are having with management. School teachers in particular
see the union as the organization that will help them to protect their
professional status.^ With the very different expectations that the
public employers and the public employee unions have of the desirable
outcomes of the collective bargaining process, it is Important that
research provide information which will aid both groups to develop and
maintain reasonable positions. The importance of research in the area
of the status of public collective bargaining after the enactment of
bargaining legislation has been recognized with studies having been
conducted in the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Nebraska. In addition, a number of studies dealing specifically with
^Sumner Slichter, James Healey, and E. Robert Livernash, The
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C,;
The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 13.
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the scope of collective bargaining have been conducted.
Currently there is insufficient information relative to public
collective bargaining in New Hampshire. Whether there has been a
change in the number of exclusive bargaining agents or collective
bargaining agreements since the enactment of RSA 273-A is not known.
It is not known whether the number of professionally negotiated
collective bargaining agreements has Increased since the enactment of
RSA 273-A. Composition of the bargaining units as contained in the
recognition clauses of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A is not known. The informa-
tion necessary to assess the status of the scope of collective bargain-
ing before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A has not been gathered
and analyzed. Some school board members contend that school boards
should be more aggressive at the collective bargaining table in that
they shr*ild introduce their own proposals rather than simply react to
those introduced by the teacher associations or unions. Unknown also
is the extent to which school boards have Introduced their own proposals
neither is it known whether there has been a change in this practice
since the enactment of RSA 273-A. In school districts where collective
bargaining agreements have not been s-ettled prior to the annual school
district meeting, it is not known whether there have been changes be-
tween the negotiating positions held by the school boards prior to the
annual school district meeting and the position that they agreed to in
the collective bargaining agreements finalized subsequent to the
meeting.
13
The Public Employee Ubor Relations Board (PELRB) was established
to administer RSA 273-A. Despite the fact that all PELRB decision. «r.
published, if only in mimeographed form, except for newspaper accounts,
very little is known about the work of this Board. We do not know
whether there has been a change in the number or the type of cases that
have been heard by this Board. Neither is it known whether the de-
cisions of the Board have resulted in a change in the permissible scope
of collective bargaining. The purpose of the study will be to provide
data concerning the status of collective bargaining in New Hampshire
prior to and following the enactment of RSA 273-A that would be useful
to decision makers in New Hampshire.
A study of both the development and current status of collective
bargaining in New Hampshire is definitely needed if school board members
and teachers are to work effectively within the collective bargaining
process. This study will give a description of selected developments
which have occurred relative to collective bargaining in New Hampshire
public school districts before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A.
Significance of the Study
The data that will be compiled and considered in this study will
be helpful to the following organizations in assisting them to make
decisions relative to the collective bargaining process.
1. Local chapters of the New Hampshire Education Association and
the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers
2. Local school boards
3. New Hampshire Education Association
14
A. New Hampshire Federation of Teachers
5. New Hampshire School Administrators Association
6. New Hampshire School Boards Association
The data that will be compiled should further an understanding of
the implications and ramifications of the adoption of a public sector
bargaining statute. It should also provide information furthering a
general understanding of the collective bargaining process.
On a national basis some 204 dissertations have been written in
the area of collective bargaining since January 1970. Only two
dissertations have dealt with the Impact of collective bargaining in
educational decision making in New England. A number of studies dealing
specifically with the scope of collective bargaining have been conducted.
With the exception of one study that was conducted in Massachusetts, the
others studied the scope of collective bargaining in states outside of
the New England area. More importantly, this author could find no
record of any dissertations relating to any aspect of collective bar-
gaining in the three northern New England states. Assuming that the
socio-economic structure of the three Northern New England states is
different from that of other parts of the country, the need for a
collective bargaining study for at least one of these states becomes
apparent. The need is borne out also by the fact that relevant infor-
mation available to the author has been found solely in primary sources:
newspapers, New Hampshire Education Association newsletters. New Hampshire
School Boards Association newsletters, and interviews with Individuals
who have played significant roles in the collective bargaining process
as it has evolved in New Hampshire public school districts. No
15
bibliography relative to the subject of collective bargaining in New
Hampshire was found. All facts set forth herein were gained only after
many interviews and a thorough review and search of the above-mentioned
sources
.
The purpose of the author's research In the area of collective
bargaining in the public sector was not to convince school board
members that collective bargaining is good or bad, but rather to bring
the entire matter into perspective so that school board members will
accept collective bargaining as a fact of life; if this occurs, the
collective bargaining process should improve. Collective bargaining
is essentially a power struggle. From the school board members' view-
point, teacher power seems to be increasing at the expense of the school
boards'. This is inevitable in that the school board initially had all
of the formal power; if the power of the teachers is to increase, it
has to be at the expense of the present power structure.^
When teachers first organized for the purpose of collective
bargaining, many school boards were totally unprepared and even today
many school boards are unaware of the requirements and implications of
the collective bargaining process. Not only were school boards un-
prepared for collective bargaining, but, in addition, they found them-
selves negotiating from a defensive position because they lacked sound
personnel policies.^ There is a need also for teachers to put the
^Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, and Collective
Bargaining
,
p. 121.
^Edward Shils and E. Taylor l^ittler. Teachers. Administrators .
and Collective Bargaining (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968),
pp. 151-52; and Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, The Unions and
the Cities (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 120.
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collective bargaining process in its proper perspective, for initially.
they tend to expect more from the process than it is capable of deliver-
ing.
Limitations of the Study
The study will not test generalizable hypotheses or propositions
concerning collective bargaining in the United States because the
study is limited to New Hampshire.
This study is limited to the specific questions addressed. The
author does not imply that there have not been other changes before
and after the enactment of RSA 273-A. The author does not imply that
there is no other useful information about collective bargaining in
New Hampshire. Furthermore, the study is limited to the content of
collective bargaining agreements reviewed and does not include any
Information about the implementation of these agreements.
g
Charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman. The Impact of Negotia-
tions in Public Education; The Evidence From the Schools (Worthington,
Ohio; Charles A. Jones. Co., 1970), p. 69.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE
Collective Bargaining
Nature of the collective bargaining process . The workplace can be
viewed as a society, and as In any society It has a need for rules and
regulations. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, man-
agement formulates the rules and regulations, and has unrestricted
power. When the employees organize for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining, the power relationship within the organization Is altered
significantly for the employer Is no longer In a position to arbitrarily
establish rules and regulations. The employer must now negotiate the
rules and regulations of the workplace with the representatives of the
union.
^
Collective bargaining Is a continuous formal process between an
employer and a labor organization acting as the exclusive representa-
tive of a defined group of employees of the employer for the purpose
of regulating relations at the work place as well as establishing
2
wages and work standards.
^Edwln F. Beal, Edward D. Wickersham, and Philip K. Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1976), p. 7; and Slichter, Healey, and Livemash, The
Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management , pp. 4, 5, and 947-49.
^Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 2; and Beal, Wick-
ersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p. 1.
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In the management
-employee relationship, with one major
exception, management Is the Initiator. It Is management that acts
and the employees who react. The major exception occurs when a
union is established because It Is the union that initiates the
collective bargaining process. The fact that the employees organize
a union and negotiate a contract with their employer does not change
the individual work relationship that each employee has entered into
with the employer as that relationship was established between the
employee and the employer at the time that the employee was hired.
The union does not supply employees for the employer, and a new in-
dividual employment relationship is established between the employer
and the individual employee each time a new employee is hired. The
written document that is negotiated by the employer and the union is
a contract, the essence of which establishes rules governing the
3
employer’s work contract with the employees.
The primary purpose of collective bargaining is to negotiate a
written agreement to establish rules and regulations governing the
relationship between the employer and the employees; without such
agreement a workable relationship is well nigh impossible.^ The
actual negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, however,
is only one segment of the collective bargaining relationship. The
major aspect of the relationship is the day to day administration of
the work rules as contained in the collective bargaining agreement
^Ibld., pp. 61, 171, 204, 249 and 250.
^Ibld.
,
p. 17; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining,
p. 116.
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rtat has been negotiated. Managea.ent administers the work rules and
the union reacts to management's action when appropriate In the form
of a grievance when It feels that management has violated or misin-
terpreted a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. In this
country, the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements establish
a grievance procedure that culminates In binding arbitration, a process
that Is unique to the United States.^ The emphasis here Is on the
arbitration of grievances (rights arbitration) rather than on the
s^^bltration of contract terms.
As previously stated, the employment relationship is between the
individual worker and the employer; the collective bargaining agree**
ment is between the employer and the union which represents the
employees that are organized into a specific bargaining unit. If
individual employees were to bargain with the employer, the result
would too often reflect the disparity between the economic strength
of the individual employee and the employer. It is the ability of
the employees to engage in concerted action, particularly to strike
on the one hand and the ability of the employer to lock out the employees
on the other hand that is the major force driving the two sides toward
an agreement.^
Kenneth 0. Warner, ed.. Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service: Theoiry and Practice (Chicago: Public Personnel Association,
1967), pp. 68-69; and Slichter, Healey, and Llvernash, The Impact of
Collective Bargaining
,
p. 17.
^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , pp. 77, 133, and 192;
Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining ,
p. 203; Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., "The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions:
A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations , ed. A. Lawrence
Chickering (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976),
p. 53; and Wellington and Winter, The Unions and the Cities , p. 12.
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Collective bargaining Is a pragmatic process, and. therefore,
negotiators will use power when they think that they have it. and they
will tend to minimize the role of power when they think that they do
not have it.^ A union’s demands tend to be predicated upon its
assessment of its power relative to that of management. Management's
appraisal of its power position will influence the degree to which
it resists the union demands,^
As alluded to in the previous paragraph, power is the ability
to employ economic force. For the union, it is the ability of the
union leadership to obtain a strike vote from the union members and
to keep the members on strike for a period of time sufficient to win
major concessions from management. The union officials must analyze
carefully their ability to obtain a strike vote as well as the members'
ability to absorb the effects of a strike. Should the union leadership
miscalculate the situation and fail in their attempt to obtain a
strike vote from the rank and file members, management would be in
a stronger negotiating position than it was before the aborted strike
vote. The bargaining power of the union would also be weakened if
the membership was not willing to remain on strike for a period of time
sufficient to gain major concessions from management. In all proba-
bility. the employer would then be able to settle the dispute without
having to grant major concessions to the union. Additionally, this
would damage the credibility of the union officials, and their
^Davey. Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 97.
Q
Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
, p. 211.
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miscalculation would weaken also the union’s bargaining position in
the future whereas management would be less concerned about subsequent
strike threats. Finally, an unsuccessful strike tends to weaken the
loyalty and esteem given by union members to its leadership.
Power for management is the ability to withstand a strike or to
initiate a lockout. It is as Important that management analyze the
situation accurately as it is for the union leadership to do so. Man-
agement must consider the potential financial loss resulting from
customers who may choose to do business elsewhere as well as the financial
loss associated with non-production for the period of the shut down.
If management is unable to withstand a prolonged strike or to sustain a
pr'otracted lockout, its bargaining power will be weakened seriously, and
it probably will have to grant concessions to the union that it would
otherwise not have granted in order to settle the dispute. Manage-
ment's miscalculation probably will adversely affect its future
bargaining power as the union will not be as concerned about manage-
ment's ability to withstand a strike or a lockout.
There has been a great deal of discussion relative to the
Importance of the equality of power. Until the passage of the Wagner
Act in 1935, there was no procedural equality under the law between man-
agement and labor. The courts ruled in favor of the employer in labor
relation matters, and the unions were not allowed to use the procedures
necessary to establish themselves as equals with the employer. It
was the Wagner Act that brought procedural equality to labor relations.
As the years passed by and the strength of the unions grew, the Wagner
22
Act was looked upon as the legislation that tipped the balance of
power in labor's favor. The Taft-Hartley law. passed in 19A7. was
seen as an effort to redress the imbalance of power between labor
and management. It should be emphasized that federal legislative
efforts and public policy have been to establish procedural equality
and not substantive equality. The thrust has been to ensure that
both labor and management have equal opportunity under the law.
Tlieoretically
,
at least, the federal government has not attempted to
tip the scales in favor of either management or labor. While leg-
islation can be passed in an attempt to equalize power between labor
and management, it will not necessarily equalize power relationships
in specific situations. It is likewise not possible to assess the
power relationship in a specific situation solely thru the use of
general principles for they vary to such a degree from one situation
to another that it is all but impossible to assess unless one is direct-
ly involved in that situation.
In those situations where the balance of power is heavily tipped
in favor of one side, the astute negotiator will not use his or her
strength to destroy or take unfair advantage of the other side as he or
she knows that the power relationship is so fluid that the balance of
Q
Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 53; and Herbert
R. Northrop and Gordon F. Bloom, Government and Labor (Homewood, Illinois
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 75.
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 95; and Slichter,
Healey and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Managements
p. 6.
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power could turn very quickly in favor of the other slde.^^ However,
the ultimate strength of the parties will be reflected in the agreement.
While in most instances the party that has the greatest strength will
not try to take unfair advantage of the other side, the final provisions
of the contract will certainly be more favorable to the stronger of the
two parties. Preoccupation with the question of power can lead the
parties to forget the primary objective of collective bargaining which
is to negotiate an agreement that is mutually satisfactory. In fact,
when the negotiators are more concerned with reaching an agreement than
they are with which party has the most power, there is a much greater
possibility that the agreement will contain something of importance to
each side.
When the parties are not able to reach a settlement that is
mutually satisfactory, they find themselves at a point of impasse.
There are several ways of breaking the point of Impasse without having
to resort to economic force: mediation, fact finding, and binding
arbitration.
Mediation is a process whereby a neutral third party, most often
a government employee, becomes Involved in the collective bargaining
sessions. The mediator serves as a catalyst in assisting the parties
to reach a voluntary agreement. He or she cannot compel the parties
to reach an agreement for the only power that the mediator has is that
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 96.
^^Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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of persuasion. The mediator listens to what each side has to say. Tha
listening aspect of the mediation process can be psychologically very
valuable as it gives each of the negotiating parties an opportunity
to vent its hostility as well as to state its real feelings and
bargaining position. The skilled mediator can then assess the situation
and determine the real Issues that separate the two parties. It also
gives the mediator the opportunity to determine which of the members
of the negotiating teams if any are significant factors in the inability
1 1
of the two teams to reach an agreement.
If mediation is to be successful, the mediator has to establish
his credibility as a knowledgeable and astute practitioner of col-
lective bargaining. Additionally, he or she must possess a high degree
of skill at working with people in conflict situations. The mediator
must be more than just a listener. He or she must draw on his or her
knowledge for thoughts and suggestions as to how to bring the parties
together and oftentimes these suggestions must be put forward in such a
14
way that the parties think that they are their own.
Fact finding combines aspects of both the mediation and the
arbitration process. The fact finder, like the mediator, tries to
move the parties toward a voluntary settlement during the course of
the investigation that he or she conducts in determining the facts of
the situation. Like the arbitrator, the end result of the fact finder’s
^^Ibld., p. 201; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice
of Collective Bargaining , p. 209.
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 201; and Beal,
Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining, p. 209.
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work Is a report reflecting his or her opinion of a Just and reasonable
settlement. Fact finding Is still a voluntary process, however, as
the parties are free to accept or reject the fact finder’s report.
Fact finding is one of the procedures of the National Emergency Dis-
putes Provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, it is seldom used
to settle disputes in the private sector.
It is Important to note the distinction between binding and arbitra-
tion of grievances (rights arbitration) and binding arbitration of future
contract terms (interest arbitration). The former affects only the terms
and provisions of collective bargaining agreements that have already been
negotiated, and is a procedure that is found in most agreements. The
latter affects terms and provisions that have not been agreed to, and is
not a common procedure for settling disputes in the private sector.
Neither is it a common procedure for settling disputes in the public
sector. The parties that engage in voluntary arbitration agree to submit
their dispute to an arbitrator and further agree to be bound by the
decision of the arbitrator. The parties submitting their dispute to
compulsory arbitration do not do so of their own free will. They are
compelled to do so by the provisions of a statute or the regulations
governing the collective bargaining procedures under which the parties
are negotiating. Grievance arbitration is a quasi-judicial process.
The arbitrator conducts a hearing where he or she receives testimony,
offers of proof, and argument on the dispute. The arbitrator weighs the
^^Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargain-
ing
, p. A68; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p.
207.
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evidence, considers the argument, and renders an award which eEtablishes
the terms for the Issues In dispute.
In negotiating an agreement, the process of fact finding and
binding arbitration are not commonly employed In the private sector.
Both management and union prefer to utilize their respective economic
weapons of the lockout and the strike rather than allow a third party
to determine the contract terms. Binding arbitration relative to
the settlement of future contract disputes is not in keeping with the
spirit of collective bargaining as its goal is not a mutually accept-
able agreement. Although compulsory arbitration is considered
an anathema to both labor and management, and is not part of the
private sector indlstrial relations scene in the United States, it
has some prevalence in public sector employee labor relations as
discussed on page 48.
If one holds to the position that the essence of the impasse
procedure is to help the parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement,
then mediation is the most effective of the impasse procedures that
are available to the negotiating parties. It is the mediation process
that affords the disputing parties the best opportunity to work out a
mutually acceptable agreement that will allow them also to function
^^Beal, Wlckersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
, pp. 414-16.
^^Davev. Contemporary Collective Bargaining , p. 197; Slichter,
Healey, and Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Manage-
ment
, pp. 750 and 751.
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effectively within the workplace.^® In the final analysis,
it is not the procedure that is of utmost importance, but rather a
positive attitude on the part of both parties toward the collective
bargaining process. It must be an attitude that is based on a mutual
willingness to work toward an agreement.
When one or both negotiators are not negotiating in good faith,
it is often as a result of the constraints that have been placed upon
them by their constituents. The members of the negotiating teams
come to the collective bargaining table with the realization that
their agreement is only tentative because it must be approved by their
respective constituents. In this connection, it should be noted that
the members of the management negotiating team are in most Instances
more sure of their position than the members of the union negotiating
team. This is so because managerial authority flows from the top
management, and there are few people involved in the decision making
process relative to management’s collective bargaining position. On
the other hand, authority in a union flows from the rank and file
membership up to the leadership and members of the negotiating team.
All union officials, whether they hold office on the local, state,
or national level are elected by the membership or regionally elected
representatives of the membership.
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , pp. 197 and 207.
^^Ibid., p. 198; and George Meany, "Union Leaders and Public
Sector Unions," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations, ed. Chickering, p, 173.
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If one accepts the theory that all organizations exist for the
purpose of satisfying the collective needs of a specific group of
people together with the fact that all union leaders are elected, then
the responsiveness of the members of the union negotiating team and
the union officials to the desires of the membership becomes more
20
understandable. As with most groups of people, the memory of the
union membership is short lived, and as previously demonstrated,
effective union leadership will not guarantee automatic acceptance of
the most recently negotiated collective bargaining agreement by rank
and file voters. It is for this reason that the union must have an
agreement that the membership will ratify for no matter how economically
sound or fair the agreement may be, it will all be for naught if the
agreement is rejected by the membership. It is precisely because of
this political pressure on the union collective bargaining team that
the collective bargaining positions that are held to by the union
collective bargaining team are not always as economically sound as
21
management would like to see them.
History of the development of collective bargaining . The basis for
modern unionism can be traced back to the nineteenth centry and the
English Industrial Revolution whose effects were felt in the United
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice o f Collective
Bargaining, pp. 5 and 308; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Ba_^
gaining, p. 257.
^4bld., pp. 266 and 319; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining^, p. 307.
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States during the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to this time, American
society had been primarily agrarian. American industry consisted
mainly of light manufacturing and crafts. The vast majority of the
firms were small, and in many Instances the work was performed in the
home. As the American economy expanded, the craft unions continued to
grow. At the same time, however, the factory system was continuing
to grow rapidly and in fact replaced segments of the craft operations.
During this period, the Civil War significantly influenced the develop-
ment of the factory system because only through factory mass production
techniques could the large quantities of materials needed to supply the
armies of the North and South be produced.
In 1869 the Knights of Labor was founded in Philadelphia. By 1878
the Knights had become a national organization. The influence of the
Knights was short-lived, and their major impact was made in the rail-
road and mining industries. The effort of the Knights of Labor to
organize the factories ended in total failure. This failure occurred
because the Knights could not control hiring in the factories as they
could admission to the various craft unions. Consequently, the Knights
had no hold over the factory owner as the owner could simply go out
and hire large numbers of unskilled workers as he needed them,
the Knights of Labor movement was significant in that it awakened work-
ers to the potential of the union movement. As the Knights of Labor
movement lost its impetus in the late nineteenth century, Samuel Gompers,
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
, pp. 28 and 29.
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president of the Cigar Makers International Union, moved to consolidate
the power of the craft unions, and he put together an organization
that has lasted to this day, the American Federation of Labor.
Collective bargaining as we know it today had its origins with
the American Federation of Labor, but that organization did not attempt
to organize the semi-skilled or unskilled operatives. The International
Workers of the World did, however, and their major impact was in the
textile industry in Lowell and Lawrence, Massachusetts. However, as
with the Knights of Labor, the success of the Industrial Workers of
the World was also short lived. The experience of the Industrial
Workers of the World once again demonstrated that in order for the
industrial union movement to be successful in factories it was necessary
that a factory be organized as a whole and not in separate groups as
was the case with the craft unions. Furthermore, the entire working
force in the factory had to be organized within a very short period of
time. Experience had shown clearly on more than one occasion that un-
less this was done the factory owner would be able to replace the
24
striking workers with very little difficulty.
After the short lived success of the Industrial Workers of the
World in the early twentieth century, the industrial union movement
was dormant until the Great Depression of the 1930' s. It was a period
of time in which radical thoughts and movements were prevalent in the
^^Ibid., p. 33.
^^Ibld., p. 35.
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country. It was a period that saw the rapid growth of industrial
unionism as the semi-skilled and unskilled workers were organized by
the Congress of Industrial Organizations which put to good use what
experience had shown to be the essential elements in the unionization
of the factory; namely that the organization had to be total and
simultaneous so that the union controlled the physical access to the
factory. The union movement was accompanied by a considerable amount
of violence. In 1934 the longshoremen in San Francisco struck. The
police utilized mounted officers, tear gas, and fire hoses during the
course of the strike, and the workers fought back with rocks and bolts.
At the end of the strike, there were two dead and 67 injured. In the
fall of 1934, textile workers in North Carolina struck. Before it was
over, the strike involved workers from almost every textile center in
the nation, and at the peak of the strike approximately 376,000 workers
had left their jobs. During the course of the strike, ten people were
26killed and 27 were wounded. In 1937, 70,000 workers in the
Bethlehem, Republic, Youngstown Sheet & Tube and Inland steel plants
struck. During the course of the strike, 18 people were killed and
hundreds of others were wounded.
2 S
Irving Bernstein, A History of the American Worker 1933-1941;
Turbulent Years (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 274-75;
and Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars; From the Molly Maguires to the Sitdowns
(Garden City, New York; Doubleday & Company, Inc,, 1973), pp. 253-59,
^^Irving Bernstein, A History of the American Workers 1933-1941;
Turbulent Years
, pp. 309-15,
^
^Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars; From the Molly Maguires to the
Sitdowns
,
p. 319,
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The rapid growth of unionism in the private sector was aided
greatly by the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 which as previously
stated established procedural equality between management and labor.
It should be noted that the growth of unionism in the 1930' s was
confined to the private sector. The reasons why a similar growth
did not take place in the public sector were many and varied, not the
least of which was the fact that the Wagner Act did not extend to
public employment. The union movement in the private sector would
continue to grow in membership and strength. It has only been
since the latter part of the 1950's that interest in private sector
unionism as well as the number of private sector union workers began
to taper off and eventually decline. In 1976 approximately 22 percent
of the workers in the private sector were unionized. The spectacular
growth of unionism in the public sector has taken place during the
same time period as the decline of unionism in the private sector,
and in 1976 approximately 45 percent of the workers in the public
29
sector were unionized.
Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector
The labor organizers of the 1930's did not find the same fertile
field for the development of unionism in the public sector as they did
in the private sector. While the compensation of public employees
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
,
pp. 43-46.
^^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York; Thomas Y.
Crowell Company, 1966), pp. 377 and 394-97; and Beal, Wickersham, and
Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p. 451.
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during this and the succeeding decades was low in comparison to that
of employees in the private sector, public employees during this
period did have certain advantages that most private sector employees
did not have. Amongst the most prized advantages for public employees
were pensions and job security. These were certainly important to
workers who had lived through a period of high unemployment, and who
had only recently seen enactment of social security legislation.
Public employees were willing to trade higher wages for these other
more highly prized fringe benefits and working conditions.^®
A series of events took place after World War II that drastically
altered the complacent attitude of public employees. High inflation
31followed both World War II and the Korean War. The collective
bargaining process played a significant role in helping private sector
employees to secure pay raises that enabled them to maintain or Increase
their purchasing power during this period. Subsequent to World War II,
a tremendous demand for goods and services arose which resulted from
the return of the members of the armed services, the accumulation of
money during World War II by the consumers, and the end of rationing.
The demand for Increased services and production was not restricted
to the private sector. The public also wanted more from their national,
^®Sam Zagaria, "Introduction,” in Public Workers and Public Unions,
ed. Sam Zagaria (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice & Hall, Inc.,
1972), p. 1.
^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bur-
reaucracles; Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor Relations,
pp. 1-2.
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32state, and local governments.
In the 1950's and early 1960's public employees found themselves
In somewhat the same position as that of unskilled labor In the mid to
late 1930' s. The number of public employees had grown considerably and
their services were in greater demand. As collective bargaining was not
generally available to public employees, the pay increases that they re-
ceived during this period did not enable them to maintain their purchasing
power. Public employees were restricted to the lobbying process in their
efforts to secure salary Increases. Their lobbying efforts generally
were unsuccessful. This is usually the case in an economy that is
experiencing high inflation as a high inflation rate works against those
34
employees whose salary increases depend upon legislative approval.
Meanwhile, employees in the private sector were securing fringe benefits
comparable to those previously held, for the most part, only by public
employees. The gains made by private sector employees in the areas of
economics and fringe benefits were well noted by those who worked in
32
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and Michael J. Murphy (Berkeley, California: McCutchen Publishing Corp.,
1976), p. 16-18.
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Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
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Publ ic Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, p. 57; and Morton R.
Godine. The Labor Problem in the Public Service (New York; Russell and
Russell, 1967), pp. 131-32.
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35the public sector.
The tremendous growth In the number of public service workers
was accompanied by an ever increasing depersonalization in their
relationship to management. The rules and regulations that governed
the public work place as determined by management became even more
rigid. Public sector employees found that they had little if any
input as to the rules and regulations under which they worked. As is
common in a societal group that experiences rapid growth, the public
employees were filled with considerable unrest. At the same time, they
were dissatisfied because their working relationships with management
were becoming less personal. Finally, the influx of young males
served as a catalyst inasmuch as they were dissatisfied with their
economic lot and provided some of the leadership in the growing mil-
itancy amongst public sector employees. After many years of living
under the paternalistic system, a system which had not brought them
the economic gains that they felt they deserved, their trust and
37
reliance on the paternalistic system disappeared.
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,
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^^Wellington and Winter. "The Limits of Collective Bargaining In
Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, p. 55; Beal, Wickersham,
and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , pp. 450, and 453-54;
and Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service , p. 168.
^^Robert A. Nisbet, "Public Unions and the Decline of Social Trust,"
in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor
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,
ed. Chickering, p. 20; Tyler "Why They Organize, in Educaj^
tlon and Collective Bargaining: Readings, in Policy and Research, eds.
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 23; and Arnold M. Zack, Impasses, Strikes,
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While the public sector union movement did not become an Important
part of the American labor relations scene until the 1960'8. a number
of public employee unions had been in existence for many years. The
National Association of Letter Carriers of the U.S.A. was founded in
1889. The American Federation of Teachers, the International Associa-
tion of Fire Fighters, the American Federation of Government Employees,
and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
were founded in 1916, 1918, 1932, and 1936 respectively. However,
as recently as 1956, the membership of those unions numbered less than
one million, and the membership was composed mostly of blue collar
38craftsmen or postal employees. The growth of public sector unionism
received a significant impetus in the 1960 's from the executive and
judicial branches of the federal government. In 1962 President John
F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 which gave federal workers the
right to organize. The real importance of Order 10988 was that it gave
legitimacy to the union movement for federal employees. Actually, the
scope of negotiations permitted under Order 10988 was quite narrow;
it did not even allow the negotiation of wages. The ramifications of
Order 10988 were great. It served as a catalyst to the union movement
39
amongst state and particularly amongst local government workers.
Prior to the 1960 's, the courts had held that public employees did not
^®Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
,
p. 450; and Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining ,
p. 343.
^^Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining , pp. 341’-42,
37
have the constitutional right to Join a union/® m 1968 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit In Mc'Uuehlln v.
Tilendls held that the right of the individual to fora, and Join a union
was protected by the First Amendment. Subsequently, several other
circuit courts of appeal handed down similar rulings. As suggested
above, until these decisions, the courts had held that public employees
did not have the right to bargain with public employers in the absence
of an express statutory enactment. Following the Seventh Circuit
decision in Mc'Laughlin v. Tilendls
. however, the courts began to re-
verse their previous decisions. While all of the above was taking
place. Industrial union officials were being confronted with a loss
of Interest in the private sector union movement. Membership decreased
with an accompanying decline in the union treasuries. A natural
partnership arose out of the growing dissatisfaction of public em-
ployees and the unions desire for additional sources of revenue and
A 2for new worlds to conquer.
Public employees, then, have joined forces to form unions
primarily for the same reasons that people have worked together over
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the centuries. Aristotle brought this out when he stated in his
Politics that "man is by nature a political animal." His succinct
reflection applies here: man has a natural tendency to join with
others with whom he has common needs. Interests, and problems, etc.^^
The labor movement in the United States has not seen anything com-
parable to the recent growth of public sector unionism since the ex-
pansion of industrial unionism in the 1930 ’s. Actually, the growth
of public sector unionism has proceeded at an even more rapid pace
than the growth of industrial unionism for in less than two decades public
sector unions have organized forty-five percent of the potential
membership. To compare, unions in the private sector have organized
only twenty-two percent of the potential membership in more than four
decades. The greatest increase in public sector union membership has
AA
taken place amongst local public employees.
The discrepancy in the rate of growth is not the only difference
between public and private sector unionism. Another major difference
involves the issue of sovereignty and accountability. Publicly
elected and appointed officials take the position that they are
accountable to the public for the performance of the agencies under
^^Nisbet, "Public Unions and the Decline of Social Trust," in
Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor
Relations, ed. Chickering, pp. 13-15; and Tyler, "Why They Organize,
^
in Education and Collective Bargaining: Readings in Policy and Researc_h
eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 13.
^^Zagarla, "Introduction," in Public Workers and Public Unions, ed.
Zagarla, pp. 1 and 3; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community
and Unlo
_
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Ized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor
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_
s
,
p. lA; and Jack Stieber, Public Employee Unionism:
Structure, Grow th,
Policy (Washington, D.C,: The Brookings Institution, 1973;. p.
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their control. They also hold that the right of the public to the
services of these agencies Is paramount; that the Interests of those
who work for these public agencies Is subservient to the Interests of
45the public. The sovereignty Issue was one of the factors that
originally held back the growth of public unionism. Public management
refused to negotiate with public employees because it felt that as the
representative of the sovereign it did not have the right to share its
responsibilities and authority with employees. As a result of social
and political pressure, (which in part explains the decision in
Mc’Laughlin v. Tllendis considered above)
,
public sector management
gradually modified its position, and entered into collective bargaln-
46ing relationships with public employees.
Because of the sovereignty issue, the desire of many groups
of public employees to have a greater voice in the performance of
their duties, the issue of the scope of negotiations is a much more
involved issue in the public sector than it is in the private sector.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that collective
bargaining costs in the private sector are financial whereas collective
Theodore W. Kheel, "Introduction: Background and History," in
Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor
Relations
,
ed, Chickering, p, 1; Harvey C, Mansfield, Jr., "The Prestige
of Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis
in Public Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, p. 38; and Beal,
Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , pp.
457-58 and 464.
^^Ibid., pp. 458-59; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and
Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor
Relations, p. 192; and John W. Macy, "The Role of Bargaining in the Public
Service," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, pp. 8-9.
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bargaining costs in the public sector are political as well as
financial. Private sector management will view union demands solely
from the point of view of whether or not it will be able to meet the
costs of the union demands and still make a profit. Publicly elected
officials will view the cost Impact of union demands from their
perceived reaction of the various interest groups within their con-
stituency to such demands. In considering accession to union demands,
elected officials will weigh quite heavily how accession will effect
their chances for reelection. Additionally, in the public sector the
implications of demands are much more significant to the consumer as he
does not have the opportunity of acquiring the services from another
supplier. Public agencies tend to monopolize the particular service
that they deliver and, as many of the nonmonetary demands that are
made by public unions affect, or may appear to affect, either the
quality of the delivery of the service, accession to nonmonetary demands
47in the public sector then becomes a political issue.
The fact that public sector management modified its position on
the sovereignty issue and entered into collective bargaining relation-
ships with public sector employees should not be construed to mean
that management went from a position of refusing to negotiate with
the unions to a position of agreeing to negotiate any and all aspects
of the work relationship. Management for the most part has moved to a
^^Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations^ ed. Chickering, pp. 64-65.
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position whereby it defines scope of negotiations to Include only
economic matters, fringe benefits, and working conditions. A chief
area of controversy today is a definition of bargalnable "working
conditions." The union takes the position that any item or issue is
a proper subject matter for negotiations while public management takes
the position that only those matters that directly affect the well
being of the union members are negotiable. It is management’s con-
tention that those items that affect the manner in which the service of
the organization is delivered or the quality of that service are not
48proper subject matters for negotiations.
The concept of co-determination or the involvement of the em-
ployees in the determination of how and to what degree the service is
delivered has not been very prevalent in the private sector in the
United States. Employees in the private sector are concerned with
that which affects their material well being; as a result their
primary concern at the collective bargaining table is placed on what
are commonly referred to as "bread and butter Issues." The fact that
co-determination plays a much greater part in public sector collective
bargaining is attributable in large part to the greater number of pro-
fessionals engaged in public service who traditionally have always
had some role in determining the quality of service. While they are
concerned about economic benefits, as a result of their training and
concomitant commitment to professionalism they are concerned also
^®Spero and Capozzola. The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau:^
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations, p. 173.
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about the service that they provide, These employees believe that the
sharing of the expertise that they possess is critical to the develop-
ment of effective delivery systems to the public. They believe that
the refusal of public management to accept their expertise prohibits
them from exercising the professional responsibility that they have
49
to their clients.
In stating its position relative to the question of scope, public
management refers again to the concept of sovereignty. Management holds
that public service is^ provided for the direct or indirect benefit of
all segments of society; this being so, the service should not be
controlled by any specific group, especially the one that has more of
a vested interest in the service than any other group. As stated
previously, it is management’s position that only economics, fringe
benefits, and those working conditions that directly affect the material
well-being of public employees are proper matters for the collective
bargaining table.
Despite the sovereignty doctrine, the tendency over the years
has been for the definition of scope to become increasingly broader;
consequently, far more items are accepted today as proper subjects for
the collective bargaining table than was the case previously. The
^^Ibld., p. 193; Zagaria, "Introduction,” in Public Workers and
Public Unions
,
ed. Zagaria, p, 2; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast,
The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p, 463,
^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau-
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations, p, 194,
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reasons for this are many and varied. The negotiating parties have
come to realize that a much more effective solution is achieved if
they are able to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Management
has come to realize that the continued reliance on a management's rights
clause is unrealistic; further, that the scope of collective bargaining
must provide a broad enough channel to encompass the areas of employee
dissatisfaction. In many instances, the issue is no longer whether or
not professionals should be involved in the decision making process of
the agency they represent, but rather by what method they should be
Involved . ^ ^
As management became more experienced at the negotiations table,
it came to realize that it was not easy to define in a precise manner
those areas that are or are not bargalnable. As a result of this
growing uncertainty as to whether or not certain Issues were bargain-
able, management became less inclined to risk major confrontation over
the question of whether or not a particular item was a proper subject
52
matter for the collective bargaining table.
The scope of collective bargaining grew as management became
willing to negotiate a specific item or issue in return for a concession
^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," in Public Workers
and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 121; Wellington and Winter, The
Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public
Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Rela tion's,
ed. Chickering, pp. 51 and 66; and Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Con^
munity and Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor
Relations
,
p. 191.
^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau-
cracles: Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations, p. 191.
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from the union. The most common example of this would be management's
willingness to agree to nonmonetary issues in return for the union's
agreement to a lower wage scale. In many small communities, the trade
off of nonmonetary items for monetary concessions represents a politi-
cal decision as it would seem to be politically more expedient to win
monetary concessions in exchange for nonmonetary items the implications
of which many people initially would not fully or even partially com-
prehend .
Scope is not the only area in public sector collective bargaining
over which there has been a considerable degree of uncertainty. Another
vexing question is who speaks for management. As a result of the
separation of powers and checks and balances system, those who represent
the executive branch in the public sector do not speak with the same
authority at the bargaining table as those who represent management in
the private sector. The monies that are necessary to fund a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by the executive branch must be
appropriated by the legislative branch. Therefore, public sector
management cannot reach an agreement at the collective bargaining table
with the same degree of finality as private sector management. In
those Instances where the executive and legislative branches have
worked well together, there has been a minimum of uncertainty and
difficulty. However, when such cooperation does not exist, there have
been occasions in which the legislative bodies have refused to
appropri-
ate the necessary monies to fund the collective bargaining
agreements.
Situations wherein the two governmental branches are not working
well
45
together may present the union with an opportunity to Improve its
position by negotiating a better contract with the legislative branch
53
after it has already reached an agreement with the executive branch.
Perhaps the most vexing question of all in the area of public
sector collective bargaining is the right to stike issue. Public
employers contend that a strike is a direct act of defiance against the
state. They contend that the essence of statehood is that the authority
of the state is greater than any of the agencies or departments that
are utilized by the state to provide services to its citizens. If the
employees of these agencies or departments are allowed to challenge the
54
state, the very essence of statehood is challenged.
In the public sector, the more essential the service the greater
the pressure the public will impose on the political leaders to settle
the strike no matter the economic costs. A strike in the public sector
55
then becomes a political weapon rather than an economic weapon.
Public employers contend that public employees already have a
considerable
^^Arvid Anderson, "The Structure of Public Sector Collective
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amount of political influence simply because of their large numbers.
Public employers maintain that the power that would be acquired by
public employees as a result of being given the right to strike when
combined with the power that they already have as a result of their
lobbying efforts would give public employees a disproportionate amount
, 56
of power.
Public employers believe that collective bargaining in the public
sector can be effective without the right to strike. They cite the
tremendous growth of public sector unionism itself as proof of their
position. Public employers contend that while public employees do not
have the right to strike, they do have the power to strike. It is
management's knowledge that public employees may strike, albeit illegal-
ly that keeps the public employer at the collective bargaining table
in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. As proof
of their position, public employers cite the tremendous increase in the
number of strikes during the last two decades; further, that the majori-
ty of these strikes have resulted in little or no legal retribution.
Public employee unions contend that the right to conduct a legal
strike is essential to the collective bargaining process, for it la the
^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau-
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations , p. 190; and Wel-
lington and Winter, "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public
Sector Labor Relations , ed. Chickering, pp. 67-69.
^^Kheel, "Introduction; Background and History," in Public E^mployee
Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations, ed.
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, pp, 450 and 459; and Davey, Contemporary Collective
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,
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ever threatening presence of a strike that keeps management at the
bargaining table, striving to reach an agreement. They believe that
there is a considerable difference between the power to strike and the
right to strike. It is their opinion that the latter involves a much
greater risk, and as a result their members are much more hesitant to
58
strike. Public employee unions believe that public employers have
relied far too heavily on the sovereignty doctrine. They contend that
there are very few governmental functions that are truly sovereign in
59
nature. They cite situations where public employees are performing
functions that are quite similar if not identical to that performed by
private sector employees. As the private sector employees have the
right to strike and public employees do not, it is the contention of
the public employee unions that their members are being treated as
second class citizens.
In the last few years, a number of state governments have agreed
with the position of public employee unions as by 1975 six states
had granted public sector employees the right to strike. In most
instances, the right to strike is qualified in that the negotiating
parties must first utilize all aspects of the impasse procedure.
Only after the public employer has rejected the report of the fact
^®Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Union ized Bureau-
cracies: Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations , pp. 8-9; and Beal
Wlckersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining, p, 459
^^Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service; A Study in
Political Pluralism, p. 30.
A8
finder may the public employees exercise the right to strike. The
right to strike in these states is further qualified by the fact
that it is not granted to those public employees who perform a service
that is essential to the public welfare and safety, l.e. fire and
14 60police.
In that the movement to grant public employees the legal right
to strike has made slow progress, public employee unions contend that
public employers have a moral obligation to cooperate in the develop-
ment of alternatives to the right to strike, i.e. binding arbitration
of future contract terms.
The search for alternatives to the right to strike is but one
example of the Issues currently facing public sector collective bar-
gaining. The scope of collective bargaining is still an unresolved
issue because as the public employee unions have become more satisfied
with their economic gains, they have turned to involvement in the
resolution of policy matters. One of the policy Issues that has become
increasingly Important to the public sector unions in the last few
years has been that of job security. The combination of the economic
problems that are presently facing the United States together with the
increasing tax rates of the local, county, state and federal governments
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
, pp. A88-89.
^^Kheel, "Introduction; Background and History," in Public
Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations,
ed, Chickering, p. 10; and Macy, "The Role of Bargaining in the
Public
Service," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 17.
have resulted in a growing taxpayer's revolt. Public employee unions
are well aware that the taxpayer's revolt has and will result in per-
sonnel reductions, and consequently, they are insisting that layoff and
recall procedures favorable to present union members be included in
their collective bargaining agreements.
The growth of public sector unionism is one of the more signifi-
cant developments that came out of the rising spirit of disobedience
in which this country found itself engulfed during the 1960's. The
atmosphere at this time was one of protest against traditional authority,
and it was a period of time in which public employees found the courage
62to question the concept of sovereignty. The movement is significant
by the very fact that it involves those people who are employed by the
public. Even if this were not the case, the movement would still be
significant because of the sheer number of people involved. The
number of public employees who belonged to labor organizations was
less than one million in 1955. During the next decade, this number had
Increased to one and one half million, and by 1975 the number of public
employees who belonged to labor organizations had grown to approximately
six million. This same period of time saw a tremendous Increase in the
number of people in the public sector as the public payroll increased
from six million employees in 1950 to ten million in 1965, and
^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," in Public VJorkers
and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 101; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban
Community and Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Labojr
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,
pp. 8 and 9; and Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast, The Practice
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approximately 3.6 million of the four million new employees were
employed by state and local governments,^^
Collective Bargaining In Education
The public demand for more governmental services or benefits was
typified by the G.I. Bill of Rights and the large number of returning
servicemen after World War II who took advantage of the Bill. Educa-
tion was becoming more important in the minds of the American people.
Many saw education as the passport to the good life. Additionally,
education had become more important because of the need to provide
skills and training for a rapidly expanding economy. This increased
emphasis on the importance of education was coupled with a tremendous
growth in school enrollment. The post-war baby boom would mean also
a rapid rise in the number of people employed by the local school
.
64districts
.
The biggest success of public unionism took place amongst local
government employees, and it was in education that the major share
of this increase took place. During the 1966-1967 school year, 1,531
collective bargaining agreements were in existence covering 609,304
fi ^
Ibid., p. 450; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations ,
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public school teachers. Within four years, the number of collective
bargaining agreements Increased to 3,522 and the number of public
school teachers covered by these agreements Increased to 1,337,146.^^
Teachers, together with other public employees, were dissatis-
fied with their wages. The teacher union movement was influenced by
the significant wage gains made by blue collar workers and also by
the teachers' Inability to obtain salary Increases comparable to the
rising cost of living. During the period 1960-1967, the average
annual salary Increase of teachers was 4.5%. This increase was actually
less than what it had been between the years 1947-1960. The two fore-
most and immediate goals of teachers as they organized for the purpose
of collective bargaining were to improve their economic status and
to establish a power position from which they would be able to retain
their improved economic status.
Another very significant cause of teacher militancy was
Zagaria, "Introduction," in Public Workers and Public Unions ,
ed. Zagaria, p. 3; and Frederick R. Livingston, "Collective Bargaining
and the School Board," in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed.
Zagaria, p. 63.
J. Fox and E. E. Johnson, "Unionization of Professionals:
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Sector Vol. 4, No. (1975): 413-14; Myron Lieberman and Michael H.
Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers (Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1966), p. 57; Moore, "Comment on Collective Negotiations and
Teachers," in Education and Collective Bargaining; Readings in Policy
and Research, eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 248; Thomas Michael Love,
"The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System Decision Making,"
(Ph.D. thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1968), p. 7; Doherty and Oberer,
Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining , p. 21; Patrick W.
Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Values: Differences in Collective
Negotiations," in The Collective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education,
eds. Patrick W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin, (Worthington, Ohio;
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dissatisfaction with the traditional power structure as found In
education. After many years of living under a paternalistic system,
a system which had not brought them the voice In their profession that
they felt they deserved, their trust and reliance In the system dis-
appeared. The dissatisfaction with the power structure became In
creaslngly more acute during the post-war period as the rapid Increase
In the number of personnel employed In education brought with It more
rigid and Impersonal work regulations. At the same time, the relation-
ship between school teachers and school administrators became even
less personal. The belief that teachers should have a greater voice
In their profession slowly evolved Into one of the goals of collective
bargaining.
Another social factor that substantially contributed to the
development of the collective bargaining movement In the 1960 ’s was
Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 24-27; and Perry and
Wlldman, The Impact of Negotiations In Public Education; The Evidence
From the Schools (Worthington, Ohio; Charles A. Jones Publishing Co.,
1970), pp. 14-15.
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the fact that a greater number of males began to choose education as
a career. In 1925 males accounted for 17% of the work force in
education but by 1965 this figure had Inceased to 35%. It was the
male teachers who provided much of the union leadership. As the prin-
cipal wage earners of their families
,
males were more concerned about
their economic status than married female teachers who at that time
regarded their salaries as a supplement to the family income.
While it was not until the 1960’s that collective bargaining
became a nationally significant force in public education, the actual
commitment to the movement was made by the American Federation of
Teachers during the 1950 's.^^ The movement was slow in developing.
Teachers had to be convinced that collective bargaining was a legiti-
mate process for public employees to utilize and that it could be
effective in helping them to achieve their goals. In 1961, an election
was held to determine whether the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
or the National Education Association (NEA) would be the exclusive
bargaining agent of the teachers in New York City. The AFT won the
^^Engel, "Teacher Negotiation: History and Comment," in Education
and Collective Bargaining: Readings in Policy and Research, eds.
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 23; Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Values:
Differences in Collective Negotiations," in The Collective Dilemma^
Negotiations in Education , eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 28; Perry and
Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence
From the Schools
, pp. 14-15; and Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School
Boards, and Collective Bargaining , p. 21.
^^Perry and Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Educa-
tion: The Evidence From the Schools, pp. 14-15.
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election. The subsequent declaration of the AFT as the exclusive
bargaining agent for the teachers In New York City, and the success
of that organization In helping those teachers to achieve their goals
represented the first major break through In the collective bargaining
movement In public education.
The remainder of the decade was to be a period of Intensive
organization on the part of both the AFT and the NEA. The AFT was
assisted by organized labor In Its efforts as Is demonstrated by the
fact that the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organization (AFL-CIO) donated $362,000.00 to the AFT during the
period 1963-1965 and the sum of $1,200,000.00 during the period
72
1961-1968. The AFT’s first major victory was the New York City
election. Others were to follow, as the AFT successfully organized
other large cities such as Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, and
Cleveland. The AFT built its national membership from approximately
fifty thousand to over two hundred and fifty thousand. While the
majority of the AFT membership is located in large cities, the AFT
has also won elections In smaller cities such as Newark, New Jersey
^^Moore, "Comment on Collective Negotiations and Teachers," in
Education and Collective Bargaining: Readings In Policy and Research,
eds . Cresswell and Murphy, p. 247; and Fox and Johnson, Unionization
of Professionals! What Can We Expect?", p. 413.
^^Perry and Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations In Public Educa-
tion: The Evidence From the Schools , pp. 10-11; Doherty and Oberer,
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Collective Bargaining: Readings in Policy and Research, eds. Cresswell
and Murphy, p. 249.
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and towns such as Pembroke, New Hampshire^^
the early 1960 s, the NEA had maintained a policy against
both strikes and militant unionism In an effort to maintain a pro-
fessional Image; however. It then saw Itself threatened by a much more
nillltant AFT which was by no means reluctant to assume a strong union
posture. The threat of the AFT to the NEA was acutely felt by the
latter organization when the AFT won the New York City election.
As a result of the Imposing presence of the AFT, pressure from
Its own NEA membership, and a realization that the AFT methods produced
better results than Its own, the NEA began to change Its posture on
collective bargaining. By the mid 1960's, It no longer opposed
strikes, and although It still attempted to maintain Its position of
professionalism, there was little difference between the two organiza-
tions In regard to the tactics employed to win recognition and con-
74
cessions from school boards.
^^Adolf Sturmthal, ed. White Collar Trade Union s (Urbana,
Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 352-54; J. Douglas
Muir, "The Tough New Teacher," In The collective Dilemma: Negotiations
In Education, eds. Carlton and Goodwin, pp. 42-43; Moore, Comment on
Collective Negotiations and Teachers," In Education and Collective
Bargaining: Readings In Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
p. 255; and Perry and Wlldman, The Impact of Negotiations In Public
Education: The Evidence From the Schools, pp. 12-13.
^^Mulr, "The Tough New Teacher," In The Collective Dilemma:
Negotiations In Education , eds. Carlton and Goodwin, pp. 35-39,
Sturmthal, ed. White Collar Trade Unions , pp. 352-54; Spero and
Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureaucracies:
Pressure
Politics In Local Government Labor Relations , p. 31; Doherty
nhnrpr. Teachers. School Boards, and Colli^lve Bargaining, pp. 21 and
35; and Beal, Wlkersham, and Klenast, The Practlc^of
Collective B^
gaining
,
p. 489.
56
The power struggle between the NEA and the AFT was a major
factor in the growth of militancy amongst teachers. As pointed out
previously, if one accepts the premise that organizations exist for
the purpose of satisfying the collective needs of a specific group of
people, then elected union leaders must respond to the needs and
desires of the union membership in the collective bargaining pro-
cess. The need of the NEA and the AFT to be responsive to the wishes
of its respective members added to the desire of each organization
to Increase its power base by increasing its membership resulted in
constant escalation of union demands at the collective bargaining
table. It was a contest in which each side was determined to prove
to teachers that it was the more effective collective bargaining
,
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agent
.
The struggle between the NEA and the AFT and the concomitant
escalation of demands is one of the reasons why the scope of collective
bargaining is a more controversial question in education than it is
in the private sector. In their efforts to meet the needs of their
members and to convince other teachers that they should Join their
organization, both the AFT and the NEA have taken the position that
any item or issue that affects the educational process is a proper
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 5 and 308; Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining,
p. 257; Lieberman and Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers , p.
58; Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Values: Differences in Collective
Negotiations," in The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in EducaUqn,
eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 27; and Perry and Wildman, The Impa_cjt
of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence From the Schoo_U,
p. 14.
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matter for collective bargaining. The AFT took the position that the
scope of collective bargaining is unlimited as early as 1965, and the
NEA took this position at approximately the same time. Both organiza-
tions recognized that the question of professional dignity was extremely
important to teachers. Professional dignity is much more important
to teachers than it is to industrial workers. Teachers, as a result
of their training and concomitant commitment to professionalism are
concerned about the service that they provide. They believe that the
sharing of their expertise is critical to the development of effective
delivery systems to the public. They believe that the refusal of
public management to accept their expertise prohibits them from
exercising the professional responsibility that they have to their
clients. Thus, teachers are less persuaded by the argument of manage-
ment prerogative than are Industrial workers.
Proponents of a broad scope of collective bargaining in education
state that teachers have the expertise and interest which entitles
them to a role in determining policy matters. They further state
^ Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System
Decision Making," pp. 175 and lA-15; Doherty and Oberer, Teachers,
School Boards, and Collective Bargaining , pp. 145 and 502; John H.
Metzler, "The Need for Limitation Upon the Scope of Negotiations in
Public Education, I," in Education and Collective Bargaining: Readings
in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 37; Spero and
Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure
Politics in Local Labor Relations , p. 193; Zagaria, ’ Introduction,
in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, p. 2; Beal, Wickersham,
and Kienast. The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p. 463; and Robert
E. Doherty, "Labor Relations Negotiators on Bargaining: Factories vs.
the Schools," in The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education,
eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 221.
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that the public Is better served by a broad scope as this allows the
public to take advantage of the teachers expertise, and that it is In
the best interests of the public for public policy to be developed by
all of the concerned parties.
Proponents of increased teacher participation state that the
school board which stands firm behind the concept of management
prerogative will create considerable resentment on the part of the
teachers; that teachers who are denied the opportunity to participate
in the development of policies, especially those policies that pertain
to professional matters, tend to be more militant. Those school
boards that pay particular attention to the specific professional
concerns and needs of the staff members in their employ reduce con-
siderably the degree of militancy amongst their staff members. It
is in the area of professional autonomy and not the area of bread
and butter issues that the majority of the most bitter union-school
78
board disputes have taken place.
Llebermnn and Moskow, Collectlvo Ni^got Int Iona for Tearhorw ,
p. 24A; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau-
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations , p. 175; Doherty
and Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, and Collective Bargaining , pp. 90-
91; and John H. Metzler, "The Role of Management in Negotiations," in
The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education , eds. Carlton and
Goodwin, p. 98.
^^Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System
Decision Making," p. 8; Metzler, "The Role of Management in Negotia-
tions," in The Collective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education . Carlton
and Goodwin, eds. p. 98; Joseph A. Alutto and James A. Belasco,
"Determinants of Attitudlnal Militancy Among Teachers and Nurses,"
in Kducation and Collective Bargaining; Readings in Policy and R^
soarcli, eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 91; and Beal, Wickersham, and
Kicnast, The Practice of Collective Bargaining , p. A89.
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Initially many school boards relied solely on the sovereignty
issue in their efforts to restrict the scope of collective bargaining.
As time passed, sovereignty became less of a viable defense, and as
a result of political and social pressure, the scope of collective
bargaining began to expand. The principal reason given for attempting
to restrict the scope of collective bargaining has now become the
thought that it is not realistic to discuss many Issues at the
collective bargaining table because of their complexity. Consequently,
many teacher unions and school boards have begun to look at collective
bargaining as a process that could be utilized to develop a mechanism
whereby the more complex Issues could be discussed outside of the
79
collective bargaining process.
The argument was now put forward that the mere fact that issues
other than economic and fringe benefits were being discussed at the
collective bargaining table did not mean that the school boards were
capitulating on the question of scope. It did not mean that school
boards were relinquishing all of their rights but simply that they
should not refuse to listen to the concerns of the teachers on the
basis of management prerogative. Often, whether or not a school board
is willing to discuss items that are not considered to be subject
^^Beal, Wickersham, and Kicnast, The Practice of Collective
Bargaining
, pp. 458-59; Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community
and
Unionized Bureaucracies; Pressure Politics In Local Government LajLqf
^
Relations, p. 192; Macy, "The Role of Bargaining in the Public Service,
in Public Workers and Public Unions , ed. Zagaria, pp. 8 and 9,
T.<phprmnn and Moskow. Collective Negotiations for Teacher^, p. 244;
and Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System
Decision
Making," p. 21.
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to mandatory bargaining depends on the school board's perception of
the union as a nuisance or as an organization with which the school
board can work to bring about improvements in the educational program
J
In spite of all of the opposition, the scope of collective
bargaining in education has grown, and may be broader than in any
other area of the public sector. Furthermore, the scope of collective
bargaining in education is likely to continue to grow. As concessions
are granted in one community it becomes more difficult for the
neighboring communities to resist similar demands. A study by
Ronald Fitzgerald of some 129 Massachusetts comprehensive collective
bargaining agreements gives further proof to the statement that
scope of collective bargaining has grown in that the study reveals
that there are very few areas related to the operations of the schools
that are not covered in one or more of the agreements that were
analyzed.®^
The ultimate goal of both the NEA and AFT is to secure a real
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Engel, "Teacher Negotiation; History and Comment," Education
and Collective Bargaining; Readings in Policy and Research, eds.
Cresswell and Murphy, p. 29; Doherty and Oberer, Teachers, School
Boards, and Collective Bargaining
,
p. 192; and Lieberman and Moskow,
Collective Negotiations for Teachers
,
p. 359.
®^John Linn and M. Chester Nolte, "Collective Bargaining Legls
lation in Education," The Collective Dilemma; Negotiations in Educa-
tion
,
eds. Carlton and Goodwin, pp. 6-7; Livingston, "Collective
Bargaining and the School Board," Public Workers and Public Unions ,
ed. Zagaria, p. 68; Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on
School System Decision Making," p. 94; and Ronald Fitzgerald,
"Guidelines for Negotiating Teams Interested in Facilitating Improve
ments in Educational Programs," (Ed.D. dissertation. University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, 1971), pp. 3-4.
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voice for their members in the development of the policies that govern
the operation of the public schools. It is inevitable that a shift in
power will take place because prior to the advent of collective
bargaining school boards by law held most of the power, although in
many communities much of it may have been controlled by the school
superintendents. Administrators and school boards had both the
practical power and the legal right to make unilateral decisions while
the teachers could only submit proposals to express their concerns and
needs. The administrators and school boards could accept or reject
82
them as they saw fit.
With the advent of collective bargaining the teachers were
given a share in decision making. One of the most immediate practical
effects of collective bargaining was to give teachers a degree of
control over managerial decisions and to assure teachers access to the
decision making process. The collective bargaining process has very
definitely affected the working conditions of the teachers; for as
stated previously, it has given teachers an opportunity to be a party
to determining their working conditions whereas this determination had
prior to collective bargaining been the exclusive prerogative
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of the school board.
^^Doherty and Oberer, Teachers. School Boards , and Collectiye
Bargaining, pp. 90-91, and 121; and Perry and Wildman, The^
Impact p_f
Negotiations in Public Education; The Evidence From the Schoo_ls. p.
68
.
®^Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School
System
Decision Making," p. 8; and Perry and Wildman, The Impact
of
tions in Public Education; The Evidence From the Schools, pp.
222-23.
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As this sharing of power is new to both the teachers and the
school boards* both must be careful that they understand fully the
Implications of any action that they take in their new relationship.
There is a tendency on the part of the teachers to expect too much
from the collective bargaining process. Many see the process as their
opportunity to satisfy all of their grievances and correct all of the
Inequities in the system. Teacher expectations of the collective
bargaining process are greater in those systems where they previously
had little or no power. As a correlative, there is a tendency on the
part of school boards to view collective bargaining as a threat.
The school boards that are threatened the most by collective bargain-
ing are found in those school districts where teachers had little or
8A
no involvement prior to collective bargaining.
Thomas Love's study further brings out the fact that collective
bargaining has had its greatest impact in the area of working con-
ditions. Approximately 90-95% of the provisions contained in the 176
comprehensive agreements that he analyzed dealt with personnel
policies. The results of this study indicated also that the impact
of collective bargaining as far as the negotiations of educational
policy at the collective bargaining table and the subsequent Inclusion
of educational policies in collective bargaining agreements had been
insignificant. Although Love found the Involvement of the teachers in
policy development at the collective bargaining table to be insignifi-
cant, he also found them to be very involved thru mechanisms that had
84
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been established outside the collective bargaining process. The
most common method of teacher involvement was found to be in the form
of recommendations thru committees that had been established by the
administration. The most significant limitation of this process is
the fact that it is only advisory. As a result. Love concluded that
in the long run this process would not result in a meaningful change
in the power structure. Fitzgerald supported the position of Love
and others that the collective bargaining process is not commonly
used to discuss such items as curriculum development because of
their complex nature. He considered collective bargaining to be a
problem solving process. However, as all problems cannot be solved
quickly or even anticipated it is not possible to find the solutions
to all of the problems at the collective bargaining table. Therefore,
it is Fitzgerald's contention that the collective bargaining process
should be utilized to define a decision making process which would
85
provide for meaningful teacher involvement.
Fitzgerald's analysis of the public school collective bargain-
ing agreements that had been negotiated in Massachusetts for the
1968-1969 school year disclosed that 46% of the collective bargaining
agreements that had been negotiated in school districts with an
enrollment of 1,000 or more pupils specified a process for teacher
involvement. One of the many examples of teacher involvement is
85,
^Love, "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School System
Decision Making." pp. 183. 47. 68. 71. 149. and 157; and Fitzgerald.
"Guidelines for Negotiating Teams Interested In Facilitating
Improve-
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found in the collective bargaining agreement between the Philadelphia
teachers and the Philadelphia Board of Education which specifies
that the superintendent of schools meet with teachers at least once
86
a month to discuss educational policy.
Thomas Love found that the scope of collective bargaining did
in fact become broader In those school districts where the teachers
utilized the collective bargaining process and, furthermore, that the
scope of collective bargaining became even broader in those school
districts in which a collective bargaining agent had been designated
as the exclusive representative of the teachers. Both Love and Shlls
concluded that those contracts that had been negotiated by the AFT
were more comprehensive than those negotiated by the NEA. It is
Love's opinion that greater emphasis will be placed on negotiating
educational policy at the collective bargaining table as the teachers
learn to use the collective bargaining process more effectively.
However, Perry and Wlldman contend that the improvement of their
.
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economic status will still be the main concern of teachers.
It would appear that the collective bargaining process has at
least had a short terra effect in helping teachers to improve their
economic status. Part of the difficulty in assessing the contribution
®^Ibid., p. 79; and Shils and Whittier, Teachers, Administrators,,.
and Collective Bargaining , p. 235.
®^Love "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School
System
Decision Making." pp. 173-7A. 186, and 38; Shils Teachers
Adml
^
Istrators, and r-nllective Bargaining , p. 144;
The tepaci o f Necotiatlons in Public Education; The
Evidence From tjje
Schools
,
p. 129.
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of collective bargaining in the salary area is that the United States
experienced a teacher shortage for a number of years. During this
time, education officials were working extremely hard to Increase
salaries in order to retain and attract quality teachers. This latter
fact was probably as responsible as collective bargaining for increas-
ing salaries during the 1960 's and the early part of the 1970' s.
Fitzgerald concluded that pay increases in the initial agreements were
ten to twenty percent higher because of the collective bargaining
process. Perry and Wildman support Fitzgerald's conclusion that
initially collective bargaining was instrumental in bringing about
higher salaries whereas they believe that larger salary increases are
given to those public sector groups that are able to apply the most
pressure. Many economists also contend that the union impact on
88
wages is likely to be more significant in the initial agreements.
Salary Increases have a very definite impact on the quality of educa-
tional programs. Fitzgerald found that the additional salary increases
granted in the 1966-1967 agreements were compensated for by utilizing
new revenues and by making minor economies. Furthermore, that salary
Increases in the 1967-1968 agreements were paid for by liquidating sur-
pluses and reductions in the educational programs. Perry and Wildman
®®Fltzgerald, "Guidelines for Negotiating Teams Interested in
Facilitating Improvements in Educational Programs, pp. 3-4; Perry and
Wildman. The Impact of Negot iations in Public Educat ion; The Evldenc_e
From the Schools, pp. 134 and 162-63; and David B. Lipsky and John
E. Drotning, "The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers
Salaries in New York State," in Education and Collective Bargaining
Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy, pp.
425-
26.
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also support the idea that there were no significant increases
in the amounts of money raised by communities to support the salary
Increases; rather they concluded there was a reallocation of re-
89
sources
.
The most commonly held opinion appears to be that with the
exception of the initial agreements, the collective bargaining process
has not been of significant assistance to teachers in their efforts
90
to improve their economic status. When teachers first began to
use collective bargaining to improve their economic status, the pres-
sure that they exerted against school boards was not met with an
equivalent pressure. School boards were not as well prepared to
negotiate as were the teacher unions. In the Intervening years,
school boards have spent a considerable amount of money in order to
become more formidable bargaining opponents.
Furthermore, for a number of years, the sympathy of the public
was with the teachers and not with the school boards. The public
felt that teachers were underpaid. As teachers salaries increased
and as the cost of living index went up, the public attitude has
®^Fitzgerald, "Guidelines for Negotiating Teams Interested in
Facilitating Improvement in Educational Programs," pp. 3-A; and Perry
and Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Educat ion ; ^ITje
Evidence From the Schools , pp. 97 and 151; and Anthony M. Cresswell
and Michael J. Murphy, "Overview," in Education and Col lective Ba^
gaining; Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
pp. 418-19.
^^Michael J. Murphy and David Hoover, "Negotiations at the
Crossroads; Increased Professionalization or Reinforced
Bureaucracy,
in Education and Collective Bargaining; Readings in
Policy and Re
^.
search, eds. Cresswell and Murphy, p. 476.
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to the point where it is no longer in sympathy with the
teachers economic demands beyond that which is necessary to keep
them even with the cost of living. Inflationary pressures have a
8^®^ter effect on public employers than they do on private employers
•
and the question of maintaining moderate budget increases is more
critical if the public employers wish to remain in their positions.
As the collective bargaining process was adopted by other public
employee groups, the teacher unions found themselves in competition
with these groups in their efforts to secure salary Increases.
On the other hand, the public found itself in the position of being
squeezed economically by the competing demands of all public employee
groups. As a result of this competition, the long run effect that
the collective bargaining process will have on the salary Increases
of a particular public employee union will depend to a considerable
extent on the collective bargaining ability of that union and the
pressure which it is able to exert upon the community. Over a period
of time, it is not reasonable to assume that the total community
financial effort will increase to any considerable extent. Therefore,
in the absence of technological advances that will increase productivity
in education with a consequent dollar savings that can be allocated
to teacher salaries, it is doubtful that the collective bargaining
r u 91
process will significantly affect the economic status of teachers.
^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," Public Workers y_d
Public Unions, ed. Zagaria, p. 104; Ronald G. Corwin^ "The
Anatomy^
of Milltant~Trofessionallzatlon," in The Collective Dile^a:
Negoti^
tions in Education, eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 243;
Doherty,
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While the collective bargaining process may not have had a
significant effect on teacher salaries, it has had a significant
effect on personnel policies especially in the areas of administrative
and grievance practices. Teacher collective bargaining agreements
have brought to education an increasingly complex body of rules and
regulations. There is no question but that the collective bargaining
agreements have narrowed and will continue to narrow the scope of
managerial discretion. Unilateral decision making by the employer
is most prevalent in districts where the teachers are not represented
by an exclusive bargaining agent. It is least prevalent in districts
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where the AFT is the exclusive representative of the teachers.
A direct consequence of the inclusion of personnel policy
provisions in collective bargaining agreements is that public school
administration has become much less flexible. Precedents are set
and what the school administrator did in the past for one staff
member he must do in the future for another. Close scrutiny of the
collective bargaining agreements by union representatives will insure
"Teacher Bargaining: The Relevance of Private Sector Experience," in
The Collective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education , eds. Carlton and
Goodwin, p. 195; and Perry and Wildman, The Impact of Negotiation s iji
Public Education; The Evidence From the Schools, pp. 162-63 and 152.
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Professionalization or Reinforced Bureaucracy," in Education and Col^
lectlve BarRaining: Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and
Murphy, pp. 476 and 481; Love, "The Impact of Teacher
Negotiations on
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,
pp. 214, 39, and 216; and Slichter, Healey, and
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Collective Bargaining on Management , pp. 9 and 279,
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that administrators will adhere closely to these agreements. Further-
more, as the teacher unions become more experienced at the collective
bargaining table, the agreements will become more sophisticated, and
school administrators can expect that seniority will prove to be an
Important restriction on the decision making process.
The public school administrator, therefore, will probably have
to be more capable than was necessary in the past if he or she is to be
effective. He or she will have to be aware of the implications of his
or her decisions, for as previously stated, the public employee union
will be ever-vlgilant to be sure that the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement are administered fairly. Most collective bargaining
agreements in education contain a grievance procedure, and many of these
provide for some form of arbitration. Given the history of collective
bargaining in the private sector where 94% of the collective bargaining
agreements provide for final and binding arbitration, it probably is
only a matter of time before the majority of the collective bargaining
agreements in education provide for final and binding arbitration.
One of the areas most significantly affected by collective bargaining
is the management of employee discipline. The presence of collective
bargaining, therefore, will force educational administrators to sharpen
94
their managerial skills.
The existence of collective bargaining agreements in education
will require additional management staff to effectively administer
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 9 and 279.
^^Metzler, "The Role of Management in Negotiations," in The Col-
lective Dilemma; Negotiations in Education , eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p.
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the agreements. In this respect the absence of the profit motive
in the public sector is very significant; in private Industry, when
administrative specialists are added to the payroll, the price of the
product to the consumer is raised in order to meet the additional cost.
In the public sector, however, such additional costs must be passed to
the consumer in the form of additional taxes. It may be difficult
to convince the public of the necessity for such additional staff.
The presence of collective bargaining will force educational
administrators to engage in more of a team effort. Top-level manage-
ment will have to keep all levels of management Informed relative to
labor policies in order that the policies may be carried out properly.
Furthermore, all levels of management must be consulted relative to
the terms of the agreement prior to its final ratification. This
communication is essential if top-level management is to understand
the ramifications of all Issues being negotiated. As previously
stated, the character and ability of lower level supervisors become
even more important in a collective bargaining relationship than in
a non-collective bargaining relationship; the character and ability
of lower level supervisors will be crucial in determining whether or
95
not stable employment relationship is maintained.
The existence of a stable employment relationship must be
considered to be one of the most important factors in helping the
parties to achieve a reasonably quick and mutually satisfactory
on Management , pp. 104-05. 181, 627, and 740; and
Love.^
Teacher Negotiations on School System Decision Making,
"The Impact of
pp. 94 and 116.
^^Slichter, Healey, and Livernash, The Impact of Collective
Bargaining on Management , pp. 14-17, 545-46, 915, and
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collective bargaining agreement. If the parties are not able to
reach such a settlement, they will have to resort to Impasse pro-
cedures; such procedures have often been less than satisfactory In
education. Actually, the Issue of an effective Impasse procedure
In the public sector has been one that Is quite complex and emotionally
charged; this has been particularly so in education. The chief issue
that people have agonized over is how to develop an effective impasse
procedure, without recourse to the strike that will result in the
disruption of public service.
Public employers contend that a strike is a direct act of
defiance against the state. They contend that the essence of state-
hood is that the authority of the state is greater than that of any
of the agencies or departments that the state uses to provide services
to its citizens. If the employees of these agencies or departments
are allowed to challenge the state, the very essence of statehood is
challenged. Public employers argue against giving public employees
the right to strike, because in the public sector the more essential
the service the greater the pressure the public will impose on the
political leaders to settle the strike, no matter what the economic
costs are. A strike in the public sector is thus a political
weapon
^^Cresswell and Murphy, "Overview," in Education and
Collectiv e
Bargaining; Readinr.s in Policy and Research , eds.
Cresswell and Murphy,
p. 297.
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98rather than an economic weapon. Public employers also contend
that the right to strike, when combined with the power that the
employees already have as a result of the large number of votes that
they represent, would give public employees disproportionate power.
The proponents of the right to strike in the education field
state that one of the initial arguments against the right to strike,
that the public health and safety might thereby be endangered, is
fallacious in that most experts now agree that a teacher strike is
not a threat to public health and safety. They state that teacher
strikes occur anyway. In an analysis of 87 strikes, David Gray and
Patricia Dyson found that 46 out of 87 court imposed strike injunctions
were violated; further in 33 Instances in which penalties were sought
by the public employer, the courts Imposed penalties in only 20
instances. It is their conclusion that the injunction process and
contempt proceedings are minimally effective. The proponents of the
right to strike state that the available impasse mechanisms are in-
adequate. They contend that the right to strike is a political
weapon for which no substitute will be found, and without which the
^®Bcal, Wlckersham, and Klenast, The Practice of Collecti ve
Bargaining
,
p. 456, and Wellington and Winter, "The Limits of Col-
lective Bargaining in Public Employment," in Public Employee Unlonsj
A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relatlon^B. ed. Chi ekering,
p. 68.
^^Spero and Capozzola, The Urban Community and Unionized Bureau-
cracies; Pressure Politics in Local Labor Relations , p. 190; and
Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment," in Public Employee Unions; A Study of the Crisis in
Public Sector Labor Relations, ed. Chickering, pp. 67-69.
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two parties cannot be equals in the collective bargaining process.^®®
The opponents of the right to strike take the position that a strike
in education is an act of defiance against the state, and further that
it denies the very essence of statehood. It is a political weapon in
that a large number of people are affected by the disruption of the
educational process, and these people will place a considerable amount
of pressure on the school board to settle the strike without regard to
the economic cost. It is their contention that the right to strike
will give teachers a disproportionate amount of power.
Doherty and Oberer contend that if it is not possible to give
public employees the right to strike, the most effective impasse
procedure is one that allows binding arbitration. The opponents of
binding arbitration of future contract terms state that this procedure
places a serious restriction on the two parties in that they are less
likely to strive to reach an agreement. The parties are apt to withhold
^^^Ibid.
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their final offer and wait for the arbitrator to determine the term*
of the contract. Doherty and Oberer state that this argument is
invalid in education whereas teachers do not have the right to strike.
It is their position that if the School board does not accept the
decision of the arbitrator then the teachers should have the right to
strike. Perry and Wildman take the position that it is not likely that
binding arbitration of future contract terms will become an acceptable
103impasse procedure in most states.
Fact finding that includes a provision for the Issuance of a
public report is a widely accepted procedural alternative to the
right to strike and binding arbitration. Mediation is also recommended
as an Impasse procedure, although it is held that for mediation to be
effective both parties must agree to the process. Mediation is the
most effective impasse procedure in keeping with the spirit and intent
of the collective bargaining process, the essence of mediation being
104
to assist the two parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
^^^Cresswell and Murphy, "Overview," in Education and Collective
Bargaining; Readings in Policy and Research , eds. Cresswell and Murphy,
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As more states pass collective bargaining legislation, and as the
use of the collective bargaining process continues to grow in public
education, greater emphasis will be placed on developing a procedure
for satisfactory and effective settlement of disputes
.
David Ross and Lawrence Raful conducted a study of the collective
bargaining statutes that had been passed by the various state legis-
latures and they found that the following provisions had been made
in order to provide for an impasse procedure:
1. Twenty-three states provide for mediation. Of the twenty-
three, one state requires that the mediation process be
entered into by mutual agreement.
2. Eighteen states provide for fact finding. Of the eighteen,
one state provides that the Governor has the authority to
make the fact finding recommendations binding within ten
days of the legislature's adjournment.
3. Three states provide for non-binding arbitration.
4. Eleven states provide for binding arbitration. Of the
eleven, three states require that the binding arbitration
process be entered into by mutual agreement, one state
provides that if mutual agreement is not reached only
those matters that do not relate to salaries, pensions,
and insurances will be submitted to arbitration, one state
requires that in addition to mutual agreement, the
parties
^^^Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolution," in
Public Workcjs
and Public Unions, p. 104.
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must have the authorization of the state legislature, one
state provides for binding arbitration of non-monetary item
only.
5. One state does not have any specific provisions for an
Impasse procedure in its collective bargaining statute,
The New Hampshire History of Collective Bargaining
in Public School Districts
While the events described in the previous sections of this
chapter were taking place on the national scene, similar events were
taking place in New Hampshire. The first Job action occurred in
Manchester, New Hampshire when the Manchester Teachers Guild, now
known as the Manchester Education Association (MEA) went on strike
in 1957. The main issue was money, with the strike lasting only one
day. However, the Issues as to whether or not teachers had the
right to organize, enter into collective negotiations, and strike
were appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The Court decided
that teachers did have the right to organize and bargain, but that
they did not have the right to strike.
^ Doris M. Ross and Lawrence Raful, A Legislator’s Guide to
Collective Bargaining in Education , Research Brief, Vol. 3, No. 4
(Denver; Education Commission of the States (1975)), pp. 6—35.
^^^Thomas Adams, interview held at New Hampshire Education
Association Office, 103 North State Street, Concord, New Hampshire.
May 13, 1977; and City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild,
100 N.H. 507 (1957).
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the 1957 Manchester strike was concluded, interest In
collective bargaining waned. One of the reasons for the ensuing
loss of interest in collective bargaining as stated by Thomas Adams,
NHEA Director for Professional Development, was the active Influencs
of the administrators in the New Hampshire Education Association.
It was Adams’ contention that the active presence of the administrators
1 OR
was a moderating influence on the policies of the NHEA. After
several years, interest began to pick up again when Robert Lewis,
Executive Director of the NHEA, proposed the adoption of a standard
two-page contract by all New Hampshire school districts. Although
it was called a "contract" it was really a policy statement on how
the district would conduct negotiations. The intent of the "contract"
was not to establish collective bargaining but to establish procedures
for what is referred to as meeting and conferring. The "contract"
also contained a grievance procedure.
Lewis approached the New Hampshire School Administrators Associa-
tion (NHSAA), and asked the Association to support the "contract" and
promote its adoption. The NHSAA appointed Superintendents Maurice
Gray and Jason Boynton, and retained Attorney Franklin Hollis to re-
view the proposed "contract." Gray, Hollis, and Boynton met with
representatives from the NHEA and worked out a revised draft which
was subsequently adopted by both the NHEA and the NHSAA. It was then
108
Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
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adopted by many New Hampshire School Boards.
The NHEA was also trying to improve the economic position of
its members by lobbying in the New Hampshire Legislature. Mrs.
Margaret Grothey, president of NHEA, spoke on behalf of HB522 at
the 1967 legislative session. HB552 provided for the payment of
additional state revenues to local school districts so that the
school districts might increase teacher salaries without increasing
local taxes. Mrs. Grothey pointed out that New Hampshire salaries
were not competitive with the surrounding states. Further, New
Hampshire had many non-certif led teachers because so many New
Hampshire certified teachers were leaving to work in other states.
HB552 was supported in the House, but on June 30, 1967, it was
killed in the Senate, presumably for lack of funds,
While not seeing collective bargaining as a threat, the New
Hampshire School Boards Association (NHSBA) was not totally dismissing
it. On May 26, 1967, it sponsored a negotiations seminar at the
special delegates assembly. John Metzler and Myron Lieberraan described
negotiation experiences in other states, pointing out critical
aspects of negotiations for the benefit of board members and
Jason Boynton, Interview held at University of New Hampshire
School of Education, Durham, New Hampshire, May 18, 1977; and Progress
Report on Professional Negotiations," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVL,
No. 5 (May 1966) : 3.
^^^"HB552 Introduced: Has Bi-Partisan Sponsorship," New Hampshire
Educator Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (April 1967: 1; "NHEA President Margaret
Grothey testifies at Public Hearing on HB 552," New Hampshire Educator,
Vol. XLVII, No. 5 (May 1967): 2; and "The Story of HB552," New Ham_2z.
shire Educator, Special Back to School Edition (September 1967) :1.
79
admlnls trators .
^ ^ ^
Having failed in their efforts to convince the 1967 Legislature
of the need to improve the economic conditions of teachers, the NHEA
called upon the NEA for assistance in the latter part of 1967. The
result was a joint investigation of educational conditions in New
Hampshire, resulting in a recommendation for major tax reform and a
special legislative session. When the report was released to the
public, it was followed by a vote of the NHEA Assembly of Delegates
calling for an action program to Implement the report. The delegates
also called upon the lawmakers to adopt legislation affirming the
right of school teachers to organize for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
In June 1968, the NHEA Executive Board issued a sanctions
alert in the State of New Hampshire informing all appropriate
agencies that sanctions were imminent unless significant improve-
ments were made in the state's educational system. In November of
that year the assembly of delegates voted overwhelmingly to continue
the sanctions alert. They also voted to reassemble in February,
1969 to reassess the situation.
^^^"More Than a Hundred Attend May 26 Negotiations Seminar and
Special Delegate Assembly," New Hampshire School Boards Association
Newsletter June 1967, p. 4.
^^^"NHEA President Delivers Report in Joint Investigation,
New Hamnshire Educator Vol. XLVII, No. 8 (October 1967): 1; "N^^-
NHEA Investigation Report: Calls for Major Tax
Session," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 5 (May
1968). 4,
"NHEA Board Issues Sanctions Alert Assembly To Take
Action August
22," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 6 (June 19 ). >
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In 1968 the first contest between the NEA and AFT occurred
when the AFT won the right to be the exclusive bargaining agent for
the Nashua teachers. Also in 1968, the Manchester Education Association
(MEA) went on strike for the second time. Major issues were the
scope of negotiations, the inclusion of the school principals in the
contract, and money. The Manchester teachers held a professional day
on March 6, 1968, and voted 501-12 to impose sanctions on the Man-
chester School District. This was the first time that sanctions
had been Imposed on a local New Hampshire School district. The action
was taken when teachers and principals learned that there had been no
progress in negotiations. The MEA also maintained that insufficient
progress had been made in Implementing a joint NHEA-NEA report Issued
in 1965, which related to educational conditions in Manchester.
Among other things, that report had called for the development of a
procedure for negotiations, settlement of teacher problems, and the
1 13
establishment of a competitive salary scale. The negotiated con-
tract included school principals, widened the scope of negotiations,
and made salary concessions. This was the first comprehensive master
agreement in the state.
"Assembly of Delegates Continues Sanctions Alert-Reconvenes in Feb-
ruary ," NewJlam£shire_Edu^^ XLVIII, No. 9 (November 1968); 1;
and "Assembly of Delegates Votes to Issue Professional Advisory, Con-
tinue Sanctions Alert," New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLIX, No. 3
(March 1969): 1.
^^^"Sanctions Imposed on Manchester: 4A0 Submit Resignations,"
New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (March 1968): 1 and 2.
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
81
The following year the MEA went out on strike again. John
Tucker, Assistant Executive Director of the NHEA and Tom Adams were
in charge of the strike for the MEA. In Adams’ words, it was fortunate
that the strike was settled on a weekend, because the MEA was due in
court the following Monday to answer why it had defied the temporary
restraining order. Judge Grant did not fine the MEA, as the member*
had returned to work. However, Norman Pettigrew, the president of
the MEA, was sentenced to prison for an indefinite period of time.
The sentence was then suspended. The sentence was greeted with
amusement by many, since this was traditionally the sentence given
to the insane.
In 1969 Robert G. Lewis retired as Executive Secretary of the
NHEA and was succeeded by John Haffernan, who came to NHEA from
Wisconsin in July 1969. It is Boynton’s contention that the NHEA
Board of Directors was taking, very seriously, the statement pre-
viously issued by Governor John King. "If you hope to win the
struggle you are in, you have to stop being shrinking violets and
get Involved, and get involved publicly . The Board of Directors
had come to the realization that their association was going to have
to become more than just a professional organization.
^^^Adams, Interview, May 13, 1977; and City of Manchester v.
Manchester Education Association, et al., Hillsborough County Superior
Court, eq. // 12202, 1969.
^^^"Assembly Delegates Continues Sanctions Alert-Reconvenes in
February," p. 1.
^^^Boynton, interview. May 18, 1977.
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It was also in 1969 that the NHEA Assembly of Delegates voted
to issue a Professional Advisory Phase II sanctions alert. The
Assembly of Delegates voted not to follow thru with the sanctions
but rather to accept the recommendation of the NHEA Executive Council.
This recommendation was to send an advisory to the teaching profession
up-dating its members on conditions in New Hampshire.
The legislature failed to raise any additional revenues to im-
prove the situation, and in the fall of 1969, Robert G. Lewis called
for a full-scale investigation of what he termed "seriously-deteriora-
ting" educational conditions in the state. This would follow the
investigation that had been carried out by a joint NHEA-NEA team in
1968. The full-scale investigation would never take place. While
the NHEA called for a full-scale investigation, it had also come to
realize that the investigation route had not brought about any signifi-
118
cant change. The full-scale investigation faded away.
The first major job action by the AFT took place in Nashua in
1970 when the Nashua Teachers Union (NTU) went on strike. The strike
lasted for eighteen days, but, unlike Manchester, Nashua did not close
its schools.
The major issues in the Nashua labor dispute were salaries and
the arbitration of grievances. The Governor offered to provide a
mediator if the teachers resumed their teaching duties. The Board
^^®"Assembly of Delegates Continues Sanction Alert-Reconvenes in
February," p. 1; "NEA-NHEA Full Scale Investigation to Begin January
7." New Hampshire Educator Vol XLVII, No. 9 (November 1969): p. 1; and
Jason Boynton, interview, held at University of New Hampshire
School
of Education, Durham, New Hampshire, August 5, 1977.
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agreed and the teachers returned to their classrooms. A settlement
was reached which included binding arbitration of grievances. Upon
s^f-tlement of the dispute^ Nashua had its first master agreement.
During the 1970-1971 period, the NHEA office began to set
negotiations goals. They began running what they called "salary
workshops." The term salary workshops was deliberately chosen instead
of collective bargaining workshops as in the early stages the NUEIA
had to convince New Hampshire teachers of the advantages of collective
bargaining. The general attitude of teachers was that collective bar-
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gaining was a technique that professional people simply did not use.
The work of the NHEA, however, produced results, as other school
districts began to sign master agreements with the teacher associations.
In 1971 the Portsmouth School Board signed a master agreement with the
Association of Portsmouth Teachers (APT) . The APT held a number of
professional demonstrations on Saturdays and after school, but they
did not strike. One of the main issues separating the parties was
arbitration of grievances. A settlement was reached, and a master
agreement was signed when the school board agreed to the inclusion
of arbitration that would be final. The board would not agree to the
inclusion of the word binding. This was to remain an issue for
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977; Boynton, Interview, May 18,
1977; and The Nashua Board of Education v. Nashua Teachers
Union Local
1044,* AFT, AFL-CIO, et al., Hillsborough County Superior Court, Eq.
//13722, 1970.
^^°"NEA Announces Regional Salary Schools," New Hampshire
_Ej^-
cator VoLXLVII, No. 6 (June 1967): 3; and "NEA Salary
School Attracts
Record Attendance: Salary Goals Released by NHEA Salary
Committee,
New Hampshire Educator Vol. XLVIII, No. 9 (November 1968): 6.
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several years until the board finally agreed to the Inclusion of the
word binding.
The following year the Contoocook Valley Education Association
entered into negotiations with the Contoocook Valley Regional School
Board. An agreement was reached and the Contoocook Valley became
the first rural area to have a comprehensive master agreement
.
The first comprehensive master agreement was also signed in Keene at
this time. Collective bargaining in Keene proved to be very difficult.
The 1970-1971 school year came to a close without a settlement with
each party accusing the other of not negotiating in good faith. The
NHEA and KEIA were distributing leaflets and were preparing for a
strike. When negotiations recommenced at the beginning of the next
school year, the NHEA tried a new strategy by withdrawing its direct
Involvement from the negotiations. Several months later, a settle-
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ment was reached between the KEA and the Keene School Board.
The 1972-1973 school year was a very active one with master
123
agreements being signed in Goffstown and Salem. While Derry and
Goffstown settled their agreements with minimum difficulty, a
bitter dispute was taking place in Salem over the refusal of the
school board to enter into a master agreement with the Salem
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
1 22
Adams, Interview, May 13, 1977.
^^^"News From Region IV," New Hampshire Educator Vol. LIII, No.
8
(October 1973): 5.
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Education Association. After over two years of bitter negotiations
culminating in a strike of two weeks, the Salem School Board agreed
to recognize the Salem Education Association, and entered into a
master agreement with that Association which Included a negotiations
procedure with provisions for mediation, a standard evaluation pro-
cedure for teachers, and a grievance procedure that provided for ad-
124
visory arbitration.
As bitter as the situation was in Salem, it was more difficult
in Farmington with the two mcijor issues being recognition and money
since Farmington had one of the lowest salary scales in the state.
After a number of unsuccessful bargaining sessions, the Farmington
Educational Association (FEA) struck. The teachers went back to
their classrooms after a memorandum of understanding was signed
pledging the school board to negotiate in good faith. Negotiations
continued, and a master agreement was prepared and presented to the
school board for ratification in July 1973 which the Board refused
to sign.
^^^"Salem Contract A Reality,” New Hampshire Educator Vol. LIII
No. 8 (October 1973): 4; Adams, interview. May 13, 1977; "Salem School
Authorities Say Teacher Strike Illegal,"; Manchester (N.H.) Union
Leader, 6 March 1973, pp. 1 and 12; "Salem Teachers Strike Enters Third
Dav." Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 7 March 1973, pp. 1 and 14;
"Salem School Teachers Vow to Stay Out," Manchester (N.H.) Union
Leader, 9 March 1973, pp. 1 and 20; "Salem Meeting Short But Heated,
Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 10 March 1973, pp. 1 and 1^1 ^nd Salem
School District v. Salem Education Association et. al., Rockingham
County Superior Court, Eq. 7405, 1973.
^^^"What's a Farmington Weigh," New Hampshire Educator Vol.
LII,
No. 7 (September 1973): 10; Adams, interview. May 13, 1977;
Strike
Closes Farmington Schools," Manchester (N.H.) Union
Leader, 6 Febru
ary 1973. pp. 1 and 14; "Teacher Unit Says Strike
to Continue.
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While 1972-1973 was an active year, it was just a prelude for
the 1973-1974 school year, which would bring with it "Timberlane ,"
the longest teacher strike in the United States. The main issue of
the Timberlane strike was control of the educational program with a
group of highly motivated teachers becoming gradually more disconcerted
when they felt that they were not involved in the development of school
4 . 126district programs.
From 1968 to 1973, the Timberlane Regional Education Association
(TREA) negotiated with the Timberlane Regional School Board. The
TREA was able to make monetary gains, but it was not able to make any
professional gains. In 1973 concerns that had been evident for
several years became major issues between the two parties. After
a number of negotiating sessions, the two major Issues that separated
the two parties were academic freedom and arbitration of grievances.
The stalemate continued, and in January 1974, the executive
committee of TREA called for a strike vote. The following day all
Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 7 February 1973, p. 2; "Teachers Told^
Jobs At Stake," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 8 February 1973, pp. 1
and 20; "Union Enjoined in School Strike," Manchester (N.H.) Union
Leader, 9 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14; "Negotiations Continue in Strike
by Teachers," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 10 February 1973, pp. 1
and 12- "Ruling Deferred on Court Order at Farmington," Mancheste_r (N.H.)
Union Leader , 13 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14; "Injunction In School
Strike Upheld," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader . 14 February 1973, pp.
1
and 12; "Farmington Teachers Still On Strike," Manchester
(N.H.) ^n^
Leader, 15 February 1973, pp. 1 and 18; "Both SidesHold Fast^in
Fara-^
ington Strike," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 17 February 1973, pp.
1
and 16; "Farmington Teachers Warned," Manchest^ (N.H.) U.
nIon
20 February 1973, pp. 1 and 14; "Schools to Open ^^^Jeachers
May Be
Tardy." Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 23 February 1973. p. 3,
and
Farmington Schools Open," Manchester (N.H.) Union Lead^,
27 Feb y
1973, pp. 1 and 12.
^^^Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
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but fifty of the teachers voted to go on strike, and picket lines
127
were formed. Attorney Lewis Soule representing the school board
Immediately asked the Rockingham County Superior Court for an injunc-
tion restraining the teachers from striking. Soule's main position
was that the strike was Illegal, and, therefore, the teachers should
be ordered back to work. Jack Middleton representing the TREA argued
that the 1957 New Hampshire Supreme Court decision outlawing teacher
strikes should not be used as precedent because that decision was
not made on a point of law. Rather, it was made on what was consider-
ed to be public policy at the time. Middleton contended that the
public's attitude toward the bargaining rights of teachers had changed
considerably in favor of their right to bargain, and that, therefore,
the Injunction should not be granted.
Judge Leonard Hardwick found that although it was within the
jurisdiction of the court to issue the injunction, it would not be
proper for the court to do so at this time. Judge Hardwick felt that
the right to strike went hand-in-hand with the right to bargain, and
that no one was denying the right of the TREIA to bargain. In
^^^Ronald Amblehl, "Strike Three You're Out," New Hampshire
School Boards Association Newsletter June 197A, p. 3; and "Education
Picket," New Hampshire Educator Vol. LIV , No. 1 (January 1974): 4.
128"Timberlane Board to Ask Injunction," Manchester (N.H.) Unloj\
Leader, 28 February 1974, pp. 1 and 16
;
"Tlmberlane School Board^ Files
Injunction," Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader . 1 March 1974, pp. 1 and
16; "Strike Injunction Hearing Recessed," Manchester (N.H.) Uni_qn
Leader, 6 March 1974, p. 3; and "TimberlaneStrike Injunction Denied,
Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader , 12 March 1974, pp. 1 and 12.
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his opinion, both sides had retained professional negotiators and
with continued effort, they should be able to arrive at a solution.
If the court was to intefere at this point, it would be taking aidea
in a dispute that should be settled by the parties themselves. The
Timberlane Regional School District appealed the decision to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, which after hearing the appeal, upheld
the decision of the Superior Court. The Timberlane Regional School
Board kept the schools open by employing substitute teachers, and
129
the strike continued.
At the annual school district meeting in March, the school
board asked the voters for support. The people voted to support the
school board's position. Several weeks later, when the Timberlane
School Board voted by the narrow margin of five to four to permanently
discontinue negotiations, and replace the striking teachers, it also
130
decided to call a special school district meeting. The meeting
was set for May A, 197 A. The purpose was to ask the voters of
the
school district to affirm the decision of the school board to dis-
continue negotiations on a permanent basis and replace the
striking
12’"Rocklngham County Superior Court Declares teachers
Right to
" Rew Hampshire Educator Vol. LIV, No. 4 (April 1974).
‘and 5.
"Timberlane Case in Review," New Hampshire School
Boards
Newsletter September 1974, pp. 1 and 2; timberlane
Regional^School^^
District V. Timberlane Regional Education
Aa=°'latlon. et al.. Rock
Lgham County Superior Court. Eq. //6879 1974; and
Timberlane Region
al School District v. TREA, 114 N.H. 245 (1974).
^^“"Negotiations End at Timberlane," ^nchester (N
19 April 1974, p. l; and "Deadline Fixed
at Timberlane.
(N.H.) Union Leader . 20 April 1974, pp. 1
and 12.
,H,) Union Leader ,
Manchester
89
teachers. The citizens who attended the special school district
meeting voted by the overwhelming majority of 1,780 to 589 to support
the school board's position. The TREA had seriously misjudged its
support amongst the voters of the school district.
Having received an overwhelming vote of confidence, the school
board held to its position. The striking teachers were advised
individually that they must return to their classroom on or before a
certain date. Failure to do so would mean that their contracts with
the Tlmberlane Regional School District would be considered null and
void, and that the district would then be free to contract with other
teachers. Superintendent Robert Crompton did not renominate those
teachers who did not return by the date set by the school board and
the school board and the administration began to replace the striking
teachers
.
Attorney Jack Middleton challenged the right of the Tinberlane
Regional School Board to sit as an impartial body in a hearing con-
cerning tenured teachers who had been engaged in a bitter strike
against the Board itself. The case was finally decided in the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. Justice Griffiths, writing for the Supreme
Court, held that the striking teachers were not entitled to a hearing
whereas they had struck during the term of their contracts. By
^^^Ambiehl, "Strike Three You're Out," p. 3; and "Spring May
Be Late, But Strike Season Has Arrived," New Hampshi re School
Boarc^ ,
Association Newsletter April 1974, pp. 1 and 2.
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abandoning their contracts, they forfeited whatever rights they had
to a hearing. The TREA continued to maintain a picket line but for
all Intents and purposes the Timberlane strike was over.^^^
The New Hampshire History of Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Legislation
The most important development since the Timberlane strike in
1974 has been the enactment of a collective bargaining statute RSA
273-A. Actually the movement to pass a state collective bargaining
law was initiated by the NHEA during the 1960's. The NHEA formed
a coalition with other public employee associations for the purpose
of passing the bill. They introduced such a bill in several different
legislative sessions. The New Hampshire School Boards Association's
(NHSBA) position was to support a collective bargaining bill with
certain provisos. The New Hampshire School Administrators Association
NHSAA) did not take a clear-cut position. The NHSBA provisos were
that bargaining would be limited strictly to economic and fringe
benefits and would not in any way whatsoever abrogate local control
of education. As the initial bills that were introduced by the coali-
tion of the NHEA and the other public employee associations did not
accommodate the provisos of the NHSBA, the latter organization was
133
opposed to the bills.
^^^"Court Backs Timberlane Board," Manchester (N.H.) Union
Leader
,
16 August 1974, pp. 1 and 14; and Farrelly et al. , v.
Timber-
lane Regional School District, 114 N.H. 560 (1974).
^^^dams, interview. May 13, 1977; and Boynton. Interview,
May 18, 1977.
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The NHSBA then began to introduce its own bills. Attorney
Arthur Nighswander, NHSBA General Counsel, NHSBA Executive Secretary
Jason Boynton and Superintendent Herman Donegan were asked by NHSBA
to draft a bill. The situation still remained a statemate, however, as
neither the NHEA nor the NHSBA had enough strength to push its respec-
1
tive bill through the New Hampshire Legislature.
In the 1971 legislative session, Representative David Bradley
sponsored HB576 on behalf of the NHSBA. The House Education Committee
supported HB576 by a nine to eight vote, but the House Committee on
Executive Departments and Administration opposed the bill. Attorney
Nighswander made the major presentation of the bill for the NHSBA.
The Nashua Teachers Union (NTU) was opposed to the bill and asked an
AFT public relations specialist to speak on its behalf. He opposed
HB576 because the bill prohibited strikes and, in fact Included
penalties for those who did strike. Jack Middleton Spoke on behalf
of the NHEA. He stated that the NHEA was opposed to HB576 because
of its limited scope, the prohibition against strikes, and the in-
clusion of penalties for those who did strike. He also opposed the
separation of administrators from the bargaining unit. Attorney
Middleton then distributed copies of amendments which revised HB576
in the best interests of the NHEA. HB576 was presented to the
House as submitted by Representative Bradley and recommended by
the
House Education Committee; it drew a tie vote. The bill was
then
13A
Boynton, interview. May 18, 1977.
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laid on the table and did not come up for another vote during the
IOC
legislative session.
In the 1973 legislative session Representatives Van Loan,
Boucher and Stevenson sponsored HB889 on behalf of the NHSBA. Senators
Spanos and Nixon sponsored SB196 on behalf of the NHEA. Both bills
passed their respective chambers. The President of the Senate then
asked Jason Boynton and Jack Middleton to work out a compromise bill.
The amendments to IIB889 that were agreed to by Boynton and Middleton
were then introduced by Senator Bradley and a compromise bill was pre-
sented to Governor Thomson for his signature. The Governor promptly
vetoed HB889 as amended. Governor Thomson’s major objection to the
bill was that it included teachers. It was a pleasant surprise for
Adams, as the NHEA did not consider it to be a good bill. The NHEA
had supported the bill because its members wanted a collective bar-
gaining law; however, the NHEA leadership did feel that it was more
of an NHSBA bill than it would like to see. Boynton, on the other
hand, was not pleasantly surprised. He had already prepared an
editorial for the NHSBA Newsletter explaining HB889 and complimenting
everyone who had worked so hard to pass the bill. His overall opinion
of HB889 was that it was a step forward, bringing about much needed
structure to the collective bargaining scene. Boynton released the
135„i97i on Education Legislation: Important Negotiations
Bills," New Hampshire School Boards Association Newsletter, May
1971,
p. 3; "Negotiations Bill-Almost It Was Close!" New
Hampshire School
Boards Association Newsletter , Summer, 1971, p. 1; and Boynton,
inter-
view, May 18, 1977.
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newsletter with its first page editorial primarily as he had prepared
it. The editorial appeared with the word "Vetoed" in large black
capital letters stamped across it. Boynton also added a statement to
the effect that if any difficulties arose due to the lack of a col-
lective bargaining statute, people would know where to point the
finger of blame.
The Tlmberlane strike provided the impetus that was needed to
bring into existence a collective bargaining law that would cover
public employees. After the Tlmberlane strike, the strategy of the
NHSBA for the 1975 legislative session was to introduce the bill that
had been vetoed by the Governor in 1973. The main concern of the
NHSBA was how to get the Governor to sign the bill. Boynton also
felt that after the 1973 experience, the bill that would have the
best chance of becoming law would be one that covered all public
employees
.
In the 1975 legislative session, the House of Representatives
passed the NHEA sponsored collective bargaining bill. The Senate,
however, would not pass the NHEA sponsored bill under any circumstance
whatsoever, and the NHEA was well aware of the Senate’s position.
The Senate as a body, however, did feel that some form of collective
bargaining legislation was necessary if collective bargaining con-
frontations such as Tlmberlane and Farmington were to be avoided.
^^^Jay Boynton, "Negotiations Law Passed,” New Hampshire School
Boards Association Newsletter , Summer 1973, pp. 1 and 2; Boynton,
Interview, May 18, 1977; and Adams, interview. May 13, 1977.
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A Committee of Conference composed of Senators Brovm, Jacobson, and
Downing and Representatives Sackett, Skinner, Close, and McGlynn
was asked to prepare a report. The Committee of Conference in turn
asked several people who represented various public employers and
public employee associations to meet and draw up a compromise bill.
Jason Boynton representing NllSBA and Attorney Jack Middleton repre-
senting NHEA were the two most prominent members of the group. In
addition to NllSBA, the following public employers were represented:
State of New Hampshire Highway Department and the State of New
Hampshire University System. Representatives from the following public
employee associations were also present: State Employees Association
(SEA), AFT, American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME). The committee also assigned a legislative assistant. Attorney
Richard LaFontaine to the group. He was to serve as a mediator between
t)'e representatives of the public employers and the representatives of
the public employees.
Boynton, who had previously been in contact with the Governor’s
office, met with Governor Thomson, and the Governor personally assured
him that he would not sign the collective bargaining bill that was
being sponsored by the NHEA. Boynton and the Governor then reviewed
the NHEA bill, and the Governor expressed to him his concerns
regarding
the bill. Of those who had been asked by the Committee on
Conference
to draft a compromise bill, it would appear that Boynton
was the only
one who had direct knowledge as to what would be
acceptable to the
Governor. During Boynton’s meeting with the Governor,
the Governor
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assured Boynton that he would not sign any bill unless the bill con-
tained all the changes specified by the Governor. This fact was made
known to Jack Middleton, as well as to the other members of the group.
Therefore, they knew that if the compromise bill did not meet with the
Governor's views on the matter, it would not pass the Senate nor would
it be signed by the Governor. There were many substantive changes in
the bill that had originally been introduced by the NHEA, and there
were many compromises. The bill that was drafted by the group was not
one that either the NHEA or the NHSBA liked, but it was one they felt
would work.
The draft was then presented to the Committee of Conference,
which in turn recommended it to the House and Senate. The House and
Sentate passed the bill in the exact form in which it had been pre-
sented to them. As the bill did not contain the elements that were
objectionable to the Governor, he signed it, and RSA 273-A came into
being.
^^^Jay Boynton, "New Hampshire Gets Bargaining Law-I Didn't
Know That," New Hampshire School Boards Association Newsletter, July
1975, p. 1; and Boynton, interview. May 18, 1977.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
The overall design of the study was directed at the collection
of data for the purpose of providing useful information about selected
changes that have taken place relative to collective bargaining as
it existed in New Hampshire School Districts prior to the enactment
of RSA 273-A and as it exists now.
Because the main objective of the study was to provide infor-
mation that would be helpful to members of the various groups that
participate in the New Hampshire collective bargaining process, the
list of questions below was distributed to various members of these
groups. The questions themselves were developed by the author from
a public sector collective bargaining course taught by Professor
Jason Boynton at the University of New Hampshire and from a dis-
sertation entitled "The Impact of Teacher Negotiations on School
Decision Making" written by Thomas Love in 1968. The questions
considered for use in this study, and which were ranked by a
sampling of persons are found immediately following.
Some Selected Questions
1. What has been the change in the number of exclusive
bargaining
agents before and after the enactment of RSA 273- A?
2. What has been the change in the number of master
agreements
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?
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3. What has been the change in the number of professional negotiators
utilized as the chief negotiator at the collective bargaining table
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?
4. What has been the change In the composition of the bargaining units
as contained In the Recognition Clause of the master agreements
negotiated before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?
5. What has been the change In the scope of collective bargaining
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A? For the purpose of
this study, scope of collective bargaining will Include:
I. Negotiations Procedures
1. Definition of scope
2. Time limits
3. Grievance procedure
a. Grievances limited to agreement
b. Final determination by superintendent
c. Final determination by school board
d. Final determination by arbiter-advisory
e. Final determination by arbiter-binding
4. Resolution of interest disputes
a. Per RSA 273-A
b. Per the provisions of the master agreement
5. No strike clause
II. Organizational Benefits (Union Security)
1. Dues deductions
2. Agency fee
3. Use of facilities
4. Organizational grievances
5. Class action grievances
6. Representational rights in grievances
7. Organizational access to employer’s records
8. Time off for Association activities
III. Direct Economic Benefits
1. Compensation by preparation and years of
experience
2. Compensation by merit
4*. Credit for experience outside the school
district
5. Retirement bonus
6. Medical insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
7 . Dental insurance
a. flat amount
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b. percentage
c. full payment
8. Life Insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
9. Disability insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
10. Course reimbursement
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
d. maximum amount budgeted or "cap"
11. Comprehensive extra-curricular activity pay schedule
12. Athletic pay schedule
13. Personal leave
a. 3 days or more
b. 1 or two days
14. Sick leave
a. 15 days or more per annum
b. less than 15 days per annum
c. cumulative to more than 60 days
d. cumulative to less than 60 days
15. Sabbatical leave
16. Maternity leave
17. Adoption leave
18. Bereavement leave
19. Military leave
IV. Policy Matters
1. Class size
2. Teaching load
3. Preparation periods
4. Curriculum
5. Textbook selection
6. Need for specialized teachers
7. Staff evaluation
8. Posting of vacancies
9. Staff selection
10. Staff transfer
11. Promotions
12. Staff termination
13. Reduction in force
14. Professional requirements for beginning
teachers
15. Staff development
16. Amount budgeted for staff development
17. School calendar
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18. Length of school year
19. Length of school day
20. Academic freedom
21. Discipline for just cause
22. Restrictions on faculty meetings
6. What has been the change in the number of school board proposals
placed upon the collective bargaining table before and after the
enactment of RSA 273-A?
7. What has been the change in the number of cases heard by the
Public Employee Labor Relations Board since the establishment of
said Board?
8. What has been the change in the type of cases heard by the Public
Employee Labor Relations Board since the establishment of said
Board?
9. What has been the change in the definition of scope of collective
bargaining by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board since the
establishment of said Board?
10.
What have been the changes in the master agreements that are
settled after the annual school district meeting?
These people receiving the selected questions were: Thomas
Adams and Joseph LaMarca of the New Hampshire Education Association
(the New Hampshire Chapter of the National Education Association),
Charles Stott of the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers (the New
Hampshire Chapter of the American Federation of Teachers), Richard
Goodman and Eugene Cote of the New Hampshire School Boards Association
(the New Hampshire Chapter of the National School Boards Association),
Evelyn LeBrun and Edward Haseltine of the New Hampshire Public
Employee Labor Relations Board, and Richard Thompson, Peter Dolloff,
Henry McLaughlin, Henry LaBranche, Berard Masse, and Mark Beauvais
of the New Hampshire School Administrators Association (the
New
Hampshire Chapter of the American Association of School
Administrators).
sent to Attorney Douglas Hatfield,Additionally, the questions were
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Attorney Robert Leslie, and William Kingston all of whom are employed
by New Hampshire School Boards as professional negotiators. The llet
of questions was sent also to the following people who had very little
or no experience whatsoever In negotiating with organized groups:
Terry Paul and Dahrlene Hendershot who represented the teaching
faculties In Hennlker and Amherst, New Hampshire, Edith Carson, a former
school board member In Amherst, New Hampshire, and Gordon Flint, super-
intendent of schools In New Hampshire Supervisory Union 43.
The Inqulrees were asked to designate those five of the questions
that they regarded as most Important and the five questions that they
regarded as least Important. Additionally, they were asked to suggest
other questions that they would like the author to consider.
Fourteen separate responses were received amounting to 70Z of
those contacted. Responses were received from at least one representa-
tive of each group. The results of the survey are presented In
Table 1 (page 101).
After reviewing the responses, the author selected the
following four questions as those to be considered further In this
study:
1.
What has been the change In the scope of collective bargaining
before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A? For the purpose
of this study, the scope of collective bargaining will Include.
I, Negotiations Procedures
1. Definition of scope
2. Time limits
3. Resolution of Interest disputes
a. Per RSA 273-A
b. Per the provisions of the master agreement
4. No strike clause
TABLE 1
RESPONSE OF INQUIREES RELATIVE TO THE
QUESTIONS CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION
IMPORTANCE OF THE
IN THE STUDY
Question
Number
Number of Respondents
Selecting Question
as Most Important
Number of Respondents
Selecting Question
as Least Important
5 lA 0
A 11 2
10 7 5
6 7 6
3 6 7
2 5 7
9 5 7
1 A 7
8 3 8
7 3 9
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5. Multiple year contracts
6. Reseirve clause
II. Organizational Benefits
1. IXies deductions
2. Agency fee
3. Use of facilities
4. Grievance procedure
a. Grievance limited to agreement
b. Final determination by superintendent
c. Final determination by school board
d. Final determination by arbiter-advisory
e. Final determination by arbiter-binding
5. Organizational grievances
6. Class action grievances
7. Representational rights in grievances
8. Organizational access to employer's records
9. Time off for Association activities
III. Direct Economic Benefits
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10 .
11 .
12 .
Compensation by preparation and years of experience
Compensation by merit
Longevity pay
Credit for experience outside the school district
Retirement bonus
Medical insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Dental insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Life insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Disability insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Course reimbursement
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
d. maximum amount budgeted or cap
Comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedule
Athletic pay schedule
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13. Personal leave
a, 3 days or more
b. 1 or 2 days
14. Sick leave
a. 15 days or more per annum
b. less than 15 days per annum
c. cumulative to more than 60 days
d. cumulative to less than 60 days
e. sick leave bank
15. Sabbatical leave
16. Maternity leave
17. Adoption leave
18. Bereavement leave
19. Military leave
IV. Policy Matters /Working Conditions
1. Class size
2. Teaching load
3. Preparation periods
4. Curriculum participation
5. Textbook selection
6. Need for specialized teachers
7. Staff evaluation
8. Posting of vacancies
9. Staff selection
10. Staff transfer
11. Promotions
12. Staff termination
13. Reduction in force
14. Professional requirements for beginning teachers
15. Staff development (Recertification)
16. Funds budgeted for staff development
17. School calendar
18. Length of school year
19. Length of school day
20. Academic freedom
21. Discipline for just cause
22. Restrictions on faculty meetings
2. What have been the changes in the composition of the
bargaining
units as contained in the recognition clauses of collective
bargaining agreements negotiated before and after the enactment
o
RSA 273-A?
3. In school districts where collective bargaining
agreements were
not finalized prior to the annual school district ^
were the changes between the negotiating positions
held by the
school boards prior to the annual school district
meeting an
position that they agreed to in the collective
bargaining agree-
ment finalized subsequent to the meeting.
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4. What has been the change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?
The first two questions set forth above were selected by a majority
of the respondents as being among the five most important of the ten
questions. The first question set forth above was selected by all of
the respondents as being among the five most important. The second
question was a very clear choice also, as it was selected by eleven
of the respondents as being among the five most important, and only
two of the respondents regarded it as being among the five least
Important. The third question was not as clear a choice as it was
selected by seven respondents as being among the five most important
and five of the respondents as being among the five least important.
While the fourth question was not a selection of the respondents,
it was chosen by the author because of the importance that had been
placed on legislative recognition of the collective bargaining process
by the New Hampshire Education Association when it was lobbying for the
passage of RSA 273-A. In the spring of 1977, when this author was
conducting the research for his comprehensive examination, he
Inter-
viewed several people, among whom were Joseph LaMarca and
Thomas Adams,
both of whom were New Hampshire Education Association
field agents.
LaMarca and Adams were asked why the New Hampshire
Education Associa-
tion had supported the passage of RSA 273-A.
They stated that the
members and the leaders of the New Hampshire
Education Association,
believed It was of prime Importance that the
collective bargaining
process be given legislative sanction.
In the mind of the author,
some proof as to whether or not RSA
273-A has been of assistance to
the constltutents of the New Hampshire Education Association would
be the number of additional collective bargaining agreements entered
Into subsequent to the adoption of RSA 273-A.
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As stated previously, the respondents were asked also to suggest
questions that might be considered In this paper. However, only a few
of the respondents compiled with the request. One respondent thought
that the tenth question should be whether or not the Incidence of
execution of collective bargaining agreements prior to the annual school
district meetings was greater after the enactment of RSA 273-A than It
was prior to Its adoption. A second respondent suggested that an
analysis be made of the differences In the nature of the collective
bargaining demands made by the teacher associations and teacher unions
subsequent to the adoption of RSA 273-A from those previously made.
A third suggested that It might be significant to quantify the dif-
ferences In the salary Increases before and after the enactment of
RSA 273-A. A fourth respondent made the following suggestions for
further Inquiry;
1. Has the Impasse procedure provided In RSA 273-A been more
effective
than procedures used before Its passage?
2. Has RSA 273-A helped school boards to limit negotiations
to salary
and fringe benefits and working conditions least affected
by
management?
3. Has the negotiations process been more workable for
both sides
since the passage of RSA 273-A?
4. Has RSA 273-A prompted additional units to
organize for purposes
of negotiations?
5 Analyze the issues relative to appropriating
money for an agree-
ment reached subsequent to the annual meeting.
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All of the suggestions were considered by the author; however,
with the exception of one suggestion that had already been Incorporated
Into the study, the suggestions did not relate directly to the re-
search project and It was decided not to Include them In the project.
Rather, the author will make reference to them when recommendatlona
are made for further research.
Several of the respondents also made suggestions relative to
section IV of the first question found on page 103. One respondent
thought that the term "Policy Matters" should be replaced by the
term "Other Substantive Matters". It was his contention that by
employing the caption "Policy Matters", the author was thereby making
the (perhaps) unwarranted assumption that all of the matters appearing
under that caption were In fact policy matters. A second respondent
suggested that the term "Policy Matters" be changed to "Conditions of
Employment", while a third respondent stated simply that policy should
not be discussed at all during negotiations. The author believes
that the decision as to whether or not a particular Item Is a policy
matter Is one that must be made by the negotiating parties. Once
that decision Is made, the parties must decide whether or not the
particular Item Is one that will be negotiated. However, the
author
did amend the caption of section IV from "Policy Matters"
to "Policy
Matters /Working Conditions".
The author made other changes to the first
question as originally
drawn. In section I, subsection 5, "Multiple
year contracts" and
subsection 6. "Reserve clause" were added. A
final change was made
In section I by transferring the subsection
relating to the grievance
107
procedure to section II. Section III, subsection 14 was changed to
Include "Sick leave bank".
Answers to the first, second, and fourth questions were obtained
by examining the collective bargaining agreements entered into by New
Hampshire School Districts for the 1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979
school years. Additionally, the records of the New Hampshire Public
Employee Labor Relations Board were reviewed. In selecting the
collective bargaining agreements to be considered, those covering the
1976-1977 school year were not included, as this was a transitional
period under RSA 273-A. This statute became legally effective in
August 1975, but was inapplicable to the collective bargaining
process until December 21, 1975, which was well after the collective
bargaining process for the 1976-1977 school year had commenced. At
the same time, the negotiators were aware of RSA 273-A's adoption,
of its provisions and that this undoubtedly would have some impact
on them. It is this author’s opinion that the collective bargaining
agreements for the 1976-1977 school year may have been atypical.
Method of Collecting Agreements
The author acquired the collective bargaining
agreements from
the New Hampshire public school districts by
personally contacting
the various school district superintendents.
The agreements collected
were those that met the following definition;
A collective bargaining agreement
is a written agreement which stip-
ulates those terms and conditions
of employment tliat the parties
have agreed to as a result of
negotiations.
108
The superintendents were contacted in April 1978. They were
quite cooperative and most of the collective bargaining agreements
were received during the months of April and May. A number of
superintendents were not able to forward collective bargaining agree-
ments as the school districts that they represented were still
negotiating the 1978-1979 collective bargaining agreements with the
teacher associations or unions that represented the bargaining units
in those districts. The author periodically contacted such super-
intendents to discuss the status of their negotiations. As collective
bargaining agreements were settled in these districts, copies were
forwarded to the author.
The author personally spoke to the superintendents in order to
reduce the possibility of misunderstanding as to the type of informa-
tion being sought as well as to ensure a better return of the material
being sought. In order to further reduce the possibility that there
would be collective bargaining agreements of which the author was
unaware, he reviewed the records of the New Hampshire Public Employee
Labor Relations Board to determine the recognition or certification
status of the teacher bargaining units in the various New Hampshire
public school districts. Either the certification status or the
recognition status has the effect that the union is the exclusive
bargaining agent for the unit.
Certification status was granted to a bargaining unit
that had
been selected by the staff members of a school
district as the exclusive
bargaining agent for said bargaining unit in an
election held and
supervised by the New Hampshire Public Employee
Labor Relations Board.
The PELRB, following its own criteria, has
granted recognition status
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to bargaining units that had both a history of collective bargaining
and a signed collective bargaining agreement with the respective public
employer prior to the enactment of RSA 273~A in 1975. Of the school
districts whose superintendents advised the author that they did not
have a collective bargaining agreement in effect for the 1975-1976
school year, the bargaining units in four of the school districts had
been recognized by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Upon
reviewing the history of collective bargaining in these districts with
the superintendents, this writer was advised that there was in fact a
signed collective bargaining agreement in effect for the 1975-1976
school year, although the agreements in question could not be considered
to be very comprehensive in nature. Copies of these documents were for-
warded to the author, and were subsequently included in the research.
This writer also made inquiry of those school districts whose teacher
bargaining units had been certified but whose superintendents had advised
the author that the school districts had not entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the respective bargaining units. In reviewing
the status of collective bargaining in these districts, this writer was
informed that even though the teacher bargaining units had been certified,
a collective bargaining agreement had not been entered into between the
school district and the teacher bargaining unit with one exception.
The one exception was a retroactive agreement covering the 1977-1978
school year, the terms of which were agreed to in the latter
part of
April 1978. The status of collective bargaining in those
school
districts whose teacher bargaining units are certified, but
which
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still do not have collective bargaining agreements will be reviewed
In Chapter IV when this writer discusses the change In the number of
collective bargaining agreements before and after the enactment of
RSA 273-A.
Method of Data Collection
As the collective bargaining agreements were received, they were
analyzed In relation to the various sub-items In question number one.
The data obtained from these analyses were the sole source of Information
that the author used to answer question one.
The recognition clause In each collective bargaining agreement
was reviewed for the purpose of determining changes In the composition
of the bargaining units contained In agreements negotiated before
the
enactment of RSA 273-A as opposed to post RSA 273-A agreements.
This
writer reviewed changes In relation to those positions
that were added
to the bargaining unit as well as the changes In
relation to those
positions that were excluded from the bargaining unit.
As with ques-
tion number one, these agreements served as
the sole source of Informa-
tion In answering question number two.
As eleven of the collective bargaining
agreements covering the
1978-1979 school year had not been finalized
at the time that
data for the third question was gathered,
and as those eleven would
comprise a majority of the agreements finalized
after the annual
school district meeting. It was
decided that only those collective
bargaining agreements that were
negotiated for the 1977-1978 school
year would be used to provide the
data to answer the third
question.
Ill
step in procuring the information used to answer question
number three was to determine the signature date of each collectiva
bargaining agreement. The signature page of each agreement was
examined, but unfortunately many of the signature pages of the col-
lective bargaining agreements that had been forwarded to the author
were blank; additionally, some of those that were signed did not have
a date affixed. This writer then reviewed the records of the Public
Employee Labor Relations Board and was able to determine a signature
date for all except four of the collective bargaining agreements that
were in effect for 1977-1978.
Of the collective bargaining agreements for which the author was
able to obtain a signature date, it appeared that execution of the
agreements probably took place after the annual school district
meeting in twenty-six instances. This writer was able to contact all
but one of the superintendents involved, and of the twenty-five
superintendents contacted, nine superintendents advised the author
that the terms of the agreement had in fact been agreed to after the
annual school district meeting. Fifteen superintendents stated that
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement had been agreed to be-
fore the annual school district meeting but the official signing of the
agreement was not held until after the annual school district
meeting.
One superintendent advised the author that the school district
he
served operated under the city council form of government
and, there-
fore, did not have an annual school district meeting.
The author discussed the situation with the
superintendents, and
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in only 3. few Instances where collective bargaining agreements were
finalized subsequent to the annual school district meeting did the
school board modify the negotiating positions that they had held prior
to said meeting. Only one superintendent was able to produce
documentation showing the changes In the position held by the school
board prior to the annual school district meeting and what It eventual-
ly agreed to in the final version of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The other superintendents told the author that they would look
for the documentation but they were not too optimistic about finding
it. The details of the information that the author discussed with
the superintendents relative to the above will be discussed in question
III, Chapter IV when the author discusses the changes between the
negotiating positions held by the school boards prior to the annual
school district meeting and the collective bargaining agreement final-
ized subsequent to the meeting.
Compilation of the material used to answer the fourth question
was done as follows. The author developed a chart by listing all of
the school districts in the state alphabetically. Notations
were
then made alongside the name of the school district as to
whether or
not a collective bargaining agreement was in effect during
any one,
two, or all three of the school years encompassed in
the study. The
chart was then used to compute the number of
collective bargaining
agreements In effect in each of the three years
and thereby establish
whether or not there had been a change in the
number of collective
bargaining agreements before as opposed to
after the enactment of
RSA 273-A, and if so, the extent of the
change. In order to demonstrate
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the change in the number of teachers covered by collective bargaining
agreements before and after the enactment of RSA 273-A, information
was taken from the Summary of Reference Data on Supervisory Unions
which is published by the New Hampshire State Department of Education.^
This document lists the number of teachers in each school district.
The total number of teachers covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments in any of the three years was computed by simply adding the
number of teachers in the school districts that had collective bargain-
ing agreements in effect for that year. There are two limitations to
this Information. The data is published in the fall of the year for
the previous school year. Therefore, the author had the information
for the 1975-1976 and the 1977-1978 school years, but was compelled to
use the 1977-1978 information for the 1978-1979 school year as that
information would not be available until September 1979. Additionally
the data cites only full-time classroom teachers, and the
bargaining
units often include others in addition to full-time classroom
teacher.
However, the author did not consider either limitation
to be serious.
^New Hampshire, State Department of Education,
Summay
, _
o
T?pfprpnce Data on Superivsory Unions , July 1, 1976. PP*
New Hampshire. State DepartmLt of lEducation.
Summary of Refere
Data on Supervisory Unions , July 1, 1978, pp.
l-o*
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The information that was gathered and analyzed in order to
answer the four questions that were selected to be studied was obtained
primarily from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded
to the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents. All but
three of the collective bargaining agreements in effect for the periods
1975-1976 and 1977-1979 were obtained. The author also utilized infor-
mation that was gathered in his many conversations with these same
superintendents. Lastly, information gathered from the records of the
New Hampshire State Department of Education and the New Hampshire
Public Employee Labor Relations Board was also utilized by the author.
The results of the study will be presented in relation to the questions
selected in Chapter III. In Chapter IV the questions will be
answer-
ed in a different order than they were listed in Chapter
III. The
author believes that the reader will be in a better
position to under-
stand collective bargaining in New Hampshire public
school districts if
the questions are answered in the following order:
What has been the
change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect be-
fore and after the enactment of RSA
273-A7: What have been the changes
in the composition of the bargaining units
as contained in the recogni-
tion clauses of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated before
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and after the enactment of RSA 273-A?; In school districts where col-
lective bargaining agreements were not finalized prior to the annual
school district meetings, what were the changes between the negotiating
positions held by the school boards prior to the annual school district
meeting and the positions that they agreed to in the collective bar-
gaining agreements finalized subsequent to the meeting?; and what has
been the change in the scope of collective bargaining before and after
the enactment of RSA 273-A? For the purposes of this study, the scope
of collective bargaining Includes those items listed on pages 100-103.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ENACTMENT OF RSA 273-A?
The data that were utilized to anwer this question were obtained
by tabulating the number of collective bargaining agreements that were
forwarded to the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for
each of the three years. In the tabulation, the author also included
the three 1978-1979 collective bargaining agreements that were not for-
warded. The number of personnel covered by these collective bargaining
agreements was computed by counting the number of staff members in
those
school districts in which a collective bargaining agreement had
been
negotiated. This information was taken from the Summary of
Reference Data
on Supervisory Unions which lists the number of staff members
in each
one of the New Hampshire public school districts.^
This information
^Ibid., pp. 1-8; and Ibid., pp. 1-8.
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relative to the status of collective bargaining in those school
districts wherein the teacher bargaining units are certified but
which still do not have collective bargaining agreements was com-
piled from the notes taken by the author during his conversations
with New Hampshire public school superintendents. As can be seen
in Table 2 (page 117), the number of collective bargaining agree-
ments in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A in
August 1975, which would be those in effect for the 1975-1976
school year, was 52. This number increased to 78 for the 1977-
1978 school year, which amounted to an increase of 50 percent over
the 1975-1976 school year. The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect for 1978-1979 Increased to 86, which amounted
to an increase of eleven percent over the 1977-1978 school year.
In addition to reporting the change in the number of agreements
in effect for each of the three years, it was decided to report the
change in the number of collective bargaining unit members that were
covered by said agreements for each of the three years. As can be
seen in Table 2 (page 117), the number of collective bargaining unit
members in 1975-1976 was 6,158. This number increased to 8,023 for
the 1977-1978 school year, which amounted to an Increase of 30
per-
cent over the 1975-1976 school year. The number of
collective bar-
gaining unit members covered by collective bargaining
agreements in-
creased to 8,356 for the 1978-1979 school year, which
amounted to an
increase of four percent over the 1977-1978 school
year.
The NHEA supported the passage of RSA 273-A
because it believed
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN EFFECT AND
STAFF MEMBERS COVERED BY SAID AGREEMENTS BEFORE AND
AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA 2 7 3-
A
Staff members
covered by
said agreements
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
1975-1976 1977- 1978 1978- 1979
freq. freq. pet
.
annual
gain
freq. pet
.
annual
gain
Ing
feet 52 78 50X 86 IIX
6158 8023 30X 8356 AX
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legislative recognition of the collective bargaining process
would assist teachers in their efforts to enter into collective
bargaining agreements with school boards. Based on the results as
tabulated in Table 2, this author would conclude that the NHEA
achieved its purpose because during the period of time that was
studied, the net change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect was 34 which was an increase of 65 percent over
the three years. The net change in the total number of teachers
covered under these agreements was 2,198, which was an Increase of
36 percent over the same period.
In considering the net change that has taken place in the total
number of collective bargaining agreements in effect and the number
of collective bargaining unit members covered by these agreements,
one very interesting question that arises is the potential for growth.
As of July 1, 1978, there were 157 public school districts in New
Hampshire that maintained schools. The 86 collective bargaining
agreements that were in effect for the 1978-1979 school year covered
93 school districts. If collective bargaining agreements were to
be negotiated in the remaining 64 school districts, this would bring
the total number of collective bargaining agreements in effect to
150, and this would be an increase of 74% over the total
number of
agreements recorded for 1978-1979 and an increase of 288%
over the
total number of collective bargaining agreements recorded
for 1975-
1976. The additional 64 agreements would represent
954 staff members
bringing the total number of staff members to 9,310
which would be
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an increase of eleven percent over the 1978-1979 school year, and an
increase of 51 percent over the total number of staff members covered
by collective bargaining agreements in 1975-1976.
According to the provisions of RSA 273-A, a school board is not
required to enter into a collective bargaining relationship with a
teacher association or union unless the association or union represents
ten or more staff members with a "community of Interest." It is,
however, possible that a school board may wish to enter into a col-
lective bargaining relationship with a teacher association or union
even though the association or union does not represent the requisite
number of staff members per RSA 273-A. Therefore, the author reviewed
the number of agreements to determine how many, if any, had been
negotiated with associations or unions representing less than ten
members. There are nine such agreements. Four of the nine have
been negotiated in supervisory unions in which collective bargaining
was conducted on a supervisory union-wide basis. Therefore, in
those supervisory unions where collective bargaining is conducted on
a supervisory union-wide basis all of the school districts are
Included in the collective bargaining process and in the subsequent
collective bargaining agreement without regard to the number of staff
members represented by the collective bargaining unit in each school
district. Accordingly, this writer concluded that in those school
districts having less than ten staff members where a collective
bargaining relationship does not already exist it is
highly unlikely
that such a relationship will develop under current
law.
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The author then considered those school districts having ten
or more staff members that do not have a collective bargaining agree-
ment. There were twenty-six such school districts that did not have
collective bargaining agreements for the 1978-1979 school year. If
agreements were to be negotiated in all twenty—six school districts
«
this would bring the total number of agreements to 112 which would
be an increase of 30% over the total number of agreements recorded
for 1978-1979, and an increase of 115% over the total number of agree-
ments recorded for 1975-1976. The additional 26 collective bargaining
agreements would represent 774 staff members bringing the total number
of staff members represented to 9,130 which would be an increase
of
nine percent over the 1978-1979 school year, and an increase of
48
percent over the total number of staff members covered by
collective
bargaining agreements in 1975-1976.
Twelve of the district teacher associations in
the aforementioned
26 school districts have been granted recognition
status under the
provisions of RSA 273-A. However, seven of the
twelve associations
have not chosen to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement with
the school boards in those respective
school districts. The remaining
five had not been recognized in time
to enter Into negotlatlo
the 1978-1979 school year. The
Interest shown by four of the five
was such that it was doubtful
whether they would enter into a
formal
relationship for the 1979-1980 school
year. The author discussed
the status of collective bargaining
with the superintendents in
several of these school districts.
One of the school districts
is
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quite affluent, and the staff members are amongst the highest paid in
the state. The teachers also are very active in the development of
the school district’s educational program. Thomas Adams, NHEA field
representative, advised the author that, as a result of their financial
and professional satisfaction, it had been very difficult for the
NHEIA to develop interest amongst the staff members of this school dis-
trict in the collective bargaining process. The school district super-
intendent was also of the same opinion.
The staff members in several of the school districts meet with
the school boards, however, the agreements that are reached are of a
very Informal nature. In one of the districts, the staff members, in
the election conducted by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board,
had initially chosen to be affiliated with a statewide teachers
organ-
ization. However, after the election the staff members changed
their
minds and advised the statewide teachers’ organization
that they no
longer wished to maintain their affiliation.
Collective bargaining units had been recognized in
two of Che
districts, however, the recognition had come after
the date on which
they had to notify the school boards of their
Intent to bargain, and
therefore, they were not eligible to bargain
under the provisions of
RSA 273-A for the 1978-1979 school year.
A bargaining unit in another
district had been recognized in sufficient
time, and two meetings ha
been held with the school board; however,
a considerable amount of
time had elapsed since the second
meeting, and the bargaining unit
had not yet given its proposal to
the school board.
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The status of collective bargaining in these school districts
then appears to be one in which the staff members either are not par-
ticularly Interested in the collective bargaining process, or if
interested, are satisfied to have an informal relationship with the
school board.
WHAT HAVE BEEN THE CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF
THE BARGAINING UNITS AS CONTAINED IN THE RECOGNI-
TION CLAUSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
NEGOTIATED BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA
273-A?
The data that were utilized to anwer this question were obtained
from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded to
the author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for each of
the three years 1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979. Fifty-two
collective bargaining agreements covering 59 school districts were in
effect for the 1975-1976 school year. The author was able to collect
the 52 agreements, and, consequently, all of the information from the
1975-
1976 collective bargaining agreements that pertained to this
question is Included in the data analysis.
The collective bargaining agreements covering the 1976-1977
school year were not included in the research as the author considered
this period of time to be a transitional year. The negotiators
were
aware of RSA 273-A, but they were not bound by its
provisions. Assum-
ing that this would have had some impact on the
negotiators, it is the
author’s opinion that the collective bargaining
agreements for the
1976-
1977 school year may have been atypical. This
issue was dls
cussed in more detail on page 107 Chapter III.
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Seventy-eight collective bargaining agreements covering 85
school districts were in effect for the 1977-1978 school year. The
author was able to collect the 78 agreements. Of the 78 agreements,
six are multiple year agreements, and were negotiated at the same
time as the 1975-1976 agreements prior to the enactment of RSA
273-A (August 1975), and will not be considered for this question.
Fourteen agreements covering 20 school districts were negotiated
as part of a multiple year agreement, and were negotiated at
the same time as the 1976-1977 agreements. Because the 1976-
1977 agreements are not being considered in this study, those four-
teen 1977-1978 agreements will also not be considered. Therefore,
for the purpose of this question 58 collective bargaining agreements
covering 59 school districts for 1977-1978 will be considered. These
58 agreements were all negotiated in 1976 or 1977 and are single year
agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
Eighty-six collective bargaining agreements covering 93 school
districts were In effect for the 1978-1979 school yesr. This
author
was able to collect 83 of the 86 agreements. Of the 83
agreements,
28 covernlng 29 school districts were negotiated as
part of a
multiple year agreement, and were negotiated along
with the 1977
1978 agreements. These 28 were Included
In the data for 1977-1978
and will not be Included In the data for
1978-1979. Additionally,
five agreements covernlng six school
districts were negotiated as part
of a multiple year agreement, and wore
negotiated at the same time
These five agreements will also not
as the 1976-1977 agreements.
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be considered. Therefore, for the purpose of this question 50
agreements covering 55 school districts for 1978-1979 will be
considered. These 50 agreements were all negotiated in 1977 or
1978 and are single year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements
As can be seen in Table 3, (page 125) the number of collective
bargaining agreements containing a recognition clause immediately
before the enactment of RSA 273-A was 43 of the 52 agreements (83Z).
The number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 that contained a recognition clause was increased
to 55 out of the 58 agreements (95%) and 48 out of the 50 agreements
(96%) respectively. The number of recognition clauses in effect for
1975-1976 that included specific personnel positions was 24 (46%).
The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 that included specific personnel positions was to change to 35
(60%) and 32 (64%) respectively. The number of recognition clauses
in effect for 1975-1976 that excluded specific personnel positions
was 31 (60%) . The number of recognition clauses that were
negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that excluded specific
personnel positions
was 39 (67%) and 34 (68%) respectively. The number of
recognition
clauses in effect for 1975-1976 that included
department chairmen
was six (12%). The number of recognition clauses
negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that included department
chairmen was increased
to eight (14%) and seven (14%) respectively.
The number of recognition
clauses In effect for 1975-1976 that
excluded department chairmen was
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS CONTAINING RECOGNITION CLAUSES AND CHANGES IN THE
COMPOSITION OF THE BARGAINING UNITS AS CONTAINED IN THE RECOGNITION
CLAUSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED
SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF RSA 2 7 3-A AND THOSE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ADOPTION
OF RSA 273-A
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
1975-
N =
1976^
52
1977-
N -
1978^
58
1978-
N -
1979^
50
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
Recognition clause 43 83% 55 95% 48 96%
Recognition clauses
including specific
personnel positions 24 46% 35 60% 32 64%
Recognition clauses
excluding specific
personnel positions 31 60% 39 67% 34 68%
Recognition clauses
Including department
chairmen 6 12% 8 14% 7 14%
Recognition clauses
excluding department
chairmen 17 33% 16 28% 16 32%
Recognition clauses
including nurses 14 27% 14 24%
17 34%
Recognition clauses
excluding nurses 10 19% 16 28%
13 26%
Recognition clauses
including part time
staff members 1 2% 5
9% 3 6%
Recognition clauses
excluding part time
staff members 10 19%
18 31% 15 30%
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TABLE 3—Continued
The Intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were In effect liranediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2
The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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17 (33%). The number of recognition clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that excluded department chairmen was
16 (28%) and 16 (32%) respectively. The number of collective bargain-
ing agreements In effect for 1975-1976 that Included nurses was
fourteen (27%). The number of recognition clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that included nurses was to change to
fourteen (24%) and seventeen (34%) respectively. The number of recogni-
tion clauses in effect for 1975-1976 that excluded nurses was ten (19%).
The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 that excluded nurses was increased to sixteen (28%) and thirteen
(26%) respectively. The number of recognition clauses in effect for
1975-1976 that included part time staff members was one (2%). The
number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
that included part time staff members was to change to five (9%) and
three (6%) respectively. The number of recognition clauses in effect
for 1975-1976 that excluded part time staff members was ten (19%).
The number of recognition clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 that excluded part time staff members was 18 (31%) and 15 (30%)
respectively.
RSA 273-A appears to have brought about a trend toward
greater
specificity in the recognition clauses that have been
negotiated since
its enactment, and this is borne out in Table 3.
The percentage of
agreements containing a recognition clause rose from
83 in 1975-1976
to 96 in 1978-1979. This trend can also
be seen in the recognition
clauses including and excluding specific
personnel positions. The
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percentage of the former rose from A6 to 64 during the three year
period that was studied while the percentage of the latter rose from
60 to 68 during the same period. This trend was also noted In the
recognition clauses Including department chairmen as well as In the
recognition clauses Including and excluding nurses and part time staff
members
.
With regard to the number of collective bargaining agreements
containing a recognition clause, the author did not find a large change.
Prior to RSA 273-A most agreements (83%) included a recognition clause.
Since RSA 273-A almost all agreements (96%) include a recognition
clause. While the number did increase from 43 in 1975-1976 to 55
in
1977-1978, the percentage increase was not as great in that
more agree-
ments were negotiated in the latter year. When the
number of agree-
ments negotiated in 1978-1979 declined to 50, the number
of agreements
containing a recognition clause declined to 48.
The percentage increase of recognition clauses
containing sped-
flc personnel positions during the
school years 1975-1976 and 1977-
1978 was not as great as the numerical
Increase because more recogni-
tion clauses were negotiated for the latter
year. Although the number
of recognition clauses including
specific personnel positions declined
the following year, the percentage
of such clauses showed a slight
increase because once again fewer
recognition clauses were negotiated
1- j t-Vio author would conclude that the
for 1978-1979. Based on the data,
the n
overall Increase has not been
substantial. A substantial number
of the
clauses still do not list
specific personnel positions.
recognition
129
Of the 67 recognition clauses that included specific personnel
positions in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, ten had been in effect in 1975-
1976. When these ten were renegotiated in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979,
guidance counselor and librarian were each added to two of the inclusion
sections as found in the ten recognition clauses. Reading coordinator,
permanent substitute, part time staff members, media specialist, driver
education teacher, staff members on leave, department chairmen who
teach three or more periods per day, team leaders, and subject co-
ordinators were each added to one of the ten recognition clauses.
The percentage increase of recognition clauses excluding specific
personnel positions during the school years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978
was not as great as the numerical increase because more recognition
clauses were negotiated for the latter year. While the number of
recognition clauses excluding specific personnel positions declined
by five in 1978-1979, the percentage change between the two years was
negligible because fewer recognition clauses were negotiated for that
year.
Of the 73 recognition clauses that excluded specific personnel
positions in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979, eight had been in effect in
1975-1976. When these eight were renegotiated in 1977-1978 and
1978-1979, the following positions were each added to two of the
exclusion sections as found in the eight recognition clauses:
assistant principal, guidance counselor, vocational education
director,
superintendent, assistant superintendent, special education
coordinator,
and hourly paid personnel. Additionally, part time
teachers, nurse.
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business administrator, media director, curriculum coordinator, and
director of guidance were each added to one of the exclusion sections
as found In the eight recognition clauses.
The change In those recognition clauses Including and excluding
department chairmen was negligible. The change In recognition clauses
including school nurses was also small, although the recognition
clauses both including and excluding school nurses did show an Increase
between the years 1975-1976 and 1978-1979.
There was an Increase In both the percentage and the number of
recognition clauses including part time staff members between the
years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978. There was a decline in both the per-
centage and the number of such clauses the following year; however,
the numbers in all three years are so small that it is difficult to
attach any meaning to the change. The overall increase in the number
of recognition clauses excluding part time staff members was more
substantial. Part of this change can be attributed to the fact
that
more recognition clauses were negotiated in 1977-1978 than
in 1975-1976
While there was a slight decrease in 1978-1979, the
overall change
was from 19 to 30 percent. The author would
conclude that during the
period studied there was more interest to exclude
part time personnel
than to include them.
IN SCHOOL DISTRICTS WHERE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS WERE NOT FINALIZED ^0
^HE ^WAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT MEETING, WHAT WERE THE
CHANGES
BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ^ ™ ^^T
SCHOOL BOARDS PRIOR TO THE ANNUAL
SCHOOL DISTRIC
MEETINGS AND THE POSITION THAT THEY
AGREED TO IN
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
FINALIZED
SUBSEQUENT TO THE MEETING?
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The data that were used to answer this question were obtained
from the signature pages of the collective bargaining agreements that
were collected by the author, the records of PELRB, and conversations
that were held with the New Hampshire public school superintendents.
Public school districts in New Hampshire are permitted by state
statute to hold their annual school district meetings between March
first and April twentieth. The author was able to determine the
signature date for all but four of the collective bargaining agree-
ments that were in effect for 1977-1978. From the signature dates
that were noted, it appeared as though the execution of 26 of the
78 agreements that were in effect for 1977-1978 took place after the
annual school district meeting. The author personally contacted the
superintendents who were involved, and was advised that in 15 of the
26 instances the terms of the agreement actually had been settled
be-
fore the annual school district meeting, and that nine of the
agree-
ments were completed after the district meeting. One
superintendent
advised the author that the school district that he
represented did
not hold a school district meeting as it came under
the city form
of government, and the author was unable to contact
one superintendent.
All of the nine superintendents were asked to
forward
documentation that would reflect the negotiating
positions of the
school boards, but only one superintendent
was able to comply with
the request. The others were extremely
doubtful that they would be
able to locate the information, and in
fact did not forward any
information.
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In seven school districts, the author was advised by the respec-
tive school superintendents that the settlements that were reached
®fter the annual school district meeting did not reflect any changes
in the school board's negotiating position Just prior to the annual
school district meeting.
In one school district, salary was the only area of disagreement.
A five percent salary increase for the teachers had been voted at the
annual school district meeting. When a settlement was reached after
the annual school district meeting, the school board agreed to a 6.3
percent salary increase for the teachers.
Of these nine agreements settled after the annual school district
meeting, the services of a mediator were engaged to help resolve the
dispute in one school district. In this instance, there were five
areas of disagreement; arbitration, duration of agreement, salary,
personnel files, and insurance. The school board changed its position
on arbitration. While it had previously not been willing to agree to
arbitration, it agreed to advisory arbitration. The board also
settled for a one year agreement where previously it had been insisting
on a multi-year agreement. The board also agreed to a two hundred
dollar increase on the base salary which was fifty dollars more than
it had been willing to agree to prior to the annual school district
meeting. Lastly, in the areas of personnel files and insurance,
the final settlement reflected the initial position of the
board.
Based on the data, the author would conclude that with the
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exception of the one school district noted above substantial change
did not take place in the negotiating positions of the school boards
in those districts where the collective bargaining agreements were
settled after the annual school district meeting.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE CHANGE IN THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF RSA
273-A? FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY, THE SCOPE
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL INCLUDE:
I. Negotiations Procedures
1. Definition of scope
2. Time limits
3. Resolution of interest disputes
a. Per RSA 273-A
b. Per the provisions of the master agreement
A. No strike clause
5. Multiple year contracts
6. Reserve Clause
II, Organizational Benefits
1. Dues deductions
2. Agency fee
3. Use of facilities
4. Grievance procedure
a. Grievance limited to agreement
b. Final determination by superintendent
c. Final determination by school board
d. Final determination by arbiter-advisory
e. Final determination by arbiter-binding
5. Organizational grievances
6. Class action grievances
7. Representational rights in grievances
8. Organizational access to employer's records
9. Time off for Association activities
III. Direct Economic Benefits
1. Compensation by preparation and years of
experience
2. Compensation by merit
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3. Longevity pay
4. Credit for experience outside the school district
5. Retirement bonus
6. Medical insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Dental Insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
8. Life insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
9. Disability insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
10. Course reimbursement
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
d. maximum amount budgeted or "cap"
11. Comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedule
12. Athletic pay schedule
13. Personal leave
a. 3 days or more
b. 1 or 2 days
14. Sick leave
a. 15 days or more per annum
b. less than 15 days per annum
c. cumulative to more than 60 days
d. cumulative to less than 60 days
e. sick leave bank
15. Sabbatical leave
16. Maternity leave
17. Adoption leave
18. Bereavement leave
19. Military leave
IV. Policy Matters/Working Conditions
1. Class size
2. Teaching load
3. Preparation periods
4. Curriculum participation
5. Textbook selection
6. Need for specialized teachers
7. Staff evaluation
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8. Posting of vacancies
9. Staff selection
10. Staff transfer
11. Promotions
12. Staff termination
13. Reduction in force
14. Professional requirements for beginning teachers
15. Staff development (Recertification)
16. Funds budgeted for staff development
17. School calendar
18. Length of school year
19. Length of school day
20. Academic freedom
21. Discipline for just cause
22. Restrictions on faculty meetings
The data that were utilized to answer this question were obtained
from the collective bargaining agreements that were forwarded to the
author by the New Hampshire school superintendents for each of the
three years; 1975-1976, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979. Fifty-two collective
bargaining agreements covering 59 school districts were in effect for
the 1975-1976 school year. The author was able to collect the
52 agree-
ments, and consequently, all of the information from the
1975-1976
collective bargaining agreements that pertained to this
question is
included in the data analysis.
The collective bargaining agreements covering
the 1976-1977 school
year were not Included in the research as the
author considered this
period of time to be a transitional year.
The negotiators were aware
of RSA 273-A, but they were not bound
by Its provisions. Assuming
that this would have had some Impact on
the negotiators. It Is the
author's opinion that the collective
bargaining agreements for the
1976-1977 school year may have been
atypical. This issue was
cussed In more detail on page 107
Chapter III.
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Seventy-eight collective bargaining agreements coveming 85
school districts were in effect for the 1977-1978 school year. The
author was able to collect the 78 agreements. Of the 78 agreements
«
six are multiple year agreements, and were negotiated at the same
time as the 1975-1976 agreements prior to the enactment of RSA 273-A
(August 1975), and will not be considered for this question. Fourteen
agreements covernlng 20 school districts were negotiated as part
of a multiple year agreement, and were negotiated at the same time
as the 1976-1977 agreements. Becuase the 1976-1977 agreements are
not being considered in this study, those fourteen 1977-1978 agree-
ments will also not be considered. Therefore, for the purpose of
this question 58 collective bargaining agreements covering 59 school
districts for 1977-1978 will be considered. These 58 agreements
were all negotiated in 1976-1977 and are single year agreements or
the
first year of multiple year agreements.
Eight-six collective bargaining agreements coveming 93 school
districts were in effect for the 1978-1979 school year.
This author
was able to collect 83 of the 86 agreements.
However, of the 83
agreements, 28 covernlng 29 school districts were
negotiated as part
of a multiple year agreement, and were
negotiated along with the
1977-1978 agreements. These 28 were Included
In the data for 1977-
1978, and will not be Included In Che
data for 1978-1979. Additionally
five agreements covernlng six school
districts were negotiated as part
of a multiple year agreement, and were
negotiated at the same time as
Che 1976-1977 agreements. These five
agreements will also not
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considered. Therefore, for the purpose of this question, 30 agreements
covering 55 school districts In 1978-1979 will be considered. These
50 agreements were all negotiated In 1977-1978 and are single year
agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
Negotiations procedures and basic parameters . RSA 273-A appears to
have had a mixed effect on the negotiations procedures and basic
parameters listed In Table A (page 138) In that three of these Items
Increased, two decreased, and one showed little change. The most
noticeable Increase took place In the area of multiple year contracts,
and the decline Involved the clauses providing a definition of scope
and a no strike clause.
As can be seen In Table A, the number of collective bargaining
agreements containing a definition of scope Immediately before the
enactment of RSA 273-A was 29 of the 52 agreements (562). The
number
of collective bargaining agreements negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 that contained a definition of scope changed to
32 out of the
58 agreements (55%) and 23 out of the 50 agreements
(A62) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect for
1975-1976 that Included time limits was A1 (79%).
The number of time
limits negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
was to change to 49
(85%) and A5 (90%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements that were In
effect for 1975-1976 that Included a
resolution of Interest disputes
clause was 36 (69%) . The number of
resolution of Interest disputes
clauses that were negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 were AO
(702)
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS PROCEDURES
AND BASIC PARAMETERS
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Negotiations 1975- 1976^ 1977-1978^ 1978- 1979^
Procedures and
N - 52 N - 58 N - 50
Basic Parameters
freq. pet. freq. pet
.
freq
.
pet
.
Definition of scope 29 56% 32 55% 23 46%
Time limits;
Initiation of the
collective bar-
gaining process 41 79% 49 85% 45 90%
Resolution of
Interest disputes: 36 69% 40 70% 34 68%
a. per RSA 273-A -0- 0% 20 35% 16 32%
b. per master
agreement 36 69% 20 35% 18 36%
No strike clause 27 52% 20 35% 21 42%
Multiple year
contracts 8 15% 28 48% 20
Reserve clause 23 44% 24 41% 26 52%
^The Intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect inmediately before the enactment of RSA
273-A.
^The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed
only
single year agreements or the first year of multiple year
agreemen s.
^The intent of the author was to consider only those
agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he
reviewed only
single year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements,
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and 34 (68%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a resolution of Interest disputes
clause per the provisions of RSA 273-A was zero. The number of
resolution of Interest disputes clauses per the provisions of RSA
273-A that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20 (35%)
and 16 (32%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a resolution of interest disputes clause per
the provisions of the agreement was 36 (69%). The number of resol-
ution of interest disputes clauses per the provisions of the master
agreement that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20
(35%) and 18 (36%).
The number of no strike clauses that were in effect for
1975-
1976 was 27 (52%). The number of no strike clauses that were
negotia-
ted for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 20 (35%)
and 21
(42%) respectively.
The number of agreements in effect in 1975-1976
that had been
negotiated as part of a multiple year contract was
eight (15*). The
number of agreements that were negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 that were negotiated as part of a multiple
year contract wa
(98*) and 20 (40%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements that were in
effect in 1975-1976 which contained a
reserve clause was 23 (44%).
The number of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 containing
such a clause was increased to
24 (41 )
140
and 26 (52%) respectively,
RSA 273-A appears to have brought about a decline in several
of the procedures listed in Table 4; these include definition of
scope, resolution of Interest disputes per the master agreement, and
no strike clause. It is the author’s opinion that these procedures
declined because they are also covered by the provisions of RSA 273-A,
and, consequently the negotiators saw no need to include them in the
collective bargaining agreements. The percentage of collective bar-
gaining agreements containing a definition of scope clause declined
from 56 in 1975-1976 to 46 in 1978-1979. The percentage of collective
bargaining agreements containing a no strike clause declined from
52 in 1975-1976 to 42 in 1978-1979. The percentage of collective
bargaining agreements containing a resolution of interest disputes
clause per the master agreement also declined between 1975-1976
and
1978-1979.
One change that usually accompanies the enactment
of a col-
lective bargaining statute is that collective
bargaining becomes more
formal. Table 4 indicates that there was an
Increase in several nego-
tlatlons procedures that are usually found in
more formal and sophlstl
cated collective bargaining. The percentage
of collective bargaining
agreements containing a time limits clause
Increased from 79 In 1975-
1976 to 90 In 1978-1979. The percentage
of collective bargaining
agreements that were negotiated as part
of a multi year agreement
increased from 15 In 1975-1976 to 40
In 1978-1979. The percentage
of collective bargaining agreements
containing a reserve clause
lAl
as
increased slightly.
Prior to the enactment of RSA 272-k, the only resolution of
interest disputes clauses were the ones that had been negotiated
part of the collective bargaining agreements. The enactment of the
statute which took place after the 1975-1976 collective bargaining
agreements were negotiated was one of the main reasons why the
number of agreements containing a resolution of interest disputes
clause per RSA 273-A went from zero in 1975-1976 to 20 in 1977-1978.
The decrease in the number of resolution of interest disputes
clauses
per the master agreement from 36 in 1975-1976 to 20 in
1977-1978 can
be attributed to the same reason. The important point
to note here
is that the total number of resolution of interest
disputes clauses
changed very little from 1975-1976 to 1978-1979.
The change between the number of no strike
clauses in effect
for 1975-1976 (27) and the number negotiated
for 1977-1978 (20) was
rather large. It was especially so when
one considers that more
agreements were negotiated in the latter
year. The number and per-
centage of such clauses negotiated for
1978-1979 while somewhat
larger than for 1977-1978 Is still
below the 1975-1976 figures. The
author would attribute the decline
In the number and percentage of
no strike clauses during the
three year period that was studied
to
the fact that RSA 273-A now
prohibits strikes by public
employees.
The public employer, therefore,
can now use the no strike
provision,
of RSA 273-A to obtain a court
Injunction ordering the striking
public employees back to work,
and does not have to rely
on a no
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strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement to obtain an
inj unction.
The number and percentage of multiple year agreements increased
substantially between 1975-1976 and 1977-1978. While both the number
and percentage declined the following year, the author would conclude
that the overall Increase that took place during the three year
period that was studied was substantial. It may be that the present
Inflationary spiral has had a mixed effect on the increase in multiple
year agreements. Some school board members would argue that the terms
of a multiple year agreement might have less overall financial impact
than those of several single year agreements, and others might be con-
cerned that inflation would place the community in a position of not
being able to honor the commitments of a long term agreement. It is
the author's opinion that the main reason for the increase in the
number of multiple year agreements is that collective bargaining
can
be a very time consuming, expensive, and even unsettling
process.
Those who are directly concerned with the process are
pleased when
it is over, and certainly they would be even more
pleased if they
thought that they did not have to become Involved
with it again for
two or more years.
nr.anlzatlonal benefits perr.'lnlne to grievances.
RSA 273-A appears
to have had a nearly uniform effect on
certain organizational benefits
pertaining to grievances in that all but
two of the Items
Table 5 (page 1A3) had a meaningful
increase during the period that
was studied. Of the Items that
Increased, the most substantial
change
1A3
TABLE 5
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO GRIEVANCES
Before RSA 2 7 3-
A
After RSA 2 7 3-
A
Organizational
Benefits Pertaining
to Grievances
1975-1976^
N - 52
1977-1978^
N - 58
1978-1979^
N - 50
freq. pet. freq. pet. freq. pet
.
Grievance procedure 37 71% 57 99% 50 100%
a. Grievance limited
to agreement 36 69% 45 78%
42 84%
b. Final determination
by superintendent -0- -0-
-0-
c. Final determination
by school board -
no advisory arbi-
tration process 8 15% 19 33%
11 22%
d. Final determination
by school board
with provision
for advisory
arbitration 13 25% 20 35%
22 44%
e. Provision for
binding arbi-
tration 16 31% 18
31% 17 34%
Organizational grie-
vances 14 27%
20 35% 17 34%
Class action grie-
vances 19 37%
29 50% 26 52%
Representational
rights in grievances 26 50%
41 71% 41 82%
1A4
TABLE 5—Continued
^The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2
The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only
single year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3
The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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that took place involved the clause granting representational rights
In the grievance process to teacher associations. The two items that
did not follow this trend were binding arbitration of grievances and
final determination of grievances by the superintendent. No change
at all took place relative to the clause wherein the final determina-
tion in the grievance procedure was made by the superintendent, and
the change in percentage in the clauses providing for binding arbitra-
tion of grievances was small.
As can be seen in Table 5, (page 143) the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect for 1975-1976 that contained a grie-
vance procedure was 37 out of the 52 agreements (71%). The number
of grievance procedures that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and
1978'
1979 was 57 out of the 58 agreements (99%) and 50 out of the 50
agreements (100%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect
in
1975-1976 which contained a clause limiting grievances to
violations
of the provisions of the agreement was 36 of the
52 agreements (69%).
The number of collective bargaining agreements
negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 that contained a clause
limiting grievances to the
violations of the provisions of the agreement
increased to 45 (78%)
and 42 (84%) respectively.
None of the agreements in effect
for 1975-1976 contained a
clause in the grievance procedure in
which the final determination
on a grievance was made by the
superintendent of schools, nor did
of the agreements negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 contain
\
any
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such a clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a grievance procedure wherein the final
determination was made by the school board with no provision for
arbitration was eight (15%), The number of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated for 1977—1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such
a clause was to change to 19 (33%) and 11 (22%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 containing a grievance procedure that provided for advisory
arbitration with the final determination by the school board was
thirteen (25%). The number of grievance procedures negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that provided for advisory arbitration with
the final determination by the school board was increased to 20 (35%)
and 22 (44%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect
in
1975-1976 wherein the final determination in the grievance
process
was binding arbitration was 16 (31%). The number
of grievance pro-
cedures negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that
provided for
binding arbitration was 18 (31%) and 17 (3«) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements
In effect for
1975-1976 that contained an organizational
grievance clause
(27%). The number of organizational
grievance clauses negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20
(35%) and 17 (3«) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a class action
grievance clause was 19 (37%)
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The number of class action grievance clauses negotiated for 1977-1978
and 1978-1979 was 29 (50%) and 26 (52%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause granting representational rights
in the grievance process to teacher associations was 26 (50%). The
number of representational rights clauses that were negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 41 (71%) and 41 (827.) rcspoc-
tlvely
.
Based on the data contained in Table 5 (page 143), the author
would conclude that the increased interest in the grievance procedure
brought forth two important changes. The first is that whereas in
1975-1976 37 out of the 52 agreements (71%) contained some form of
grievance procedure by 1978-1979 50 out of the 50 agreements (100%)
contained some form of grievance procedure. The second
is that whereas
in 1975-1976 29 out of the 52 agreements (56%)
contained some form of
arbitration procedure by 1978-1979 39 out of the
50 agreements (78%)
contained some form of arbitration procedure.
with regard to the number o£ clauses limiting
grievances to the
provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, the author found a
substantial change. The Important point
to note here Is that as a
result of the Increase that took
place during the three year period
that was studied only a small
fraction of the negotiated agreements
do not contain a clause limiting
grievances to the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
The Increase In the number of
Clauses limiting grievances to
the provisions of the agreement
may be
N
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attributed to a compromise between the teacher association and the
school board. It would seem that the teacher association would pre-
fer a grievance procedure with a broad definition as to what con-
stitutes a grievance wherein It would be able to grieve school dis-
trict practices and policies in addition to the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement. It would also seem that the school
board would prefer a grievance procedure with a narrow definition as
to what constitutes a grievance especially If the grievance procedure
provides for some form of arbitration. It is the author’s opinion
that most school boards would take a very strong position on this
matter, and would refuse to accept a grievance procedure that did
not limit grievances to the provisions of the collective
bargaining
agreement. Therefore, the acceptance by the teacher
association of
a grievance procedure limiting grievances to the
provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement may be an acceptance
of the school
board’s position in order to obtain at least some
kind of grievance
procedure
.
•n,e number and percentage of agreements
that contained a clause
providing for the final determination of
grievances by school boards
without advisory arbitration Increased
sharply between the school
years 1975-1976 and 1977-1978. however,
the number and percentage of
agreements containing such a clause
declined considerably the fol-
lowing year. and. as a result the
overall increase during the three
year period studied, was rather
modest. The Immediate rise and
subsequent decline of this provision
might be attributed to the fact
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that 1977-1978 was the first year that school boards and teacher
associations negotiated under the provisions of RSA 273-A, and that
the interest in collective bargaining had increased dramatically.
It would not seem that a grievance procedure wherein the school board
was the final arbiter would be acceptable to the teacher association.
In those Instances wherein the teacher association was negotiating
a grievance procedure for the first time, it might have been willing
to accept a clause wherein the school board was the final arbiter
in the grievance procedure as a trade-off for obtaining a grievance
procedure with the thought of negotiating a more acceptable one in
the future.
The percentage and number of clauses providing for advisory
arbitration increased moderately between the years 1975-1976 and
1977-1978. It is important to note that, while the numerical in-
crease in advisory arbitration clauses between 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 was slight, the percentage Increase was moderate. The change
in the number and percentage of clauses providing for binding
arbitra-
tion during the period of time studied was such that the author
would
consider it to be small. The important point to note here
is that
the number of grievance procedures providing for some
form of arbitra-
tlon Increased from 29 (56%) in 1975-1976 to 39 (78%)
in 1978-1979 and
that almost all of the growth took place In the
area of advisory
arbitration.
Having considered the changes that took place
in the area of
final determination by school board with
provision for advisory
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arbitration and final determination by arbiter-binding. It Is the
opinion of this writer that the change or lack of change in these
areas is interrelated. Some school boards are opposed to binding
arbitration because they would no longer be able to make the final
determination on certain Issues. They consider this to be an abdica-
tion of their responsibility to the voters of the school district
because the voters have elected the school board members to make
the decisions involving the affairs of the school district. At the
same time, the teacher associations are adamant in their demands for
binding arbitration. A clause that provides advisory arbitration
is a compromise. On the one hand, it satisfies the need of the
teacher associations to a certain extent in that it provides their
members with some form of arbitration. On the other hand, it removes
the objection of the school boards in that the decision of the
arbitrator is advisory, and it is the school board that will make the
final decision.
The increased interest in organizational grievances and class
action grievances was also evident. The percentage of
collective
bargaining agreements containing the former increased from
27 in
1975-1976 to 35 in 1977-1978 while the percentage of
collective
bargaining agreements containing the latter increased
from 37 in 1975
1976 to 50 in 1977-1978. Both the number
and the percentage of
clauses providing for organizational and class
action grievances re-
mained approximately the same in 1977-1978
and 1978-1979. However,
the author concluded that the overall
increase in the percentage of
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clauses providing for class action grievances during the three year
period that was studied was substantial. The most substantial change
involved the collective bargaining agreements granting representational
rights in the grievance process to teacher associations. The author
found that a large change in the number and percentage of agreements
containing such a clause took place during the years 1975-1976 and
1977-1978. While the number of agreements containing such a clause
did not change the following year, the percentage of agreements con-
taining such a clause continued its upward trend.
Certain other organizational benefits . The change in the selected
items as listed in Table 6 (page 152) followed the upward trend that was
established in the previous table with three of the five items that are
contained in the table showing a noticeable increase. Of the items
that
changed, the most noticeable increase that took place involved
the clause
granting the right to use the school district's facilities
to the teacher
association. The two items that did not follow the upward
trend were
agency fee and organizational access to employer's
records. The change
in these two clauses was small.
As can be seen In Table 6 (page 152), the number
of collective
bargaining agreements In effect In 1975-1975
whereby the school board
agreed to deduct dues from the teachers’
paychecks as a service to the
teachers’ association was 31 out of the
52 agreements (602). The
number of dues deduction clauses that
were negotiated for 1977-1978
and 1978-1979 was to change to 45 out
of the 58 agreements (782) and
37 out of the 50 agreements (74%)
respectively.
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TABLE 6
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Certain
Other Organizational
Benefits
1975-
N -
1976^
52
1977-
N -
1978^
58
1978-
N -
1979^
50
f req
.
pet
.
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
Dues deductions 31 60% 45 78% 37 74%
Agency fee -0- 0% -0- 0% 1 2%
Use of facilities 17 33% 33 57% 27 54%
Organizational access
to employer’s
records 21 40% 27 47% 22
44%
Time off for
association
activities 19 37% 24 41%
26 52%
^he intent of the author was to consider all of ^reements
that were in effect immediately before the
enactment of RSA 273-A.
^The intent of the author was to consider only
those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore,
he reviewed only
single year agreements or the first year of
multiple year agreements.
3
The intent of the author was
that were negotiated for 1978-1979
year agreements or the first year
to consider only those agreements
Therefore he reviewed only single
of multiple year agreements.
\
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The collective bargaining agreements in effect for 1975-1976 as
well as the collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-1978
did not contain an agency fee clause. One agreement (2%) negotiated in
1978-1979 provided for an agency fee clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause whereby the teachers’ association
was allowed to use the school facilities was 17 (33%) . The number of
use of facilities clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was
33 (57%) and 27 (54%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing the teachers’ association
with access to their employer’s records (school board) was 21 (40%).
The number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated
for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a clause
was 27 (47%) and 22
(44%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing staff
members with
off to attend association activities was 19
(37%). The number of
time off for association activities
clauses negotiated for 1977-1973
and 1978-1979 was increased to 24 (41%)
and 26 (52%) respectively.
The purpose of the items in Table 6
could be to strengthen the
teachers- association as an organization
or to provide a benefit
whereby the association is better
able to serve the membership.
The
percentage of clauses providing for
dues deductions rose from 60
in
1975-1976 to 74 in 1978-1979. This
item strengthens the association
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as an organization. The regular collection of dues is essential
to the establishment and survival of most organizations. Therefore,
this clause is very Important to the teacher associations. It is
certainly much easier to have the employer deduct dues as an automatic
payroll deduction than it is to collect from the members on an Individ'
ual basis. The inclusion of the clause allowing the association to
use the school district’s facilities and the clause allowing staff
members to have time off from their duties to represent the associa-
tion places the association in a position whereby it is better able
to serve its members. The former clause increased from 33% in
1975-
1976 to 54% in 1978-1979, and the latter clause increased
from 37% in
1975-1976 to 52% in 1978-1979.
Agency fee, one of the two items in Table 6 that
showed little
change, is an item the negotiation of which has
political implications.
The agency fee is a sum of money that all staff
members would pay to
the association even if they did not wish to Join
the association.
The teacher associations contend that since
all staff members share
equally in the benefits that the association
negotiates they should
share In the expenses of the association.
The school boards contend
that this would be tantamount to forcing
staff members to join the
union. It is obvious from the data
that RSA 273-A has not helped
teacher associations to convince
school boards that they should
change their position on the agency
fee issue.
n.,.., economic benefits pertalnlnf to
compensation. RSA 273-A appears
to have had a mixed effect on
the items listed In Table 7
(page 155)
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TABLE 7
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO COMPENSATION
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Direct Economic
Benefits Pertaining
to Compensation
1975-
N -
1976^
52
1977-
N -
1978^
58
1978-
N -
1979^
50
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
freq
.
pet
.
No salary provision 5 9% 4 7% -0- 0%
Salary schedule
by preparation
and years of
experience 46 89% 54 93% 50 100%
Salary schedule by
merit 1 2% -0- 0% -0- 0%
Additional compen-
sation by merit 5 10% 5 9% 2 4%
Longevity pay 15 29% 11 19% 14 28%
Credit for experience
outside the school
district 21 40% 25 43% 27
54%
Retirement bonus 5 10% 8 14%
5 10%
^he intent of the author was to consider all of agreements
that were in effect Immediately before the enactment
of RSA 273-A.
^The intent of the author was to consider only
those
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore,
he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
^The intent of the author was to consider
only those
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore,
he reviewed only sing
year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
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since two increased moderately, two did not change much, and three
declined. The most noticeable increase involved the clause that
provides for a salary schedule by preparation and years of experience,
and the most noticeable decline involved the collective bargaining
agreements that did not provide for a salary clause either by prep-
aration and years of experience or by merit.
As can be seen in Table 7 (page 155) , the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that did not contain a
clause providing for a salary schedule by preparation and years of
experience or by merit was five out of the 52 agreements (9%). The
number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-1978
that did not contain such a clause was four out of the 58
agreements
(7%). All of the collective bargaining agreements that
were negotiated
for 1978-1979 contained a clause providing for a salary
schedule.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect
in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for a salary
schedule
by preparation and years of experience was 46 (89%)
.
The number of
such clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and
1978-1979 was Increased to
54 (93%) and 50 (100%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements In effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing
for a salary schedul
by merit was one (2%). None of the
collective bargaining agreement,
that were negotiated for 1977-1978 or
1978-1979 contained a clause
providing for a salary schedule by
merit.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect for
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1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for additional compensation
by merit was five (10%). The number of collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a
clause was five (9%) and two (A%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for longevity pay was
15 (29%). The number of collective bargaining agreements negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 that contained such a clause was to change
to eleven (19%) and fourteen (28%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained an agreement providing credit for experience
outside the school district was 21 (40%). The number of clauses pro-
viding for experience outside the school district that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was increased to 25 (43%) and 27 (54%)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect
for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for retirement
bonus was
five (10%). The number of clauses negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978
1979 that contained such a clause was eight (14%)
and five (10%)
respectively.
While the number of collective bargaining
agreements that did
not contain a clause providing for a
salary schedule only declined
by five and the percentage only
declined by nine between 1975-1976
and 1978-1979,
decline because
the author considered this to be
the most noticeable
the result of the decline was that
all of the collective
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bargaining agreements negotiated for 1978-1979 contained a clause
providing for a salary schedule.
While the number of salary schedules by preparation and years
of experience only Increased by four and the percentage only Increased
by eleven between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979, the author considered this
to be the most noticeable change because the Increase brought the
percentage of agreements containing such a clause to lOOZ.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contained
a clause providing for a salary program based on merit declined from
2% in 1975-1976 to 0% in 1978-1979. The percentage of collective
bargaining agreements that contained a clause providing for additional
compensation by merit declined from ten in 1975-1976 to four in
1978-
1979. It is important to note that these latter merit
compensation
programs were supplementary to the uniform compensation
programs as
were specified in the clauses providing for a salary
schedule based
on preparation and years of experience.
In the oplnon of the author, it is not surprising
that there has
been a noticeable increase in the percentage of
clauses providing for
a salary schedule by preparation and years
of experience, and a de
Cline in clauses providing for a salary
schedule by merit or claus
providing for additional compensation by
merit, because teacher associ
atlons have consistently been in favor
of programs that provide for
a uniform rate of pay.
The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements that contained
a clause providing for longevity
pay declined from 29 in 1975-1976
to
159
19 in 1977-1978; however, the percentage of agreements containing
such a clause Increased the following year to 28. This writer con-
cluded that the decline in the percentage of the longevity pay clause
from 29% in 1975-1976 to 28% in 1978-1979 did not constitute a change
of much importance.
The percentage of clauses providing credit for experience out-
side the school district increased from AO in 1975-1976 to 5A in
1978-1979. The author concluded that this was a moderate change. It
is the opinion of the author that the teacher associations are in
favor of a clause that gives teachers salary credit for their previous
years of experience. At the same time, the teacher associations have
sought to incorporate a statement which would prohibit the school
board from giving a newly hired teacher more salary credit than
that
which the teacher is entitled to according to his or her years of
experi-
ence. It is this writer’s opinion that the teacher
associations have
not been very successful in their efforts to
incorporate this statement
into the collective bargaining agreement.
The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements containing a
clause providing for a bonus payment at the
time of the teacher's
retirement Increased from 10% In 1975-1976 to
14% In 1977-1978; how-
ever. the percentage of retirement bonus
clauses declined to ten the
following year. The author concluded
that there was little change in
the percentage of retirement bonus
clauses during the three-year
period that was studied.
mv.ct economlr benefits pertaining to Insure
It would appear
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that the effect of RSA 273-A has been one whereby the change in
the Items listed in Table 8 (page 161) has been uniform in that all
items listed Increased from pre 273-A levels. The most noticeable
change was in the area of medical insurance in that as of 1977-1978
all collective bargaining agreements contained a clause wherein this
fringe benefit was provided to staff members. Medical insurance was
also Included as a fringe benefit in all of the collective bargaining
agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979. The least noticeable
change took place in the area of disability insurance.
As can be seen in Table 8 (page 161) the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause
providing medical insurance as a fringe benefit was 44 out of 52
(85%). The number of medical insurance clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 58 (100%) and 50 (100%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect for
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing dental insurance as a
fringe benefit was one (2%) . The number of dental insurance clauses
that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was Increased to
three (5%) and five (10%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect
for
1975-1976 that contained a life insurance clause was 21 (40%).
The
number of life insurance clauses negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 was to change to 26 (45%) and 29 (58%)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect for
]^975_1976 that contained a clause providing
for disability insurance
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TABLE 8
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS
PERTAINING TO INSURANCE
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Direct Economic 1975-1976 1977-1978 1978-1979
Benefits Pertaining N - 52 N 58 N 50
to Insurance
freq. pet. freq. pet. freq. pet.
Medical insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Dental insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Life insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
Disability insurance
a. flat amount
b. percentage
c. full payment
4A 85% 58
9 17% 16
6 12% 10
29 56% 32
1 2% 3
0 0% 2
0 0% 1
1 2% 0
21 40% 26
0 0% 0
2 4% 1
19 37% 25
9 17% 12
0 0% 1
0 0% 0
9 17% 11
100% 50 100%
28% 15 30%
17% 10 20%
55% 25 50%
5% 5 10%
3% 2 4%
2% 0 0%
0% 3 6%
45% 29 58%
0% 0 0%
2% 2 4%
43% 27 54%
21% 11 22%
2% 1 2%
0% 1 2%
19% 9 18%
^The intent of the author was to consider only those
agreements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment
of RSA 273-A.
^The Intent of the author was to consider only those
agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore,
he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year
agreements.
\he Intent of the author was to consider only those ^^reements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore,
he reviewed only sing
ye« agLemeLs or the first year of multiple year
agreements.
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was 9 (17%). The number of disability insurance clauses that were
negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was increased to 12 (21%)
and 11 (22%) respectively.
The author considered the increase in the number and percentage
of clauses providing medical Insurance as a benefit to be substantial.
The important point to note here is that all collective bargaining
agreements now contain a clause that provides medical insurance as
a fringe benefit.
The percentage of medical insurance clauses wherein the school
board has agreed to pay for the staff members' medical insurance
coverage up to a specified sum of money (flat amount) with the staff
member paying the remainder of the cost, if any, showed a moderate
Increase. Table 8A (page 163) shows in detail the flat amount of
money paid by school districts toward medical insurance.
Of the nine school districts that were paying a flat
amount
of money toward medical Insurance In 1975-1976.
one was paying less
than one hundred dollars ($100.00) per annum and eight
were paying
between three hundred and one ($301.00) and five
hundred dollars
($500.00) per annum. Of the 15 school districts
that were paying
a flat amount of money toward medical
Insurance In 1978-1979, four
were paying between one hundred and one
($101.00) and three hundred
dollars ($300.00) per annum, one was paying
between three hundred
and one ($301.00) and five hundred dollars
($500.00) per annum, five
were paying between five hundred
and one ($501.00) and seven hundred
dollars ($700.00) per annum, and five
were paying between seven
\
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TABLE 8A
MEDICAL INSURANCE;
FLAT AMOUNT
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Flat Amount 1975- 1976 1978- 19 79
In Dollars N - 9 N - 15
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
0 - 100 1 11% 0 0%
101 - 300 0 0% 4 27%
301 - 500 8 89% 1 7%
501 - 700 0 0% 5 33%
701 - 900 0 0% 5 33Z
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and one ($701.00) and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per annum.
In 1975-1976 none of the school districts were paying over five
hundred dollars per annum toward the cost of medical Insurance,
however, by 1978-1979 33% of the school districts were paying over
five hundred dollars and 33% of the school districts were paying over
seven hundred dollars. This writer concluded that there has been
a substantial Increase In the amount of money that the school boards
have agreed to commit toward the cost of medical Insurance.
The percentage of clauses wherein the school board has agreed
to pay a percentage of the medical Insurance cost showed a moderate
Increase. Table 8B (page 165) shows In detail the percentage of
medical Insurance paid by several districts. Of the six school dis-
tricts that were paying a percentage of the medical Insurance plan
In 1975-1976, two were paying between 50 and 74% toward the
Individual
staff member’s coverage only. One district was paying
between 75 and
99% toward the Individual staff member’s coverage and
between 50 and
74% toward the staff member’s family coverage. One
district was
paying 65% toward both the Individual and family
coverage. Two dis-
tricts were paying between 75 and 99% toward both
the Individual and
family coverage, and were paying the same
percentage toward the cov-
erage of the other members of his or her
family. Of the ten
districts that were paying a percentage of
the medical Insurance cov-
erage In 1978-1979, three were paying
between 75 and 99% toward the In-
dividual staff member’s coverage only.
One district was paying between
75 and 99% toward the Individual
and family coverage; however, that
same
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TABLE 8B
MEDICAL INSURANCE:
PERCENTAGE
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Extent of Medical
Coverage
1975-1976
N " 6
1978-1979
N - 10
percentage paid by
district
percentage paid by
district
25-49 50-74 75-99 25-49 50-74 75-99
Individual only 0 2 0 0 0 3
Individual and
small percentage
for family (same
districts) 0 1 1 0 0 1
Individual and
family 0 1 2 0 0
6
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district was paying a lower percentage toward the family coverage.
Six districts were paying between 75 and 99% toward both the individual
and family coverage, and were paying the same percentage toward the
coverage of the other members of his or her family.
The author noted that two substantial changes took place relative
to medical insurance coverage. The first change was that whereas in
1975-1976 50% of the school districts were providing benefits within
the 75 to 99% range by 1978-1979 all of the school districts were
providing benefits within the 75-99% range. The second change was
that whereas in 1975-1976 33 1/3% of these districts were paying
toward both the individual and family coverage within the 75 to 99%
range at the same rate, by 1978-1979 60% of these districts
were paying
toward both the individual and family coverage within the
75-99% range
at the same rate.
Table 8C (page 167) shows a detailed breakout of medical
insur-
ance-full payment as found in Table 8. The clauses
wherein the school
board agreed to pay the full cost of the individual
staff member’s
coverage declined from 45% in 1975-1976 to 36%
in 1978-1979. The
clauses wherein the school board agreed to
pay the full cost of the
individual staff member's coverage plus a
portion of the family coverage
changed from 27% in 1975-1976 to 28% in
1978-1979. The percentage of
clauses wherein the school board agreed
to pay the full cost
the individual staff member’s coverage
and family coverage increased
from 28% to 36%.
in the opinion of this writer,
the changes as noted above
were
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TABLE 8C
MEDICAL INSURANCE;
FULL PAYMENT
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Full Payment 1975-
N -
1976
29
1978-
N -
1979
25
freq. pet. freq. pet.
Individual 13 45% ' 9 36%
Individual + 1% to
24% of family
coverage 0 0% 2 8%
Individual + 25% to
49% of family
coverage 1 3% 0 0%
Individual + 50% to
74% of family
coverage 2 7% 2
8%
Individual + 75% to
99% of family
coverage 5 17%
3 12%
Individual + full
family coverage 8 28%
9 36%
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not substantial. It is important to note that the change that did
occur was such that the school districts paid more of the medical
Insurance premiums in 1978-1979 than in the previous years.
It is even more important to note that in all three types of
medical Insurance clauses (flat amount, percentage, and full payment)
the school boards agreed to increase the amount of money that they paid
toward the cost of medical Insurance. In the opinion of the author,
this is an important trend to note in that medical insurance is a
benefit that ranks high on the priority list of teacher associations,
not only because of the spiraling cost of medical insurance but also
because their members do not have to pay taxes on fringe benefits.
The change in the percentage of collective bargaining
agreements
that provided a dental Insurance plan was moderate as the
percentage
increased from two in 1975-1976 to ten In 1978-1979. It
Is difficult
to attach any meaning to this Increase as the
percentages ate quite
small. In the opinion of the author, it is a fringe
benefit that
will continue to Increase both in number and
percentage. Although
the numbers at the present time are small,
this fringe benefit did
register an Increase in two consecutive years.
More Importantly as
the cost of dental care continues to rise
it will be a fringe benefit
that will become increasingly attractive
to teacher associations.
The number and percentage of collective
bargaining agreements
providing life Insurance increased both
in 1977-1978 and 1978-1979.
Of the 21 collective bargaining
agreements that contained a life
insurance clause in 1975-1976, thirteen
provided the staff members
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with a policy which Included a death benefit that fell within the range
of two thousand ($2,000.00) to five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) and six
provided the staff members with a policy which included a death benefit
that fell within the range of five thousand and one ($5,001.00) to ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00). Of the 29 collective bargaining agree-
ments that contained a life insurance clause in 1978-1979, twelve provided
the staff members with a death benefit policy which fell within the range
of two thousand ($2,000.00) to five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), ten
provided the staff members with a death benefit policy which fell within
the range of five thousand and one ($5,001.00) to ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00), and seven provided the staff members with a death benefit
policy which fell within the range of ten thousand and one ($10,001.00)
to twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
This writer concluded that the increase in districts providing
life insurance as a fringe benefit, which went from 40% in 1975-1976
to 58% in 1978-1979, was substantial. The author also concluded that
the increase in the financial value of the death benefits was sub-
stantial. In 1975-1976 32% of the life insurance policies
provided a
death benefit between five thousand and one ($5,001.00) and ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), and none of the policies provided a
death benefit of more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00). By
1978-1979 the percentage of life Insurance policies
providing a
death benefit of more than five thousand dollars
had increased to
59% with 35% of the policies providing a death
benefit between five
thousand and one ($5,001.00) and ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00),
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and 2A% of the policies providing a death benefit between ten
thousand and one ($10,001.00) and twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
In the opinion of the author, this is a fringe benefit that will
continue to Increase in percentage and value, and in fact the author
was surprised that more agreements did not already provide for this
benefit. This is a benefit that the school boards can provide at a
minimal cost, and at the same time it is an attractive fringe benefit
to the teacher associations especially when it is apparent that the
school boards are willing to assume the entire cost.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that provided
a disability insurance clause increased from 17 in 1975-1976 to 22
in
1978-1979. The author concluded that this was a slight increase.
ntrect economic benefits pertaining to leaves of absence.
RSA 273-A
appears to have had a nearly uniform effect on the items
listed in
Table 9 (page 171) in that all of the items with the
exception of one
increased. There were several substantial changes
with the most
noticeable being that item providing for personal
leave. This was
the most noticeable because of the size
of the Increase, and also be-
cause by 1978-1979 a clause providing for
personal leave could be
found in all of the collective bargaining
agreements that had been
negotiated for that year. The item that
did not increase was adoption
leave.
AS can be seen in Table 9 (page 171).
the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause
providing for personal leave was 40
out of the 52 agreements
(77Z).
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TABLE 9
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN DIRECT ECONOMIC BENEFITS PERTAINING
TO LEAVES OF ABSENCE
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Direct Economic 1975-1976^ 1977-1978^ 1978- 1979^
Benefits Pertaining
to Leaves of Absence
N = 52 N = 58 N - 50
f req. pet. f req
.
pet
.
f req. pet
.
Personal leave AO 77% 53 91% 50 100%
a. 3 days or more 32 62% 39 67% 35 70%
b. 1 or 2 days 8 15% lA 2A% 15 30%
Sick leave 46 89% 58 100% 50 100%
a. 15 days or more
per annum 26 50% 33 57% 37 7A%
b. less than 15 days
per annum 20 39% 25 A 3% 13 26%
c. cumulative to
more than 60
days AA 85% 53 91% A8 96%
d. cumulative to
less than 60
2%
19%
2%
3A%
e.
days
sick leave bank
1
7
2%
1A%
1
11
1
17
Sabbatical leave 19 37% 20 35%
26 52%
Maternity leave 28 5A% AA 76%
39 78%
Adoption leave 13 25% 8 15%
13 26%
Bereavement leave 26 50% 28
5A% 30 60%
Military leave 23 A6% 28
5A% 27 5A%
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TABLE 9—Continued
The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3The Intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
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Of the 40, 32 (62%) provided for 3 or more days of personal leave
and 8 (15%) provided for less than 3 days of personal leave. The
number of such clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 was Increased to 53 out of the 58 agreements (91%) and 50 out
of the 50 agreements (100%) respectively. Of the 53 personal leave
clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978, 39 (67%) provided for
3 or more days and 14 (24%) provided for less than 3 days. Of the
50 personal leave clauses that were negotiated for 1978-1979, 35
(70%) provided for 3 or more days and 15 (30%) provided for less
than 3 days.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a sick leave clause was 46 (89%).
Of the 46 agreements, 26 (50%) provided for 15 or more days of sick
leave per annum and 20 (39%) provided for less than 15 days of sick
leave per annum. Additionally, 44 (85%) of the 52 agreements
provided
for sick leave cumulative to 60 or more days, and one agreement
(2%)
provided for sick leave cumulative to less than 60 days.
Lastly,
seven (14%) of the fifty-two agreements provided for a sick
leave
bank.
nie number of sick leave clauses that were
negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 58 (100%)
and 50 (100%). Of the
58 agreements that were negotiated for 1977-1978,
33 (57%) provided
for 15 or more days of sick leave per
annum, and 25 (A3%) provided for
less than 15 days of sick leave per
annum. Additionally, 53 agreement.
(91%) provided for sick leave
cumulative to 60 days or more, and one
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agreement (2%) provided for sick leave cumulative to less than 60
days. Lastly, eleven (19%) of the fifty-eight agreements provided
for a sick leave bank. Of the 50 agreements negotiated for 1978-1979,
37 (74%) provided for 15 or more days of sick leave per annum, and
13 (26%) provided for less than 15 days of sick leave per annum.
Additionally, 48 agreements (96%) provided for sick leave cumulative
to 60 days or more, and one agreement (2%) provided for sick leave
cumulative to less than 60 days. Lastly, 17 (34%) of the 50 agreements
negotiated for 1978-1979 provided for a sick leave bank.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a sabbatical leave clause was 19
(37%). The number of sabbatical leave clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 20 (35%) and 26 (52%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a maternity leave clause was 28
(54%). The number of maternity leave clauses negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 was 44 (76%) and 39 (78%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained an adoption leave clause was
13 (25%). The number of adoption leave clauses that were
negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was to change to 8 (15%) and 13
(26%)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that
were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a bereavement
leave clause was
26 (50%). The nueiber of such clauses Chat were
negotiated for 1977-1978
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and 1978-1979 was 28 (5A%) and 30 (60%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976 that contained a military leave clause was 23
(46%). The number of military leave clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 28 (54%) and 27 (54%) respectively.
With regard to the change in the number of collective bargaining
agreements that contained a clause providing personal leave, the
percentage of such clauses increased from 77 in 1975—1976 to 100 in
1978-1979. The author also concluded that this change was substantial
because as of 1978-1979 all of the collective bargaining agreements
that were negotiated for that year provided personal leave to the
staff members. The major share of the increase was accounted for by
those clauses providing for one or two days of personal leave.
The
change in the number and percentage of clauses providing
for three or
more days of personal leave was much smaller.
While the number and percentage increase in the
clauses provid-
ing sick leave benefits was not substantial, the
author, nevertheless,
concluded that the change was important because
in both 1977-1978 and
1978-1979 all of the negotiated agreements
contained a clause provid-
ing sick leave benefits. Based on the
data, this writer concluded
that there was a substantial Increase in
the number and percentage of
clauses providing 15 or more days of
sick leave per annum. This in-
crease was brought about not only by
the overall increase in the
number and percentage of clauses
providing for sick leave benefits,
but also by the decline in the
clauses providing for less than
15
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days per annum. The percentage of collective bargaining agreements
containing a clause that allows staff members to accumulate 60 or
more days of sick leave increased from 85 in 1975-1976 to 96 in
1978-1979 while the percentage of clauses allowing staff members to
accumulate up to 60 days of sick leave did not change during the three
year period that was studied.
The collective bargaining agreements containing a sick leave
bank clause increased from 14% in 1975-1976 to 34% in 1978-1979, and
the author concluded that this change was substantial.
In the opinion of the author, the improvement in the area of
sick leave fringe benefits was one which allowed both school boards
and teacher associations to satisfy their respective needs. The
schoold boards were able to agree to the demands of the teacher
associa-
tions and at the same time improve the fringe benefit package
for
staff members without having to make substantial increases
in their
operating budgets because by and large the Increased sick
leave benefits
are not utilized. At the same time, this enabled
the teacher associa-
tions to satisfy the demands of their members for
an Improved fringe
benefits package. An analysis of the Improvements
leads one to con-
clude that essentially what Is being provided
Is protection to the
staff members against long term Illness
or disability, and the school
boards are providing this benefit through
the method of self Insurance.
This writer would expect to see continued
improvements In this area for
the above mentioned reasons.
The collective bargaining agreements
that contained a clause
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providing for a sabbatical leave increased from 37% in 1975-1976 to
52% in 1978-1979, and the author concluded that as a fringe benefit
this change was substantial. However, whereas only one of the 19
sabbatical leave clauses in effect for 1975-1976 provided staff
members with an unpaid sabbatical leave, eight of the 26 sabbatical
leave clauses negotiated for 1978-1979 provided staff members with
an unpaid sabbatical leave.
Based on these data, the author concluded that in terms of an
economic fringe benefit to staff members there was not a change,
as the number of paid sabbatical leave clauses did not increase
between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979. It may be that the teacher associa-
tions were willing to accept an unpaid sabbatical leave in order to
have a sabbatical leave clause in the collective bargaining ‘agreement
with the thought of negotiating a paid sabbatical leave at a future
date.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause
providing for maternity leave increased from 54% in 1975-1976 to 78%
in 1978-1979, and the author concluded that this change was
substantial.
However, in 1975-1976 ten out of the twenty-eight maternity
leave
clauses provided a paid leave of absence to the staff members,
and in
1978-1979 fourteen out of thirty-nine maternity leaves of
absence
provided a paid leave of absence. As the percentage of
paid maternity
leaves of absence was 36 in both 1975-1976 and in
1978-1979. the author
concluded that in terms of an economic fringe
benefit there was not a
change.
The percentage of adoption leave clauses
declined from 25 in
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1975-1976 to 15 in 1977-1978, The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements containing such a clause Increased the following year to
26. This writer concluded that there was little change In the per-
centage of adoption leave clauses during the three year period that
was studied.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements providing for
bereavement leave and military leave Increased between 1975-1976 and
1978-1979. The former Increased from 50% In 1975-1976 to 60% In 1978-
1979, and the latter Increased from 46% In 1975-1976 to 54% In 1978-
1979. The size of both changes was such that the author considered
them to be moderate.
Other direct economic benefits . It would appear that RSA 273-A had
only a moderate effect on the Items listed In Table 10 (page 179) . with
the most noticeable Increase taking place In the area of course
reim-
bursement and the least noticeable Increase ' taking place In
the area of
athletic pay schedules.
As can be seen In Table 10 (page 179), the number of
collective
bargaining agreements in effect In 1975-1976 that
contained a clause
providing for course reimbursement was 39 out of
the 52 agreements
(75%). The number of course reimbursement
clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was Increased
to 46 out of the 58 agree-
ments (79%) and 43 out of the 50 agreements
(86%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements In effect In
1975-1976 that contained a comprehensive
extra-curricular pay schedule
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TABLE 10
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
SPECIFYING CERTAIN OTHER DIRECT
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Other Direct 1975-1976^ 1977-1978^ 1978- 1979^
Economic Benefits N = 52 N - 58 N - 50
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
Course reimbursement 39 75% 46 79% 43 86%
a. flat amount 25 48% 30 52% 32 64%
b. percentage 5 10% 7 12% 4 8%
c. full payment
d. course reimburse-
9 17% 9 16% 7 14%
mont: maximum
amount budgeted
or "Cap" 12 23% 14 24% 20
40%
Comprehensive extra-
curricular pay
schedule 20 39% 24 41%
22 44%
Athletic pay schedule 1 2% 4 7%
2 4%
^The intent of the author was to consider all of
^reements
that were in effect iiranediately before the enactment
of RSA
^The intent of the author was to consider only
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore,
he
year agreements or the first year of multiple
year
those agreements
reviewed only single
agreement s
.
3The intent of the author was to consider
only those
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore,
he reviewed only g
year agreements or the first year of
multiple year agreements.
was 20 (39%). The number of comprehensive extra-curricular pay
schedules negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 2A (AIX) and
22 (44%) respectively.
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The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained an athletic pay schedule was one (2%). The
number of athletic pay schedules negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-
1979 was four (7%) and two (4%) respectively.
Tlie collective bargaining agreements containing a clause pro-
viding for course reimbursement increased from 75% in 1975-1976 to
86% in 1978-1979. This writer considered the percentage increase
to be moderate. The important point to note, however, is that the
change was consistent in that the percentage increased in both years,
and that as a result of the increase only a small fraction of the col-
lective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1978-1979 did not provide
course reimbursement as a fringe benefit. The author would expect
this upward trend to continue.
There was a substantial change in the clause wherein the
school
board agrees to pay a flat amount or specific sum of
money toward a
course as the percentage of such clauses Increased
from 48 in 1975-
1976 to 64 in 1978-1979. During the same
period of time, clauses that
provide for a percentage reimbursement or full
payment of the cost of
the course showed little change. The former
changed from 10% in 1975-
1976 to 8% in 1978-1979, and the latter
changed from 17% in 1975-1976
to 14% in 1978-1979. There was also a
substantial change in the clause
entitled maximum amount budgeted or "cap”
wherein the school board and
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the teachers' association agreed to the total amount of money that
will be spent for course reimbursement. The percentage of such
clauses increased from 23 in 1975-1976 to 40 in 1978-1979. It is
the author's opinion that the increases noted above may have occurred
because school boards wish to place some controls on the ever-increasing
costs of course reimbursement. The maximum amount budgeted or "cap"
clause also provides the school board with a specific sum of money
that it may use for budgeting purposes. It is also the author s opinion
that as the costs of college courses continue to rise, and as the need
for more accountability in budgeting procedures continues to increase,
the percentage of the flat amount clauses and the maximum amount bud-
geted or "cap" clause will continue to increase.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements providing
for
comprehensive extra-curricular pay schedules changed from 39 in
1975-
1976 to 44 in 1978-1979, and the percentage of
collective bargaining
agreements providing for athletic pay schedules changed
from two in
1975-1976 to four in 1978-1979. The author concluded
that neither
change was large.
Policy matters/working conditions pertaining to
instruction.
273-A appears to have had a mixed effect
on the items in Table 11
(page 182): the author considers the overall
effect to have been
slight. Of the Items listed in Table 11,
three declined, one showed
no change, one sh<»ed a slight
Increase, and two showed moderate
increases. The two moderate increases
involved the clauses that pro-
vided for preparation periods and
the determination of teaching
load.
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TABLE 11
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN POLICY MATTERS /WORKING CONDITIONS
PERTAINING TO INSTRUCTION
Before RSA 2 7 3-
A
After RSA 2 7 3-
A
Policy Matters/
Working Conditions
Pertaining To
1975-1976^
N - 52
1977-
N -
1978^
58
1978-
N -
1979^
50
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
Textbook selection 2 4% 2 3%
0 0%
Class size 3 6% 5
9% 4 8%
Teaching load 4 4% 8 14%
5 10%
Preparation periods 10 19% 14
24% 14 28%
Curriculum partici-
pation 21 40% 13
23% 12 24%
Need for specialized
teachers 0 0%
0 0% 0 0%
Academic freedom 6 12%
8 14% 4 8%
^The intent of the author was
were in effect immediately before
to consider all of the agreements
that
the enactment of RSA 273-A.
agrLmeLs or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
^The intent of ^he author ^“iLefoniritogle year
rg«erert"rth"arsryr if luUlple ;ear agreements.
The moBt noticeable decrease Involved the clause that provided for
curriculum participation by staff members.
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As can be seen in Table 11 (page 182), the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-1976 that provided for staff
participation in textbook, selection was two out of the 52 agreemente
(A%) . The number of textbook selection clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 was two out of the 58 agreements (3%). None of the
collective bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979
contained a clause providing for the participation of staff members
in textbook selection.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that were in
effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for the deter-
mination of class size was three (6%). The number of class size
clauses negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was five (9Z) and four
(87,) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for the determination
of
teaching load was four (4%) . The number of teaching load
clauses
that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
was eight (141) and
five (10%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for
the determlnatlo
the number of preparation periods was ten
(19%). The number of pre-
paration period clauses negotiated lor
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was
fourteen (24%) and fourteen (28%)
respectively.
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The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for curriculum participation
was 21 (40%). The number of curriculum participation clauses that
were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was thirteen (23%) and
twelve (24%) respectively.
None of the collective bargaining agreements in effect for 1975-
1976 contained a clause providing for staff participation in the deter-
mination of the need for specialized teachers, nor did any of the col-
lective bargaining agreements negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
contain such a clause.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for academic freedom was
six (12%). The number of academic freedom clauses that were negotiated
for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was eight (14%) and four (8%) respectively.
The percentage of clauses providing for staff participation in
textbook selection declined from 4 in 1975-1976 to 0 in
1978-1979.
The author concluded that a decline of 4X was a slight
change. The
Important point to note is that none of the collective
bargaining
agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979 contained
a clause that
provided for the participation of staff members
in textbook selection.
The percentage of clauses specifying the
maximum sites of the
classes that might be assigned to staff
members changed from six in
1975-1976 to eight in 1978-1979. The author
concluded that this was
a slight change.
The percentage of clauses providing
for the determination of
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teaching load had increased from four In 1975-1976 to ten in 1978-
1979. This writer concluded that this was a moderate Increase.
However, the increase in the percentage of clauses Involving the
determination of teaching load may be larger than what it appears to
be in that teaching load applies in most Instances to only those
districts that maintain high schools. As approximately 50Z of the
school districts in New Hampshire maintain a high school, the 6Z
change in teaching load between 1975-1976 and 1978-1979 is equivalent
to a 12% change in secondary schools.
The percentage of clauses providing for the determination of the
number of preparation periods increased from 19 in 1975-1976 to 28
in 1978-1979. The author concluded that this was a moderate change.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause
providing for curriculum participation by staff members declined from
40% in 1975-1976 to 24% in 1978-1979. The author concluded
that this
was a substantial decrease. This was also the most
noticeable change
in Table 11. It would appear that teacher associations
did not
consider the Inclusion of a curriculum participation
clause in the
collective bargaining agreement to be a priority.
It may be that
school boards did not wish to include this
clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, and were willing to
agree to something else
which the teacher association wanted In
return for leaving the
curriculum participation clause out of
the agreement.
The percentage of clauses providing
for academic freedom de-
clined from twelve In 1975-1976 to
eight In 1978-1979. The author
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concluded that this was a slight change.
It would appear that the Items listed In Table 11 were not very
high on the priority list of the teacher associations. It may be that
some of these Items were brought up In the collective bargaining
sessions, and rather than have them Included In the collective bargain-
ing agreements, the school boards agreed to make arrangements outside
of the collective bargaining agreements which satisfied the concerns
and needs of the teacher associations.
It is also the opinion of this writer that substantial increases
will not take place amongst the items listed in Table 11 in the near
future. Given the present economic conditions and the decrease in
the
number of staff positions in education, economics, fringe benefits,
and
clauses related more closely to the direct welfare of the
association
or the individual staff member will continue to be the
priority of the
teacher associations rather than the type of clause
found in Table 11.
Policy matters/working conditions pertaining to st^. RSA
273-A
appears to have had a definite effect on the
items listed in Table 12
(page 187) with all but two of the items showing
an Increase and none
of the items showing a decrease. The
most noticeable Increase in-
volved the reduction in force clause.
The two clauses that did not
change at all were staff selection and
promotions.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause
providing for staff evaluation was
20 out of the 52 agreements
(39%). The number of staff
evaluation
clauses that were negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 30
out
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TABLE 12
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS SPECIFYING
CERTAIN POLICY MATTERS /WORKING CONDITIONS
PERTAINING TO STAFF
Before RSA 273-A After RSA 273-A
Policy Matters/
1
Working Conditions 1975-1976^ 1977-1978^ 1978- 1979^
Pertaining To N - 52 N - 58 N - 50
Staff
f req
.
pet
.
freq. pet
.
f rrq. pet
.
Staff evaluation 20 39% 30 52% 26 52%
Posting of vacancies 8 15% 11 19% 18 36%
Staff selection 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Promotions 4 8% 4 7% 4 8%
Staff transfer 14 27% 15 26% 17 34%
Staff termination 1 2% 4 7% 3 6%
Reduction in force 5 10% 21 36% 19 38%
a. completely
16% 6%seniority 2 4% 9 3
b. partially
seniority 1 2% 4 7% 6 12%
c. no seniority 2 4% 8 14% 10 20%
Professional require-
ments for beginning
teachers 5 10% 11 19% 12
24%
Discipline for just
cause 9 17% 17 29%
16 32%
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TABLE 12
—
Continued
^The intent of the author was to consider all of the agreements
that were in effect imraediately before the enactment of RSA 273-A.
2The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreement or the first year of multiple year agreements.
3The intent of the author was to consider only those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore, he reviewed only single
year agreements or the first year of multiple year agreements.
of the 58 agreements (52%) and 26 out of the 50 agreements (52%)
respectively.
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The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 containing a clause that provided for the posting of staff
vacancies that occur within the school district was eight (15%). The
number of posting of vacancy clauses that were negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 was eleven (19%) and 18 (36%) respectively.
None of the collective bargaining agreements that were re-
viewed contained a staff selection clause wherein procedures were
established that provided for the involvement of staff members in
the hiring of new staff members.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing that specific procedures
be followed relative to promotions within the school
district was
four (8%). The number of promotion clauses that were
negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was four (7%) and four (8%)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in
effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing that
specific procedures
be followed relative to staff transfers
within the school district
was fourteen (27%). The number of staff
transfer clauses that were
negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was
15 (26%) and 17 (34%) re-
spectively
.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect in
1975-1976 and 1978-1979 that contained
a clause providing specific
procedures relative to the termination
of staff within the school
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district was one (2%). The number of staff termination clauses that
were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was four (7Z) and three
(6%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect for
1975-1976 that contained a reduction In force clause providing that
specific procedures be followed In the event of a layoff of staff
members due to the lack of work was five (10%). The number of reduc-
tion In force clauses that were negotiated In 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
was 21 (36%) and 19 (38%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements In effect In
1975-1976 that contained a clause requiring that beginning teachers
meet certain professional requirements was five (10%). The number
of clauses that were negotiated In 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 which
required that beginning teachers meet certain professional requirements
was eleven (19%) and twelve (24%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements that
were In
effect in 1975-1976 that contained a clause stating
that staff members
may only be disciplined for just cause was nine (17X).
The number
of discipline for Just cause clauses that
were negotiated In 1977-1978
and 1978-1979 was 17 (29%) and 16 (32%)
respectively.
The collective bargaining agreements that
contained a clause
specifying that certain procedures be
followed relative to staff
evaluation changed from 39% In 1975-1976
to 52% In 1977-1978. The
percentage of such clauses did not change
the following year. This
writer concluded that this was a
moderate change. In an era when
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more emphasis is being placed on accountability, and reduction in
force is becoming more imminent in a number of school districts, the
lack of growth between 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was surprising. It
may be that some school boards and teacher associations reached an
informal agreement on an evaluation procedure, and did not include
the evaluation procedure in the collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the staff evaluation clauses that were found
in the various collective bargaining agreements were quite similar.
They specify that the teacher is to be aware of all of the observa-
tions, and that the staff evaluation program is to be conducted in an
open atmosphere. Some of the clauses specify the number of times
that a teacher is to be observed each year. The observations are to
be reduced to writing, and the teacher is to be given a copy within
a specified number of days after the observation. A conference is
to be held between the teacher and the person who has performed
the
observation within a specified number of days after the receipt
of
the report. The person who has performed the observation
is to help
the teacher correct any deficiencies that may have been
observed, and
the teacher may request additional conferences.
The teacher is ashed
to sign the evaluation, and may attach a
response if he or she does
not agree with the evaluation. No document
may be placed in the
teacher's personnel folder without the prior
knowledge of the teacher.
The clauses also provide procedures whereby
the teachers may review
their personnel folder.
of clauses providing for the posting
of vacancies
The percentage
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changed from 15 in 1975-1976 to 36 in 1978-1979. The author concluded
that this was a substantial increase. In the opinion of the author
»
this clause will continue to increase both in percentage and number.
Teacher associations feel very strongly that staff members should be
given the opportunity to apply for both professional positions as veil
as extracurricular assignments before candidates are hired from out-
side the school district. They further believe that all staff members
should be given equal opportunity to apply for these positions.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contained
a clause providing that specific procedures be followed
relative to
staff transfers within the school district increased from
27 in 1975-
1976 to 34 in 1978-1979. The author concluded that
this was a moderate
change.
The provisions of the staff transfer clauses that
were found In
the various collective bargaining agreements
were quite similar. They
state that In order to be eligible for a
voluntary transfer the teacher
must submit a written request to the
administration by a specific date
stating that he or she wishes to be
transferred. They also state that
the administration will make every effort
to avoid Involuntary trans-
fers after a specific date, and In
the case of an Involuntary transfer
the teacher may meet with the
superintendent to appeal the transfer.
The decision of the superintendent
In the case of an appeal of
an In-
voluntary transfer shall be final.
There was little or no change
In the frequency of clauses
dealing
with the promotion and termination
of staff members. It may
be that
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the changes Involving the staff selection, promotion, staff transfer,
and staff termination clauses ranged from no change at all to a moder-
ate change because the teacher associations are of the opinion that
they will meet more resistance from school boards in the negotiation
of these matters. With this thought in mind, teacher associations
may prefer, at least for the present, to place their emphasis in
areas such as economics, fringe benefits, and organizational benefits
where they believe that they will be able to make greater gains.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause
specifying that certain procedures be followed in the event of a
reduction of force increased from 10% in 1975-1976 to 38% in 1978-
1979. The author concluded that this was a substantial change. In
the opinion of the author, a substantial increase took place in the
percentage of reduction in force clauses because this is a very real
issue in education today. As a result of declining enrollments
and
the demand for more accountability in the expenditure of
educational
budgets, senior staff members are becoming Increasingly
concerned
about retaining their positions. In all probability, they
are
placing pressure upon the teacher associations to
negotiate reduction
in force clauses. It may also be that in
those school districts where
the school board may be confronted with a
reduction in force that
the school board wishes to include a
reduction in force clause in the
collective bargaining agreement in order to
avoid any misunderstanding
when and if the reduction in force
should take place. This writer
would expect the negotiation of
reduction in force clauses to become
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an even higher priority of teacher associations in the future.
The reduction in force clauses that the author found in the
collective bargaining agreements approached the question of the lay-
off of staff members in several different ways. The
number of
reduction in force clauses in effect in 1975-1976 stating
that the
determination as to who will be laid off will be made
solely on the
basis of seniority was two (4%). Tl>e number of
such clauses that
were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979
was nine (16J;) and three
(6%) respectively. The number of
clauses In effect In 1975-1976
stating that the determination as to who
will be laid off will be
s^de at least to some extent on the
basis of seniority was one (2X).
The number of such clauses that were
negotiated for 1977-1978 and
1978-1979 was four (7%) and six (12%)
respectively. Some of these
clauses state that seniority will
be considered, but will not nec-
essarily be the determining factor.
Others state that
teachers must be laid off before
tenured teachers, but do not
state
that tenured teachers will be
laid off according to seniority.
The
number of clauses In effect In
1975-1976 that do not mention
seniority
was two (4%). The number of
such clauses that were neg
1,77-1978 and 1978-1979 was
eight (14%) and ten (20%)
respectively,
some of these clauses state
that those teachers who
are laid off will
be considered for other
positions In the school district
1-bAt Quality education is the
most important
certified. Others state
tha q
rl in the event of a layoff,
the school board wi
consideration, and,
retain the best teachers.
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The Increase in the reduction in force clauses from lOZ in
1975-1976 to 38% in 1978-1979 was not one that was entirely favorable
to the teacher associations as those clauses mentioning some form of
seniority only increased from 6% in 1975-1976 to 18% in 1978-1979
while the percentage of clauses that did not mention seniority at all
Increased from 4% in 1975-1976 to 20% in 1978-1979.
The collective bargaining agreements that contained a clause
specifying certain professional requirements for beginning teachers
Increased from 10% in 1975-1976 to 24% in 1978-1979. The author
concluded that this was a moderate increase. These clauses state
that a school board may only hire certified teachers. New Hampshire
State Department of Education regulations prohibit a school board from
employing an uncertified teacher in a classroom for more than 20
consecutive days, therefore, one might wonder why the teacher
associa-
tions would want such a clause. It may be that teacher
associations
want this clause simply as an added assurance that
school boards will
only hire certified personnel. If school boards
were to hire un-
certified personnel in those districts where the
collective bargaining
agreement contains such a clause, they would both
violate the regulation,
of the State Department of Education,
and breach the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements that contained
a discipline for just cause clause Increased
from 17 In 1975 1975 to
32 In 1978-1979. The author
considered this to be a substantial
ch g
These clauses state that a staff
member may only be disciplined for
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just cause, and just cause is not further defined.
Certain other policy matters /working conditions . RSA 273-A appears
to have had a definite effect on the items listed in Table 13
(page 197) with all but one of the clauses showing an Increase. The
most noticeable increase involved the clause pertaining to staff
development. The item that decreased Involved the clause wherein
funds were budgeted for staff development.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing for staff development
(Recertification) was three out of the 52 agreements (6%) . The
number of staff development clauses that were negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 was thirteen out of the 58 agreements (22Z)
and
17 out of the 50 agreements (34%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in
effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing funds for
staff develop-
ment was two (4%). The number of such clauses
negotiated for 1977-
1978 and 1978-1979 was 0 (0%) and one (2%).
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect in
1975-1976 that contained a clause providing
for staff participation in
th. development o£ the school calendar
was 18 (35%). The number of
school calendar clauses negotiated for
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was
to change to 22 (38%) and 23 (46%)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining
agreements In effect In
1975-1976 that contained a clause
specifying the length of the school
year was 21 (40%). The number of
length of school year clauses
that
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
SPECIFYING CERTAIN OTHER POLICY
MATTERS/WORKING CONDITIONS
Before RSA 2 7 3-
A
After RSA 2 7 3-
A
Certain Other
Policy Matters/
1975-19761
N - 52
1977-
N -
CM
00
00
os 19 78-
N -
1979^
50
freq. pet. freq. pet
.
freq. pet
.
Staff development
(Recertification)
3 6% 13 22% 17 34%
Funds budgeted for
staff development 2 4% 0 0% 1 2%
School calendar 18 35% 22 38% 23 46%
Length of school year 21 40% 33 57% 26
52%
Length of school day 12 23% 16 28%
15 30%
Restrictions on
faculty meetings 2 4% 6 10%
5 10%
Hhe intent of the author was to consider all of ^teements
that were in effect immediately before the enactment
of RSA Z73-A.
^The Intent of the author was to consider only
those
,
that were negotiated for 1977-1978. Therefore,
he reviewed only slngl
year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
^The intent of the author was to consider only
those agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979. Therefore,
he reviewed only sing
year agreements or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
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were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was 33 (57X) and 26 (52X)
respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in 1975-
1976 that contained a clause specifying the length of the school day
was twelve (23%). The number of length of school day clauses that
were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 Increased to 16 (28%) and
15 (30%) respectively.
The number of collective bargaining agreements in effect in 1975'
1976 that contained a clause providing for restrictions on faculty
meetings was two (4%). The number of restrictions on faculty meeting
clauses that were negotiated for 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 was six
(10%) and five (10%) respectively.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements
that contained
•a clause relative to staff development
(Recertification) Increased
from six In 1975-1976 to 34 In 1978-1979. The
author considered this
to be a substantial change. The New
Hampshire State Department of
Education's recertification program for
professional staff members
in local school districts allows staff
members to Include workshops
and other types of In-service training
activltes as well as college
courses In their recertification
programs. The former recertification
program only recognized college courses
toward recertification, and
the reimbursement provisions as
well as the salary schedules in
col-
lective bargaining agreements only
recognized college course credits
that were acquired by staff
m^bers. It Is this writer's
opinion that
the staff development clauses
that are now being Included
In the
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collective bargaining agreements are the result of the teacher associa-
tions' desire to obtain reimbursement for funds expended on staff
development activities and salary recognition for staff development
activities other than college courses. It is also the author's opinion
that the percentage of these clauses will continue to increase in the
future.
The percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contain
a clause providing funds specifically for staff development declined
from 4 in 1975-1976 to 2 in 1978-1979. This writer concluded that
this
was a slight change. It may be that teacher associations are
not
emphasizing this clause because school districts have from the
very
inception of the staff development program budgeted
specific sums of
money to develop in-service training programs.
The collective bargaining agreements that
contained a clause
providing for staff participation In the development
of the school
calendar as well as those collective bargaining
agreements that con-
tained a clause specifying Che length of
the school year and the
length of the school day showed moderate
Increases. The Items In
volving the determination of the school
calendar, the length of the
school year, and the length of the
school day are interrelated In
that each deals In Its own way
with the staff member's workday.
It would appear from the changes
that have taken place In these
Items
that there Is not a great deal
of concern about the present
status
el these clauses on the part
of the teacher associations.
It may also
the clause, the negotiation
of which would
be that of the three items
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meet with the most resistance on the part of school boards would
be the one specifying the length of the school day. It Is the
author's opinion that school boards would consider this to be a
management prerogative, and would be very reluctant to Include the
clause In the collective bargaining agreement. The school calendar
clauses have, to this point, only allowed the staff to participate
In an advisory capacity. It is quite probable that anything beyond
an advisory capacity would meet with strong resistance by the school
board. In this writer's opinion, the length of school year clauses
have only stated what has been the practice in many school districts
for a number of years, and most likely have not generated
a great
deal of discussion. In Che opinion of the author the
percentage of
collective bargaining agreements having these kinds of
clauses will
continue to Increase but the more noticeable Increases
will Involve
the school calendar and length of school year
clauses.
The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements that contained
a clause specifying restrictions on faculty
meetings Increased from
four In 1975-1976 to ten In 1978-1979.
The author concluded that this
was a moderate Increase. It would
appear that there has not been a
great deal of calling meetings without
adequate notice or having un-
necessarily lengthy meetings on the
part of school administrators In
this area. It Is the author’s
opinion that any future growth In
the
percentage of clauses specifying
restrictions on faculty meetings
will
depend on whether or not there
Is misuse of faculty meetings
In this
area by school administrators.
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Sunmary of Findings
The findings In this chapter indicate that; there has been a definite
increase in collective bargaining since the enactment of RSA 273-A; there
have been very definite gains by the teacher associations relative to the
collective bargaining agreement clauses that were reviewed in this study;
and it would appear that RSA 273~A has had an impact on the increase in
the collective bargaining activity as well as on the gains made by the teacher
associations.
Question one . The growth in collective bargaining activity was evidenced
by the increase in the number of collective bargaining agreements
in effect
after the enactment of RSA 273-A. An analysis of this Increase
revealed
that the potential for further growth under the present
law is limited in
that, with but a few exceptions, all of the school
boards in the large and
medium sized school districts in New Hampshire have
entered into collective
bargaining agreements
.
The provisions of RSA 273-A led the author to
conclude that It Is
highly unlikely that very many of the small
school districts will be organ-
ised for the purpose of collective bargaining.
RSA 273-A provides that
school districts wherein the teacher
association represents less than ten
staff members with the same coMsunlty
of Interest do not have to enter
Into
collective negotiations with the teacher
association.
A review of the materials gathered
for this study Indicates that
intensive collective bargaining activity
in New Hampshire took place during
the late 1960's and early 1970's
(1968-1973) and the three-year period
(1975-1978) immediately following the
enactment of RSA 273-A. Except
for
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these two periods, the growth of collective bargaining can be characterized
as gradual.
Question two . It would appear that RSA 273-A had a very definite impact
on the status of recognition clauses as found In the collective bargaining
agreements. After the enactment of RSA 273-A, there was an Increase In the
percentage of collective bargaining agreements that contained a recognition
clause. The important point to note, however, is that virtually all of the
collective bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979 contain
ed such a clause. It would appear that the influence of RSA 273-A also
extended to the specificity of the recognition clauses, in that there was
an increase in the percentage of recognition clauses that included
specific
personnel positions as well as an increase in the percentage of
recognition
clauses that excluded specific personnel positions.
question three . RSA 273-A had very little impact on the
bargaining posl-
tlons of the school boards la those school districts
wherein the collective
bargaining agreement was settled after the annual
school district meeting.
In the base year (1977-1978) that was studied
only a small percentage of the
collective bargaining agreements that were In
effect for that year were
settled after the annual school district
meeting. Of the agreem
were settled after the annual school
district meeting, the author found
only one Instance wherein there were
substantial differences between the
provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement that the school board
finally agreed to and the collective
bargaining positions of that same
school board prior to the annual
school district meeting.
Question four . The author noted that
some very definite changes in
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the scope of collective bargaining have taken place since the enactment
of RSA 273-A. It would appear that the enactment of RSA 273-A haa
had a very definite impact on the scope of collective bargaining in New
Hampshire.
RSA 273-A appears to have had an increasing effect on some items
and a decreasing effect on other items listed under Certain Negotiations
Procedures and Basic Parameters in that after the enactment of the
statute three of the clauses in this section showed an increase and two
of the clauses showed a decrease. This writer attributed the decrease
of the definition of scope and no strike clauses to the fact that the
provisions of these clauses are now covered by the provisions of
RSA
273-A, and as a result some of the negotiators no longer may
see a
need to include these clauses in the collective bargaining
agreements.
The substantial Increase In multiple year contracts
Is attributed by
the author to the desire of the negotiating parties
to reduce the amount
of time as well as the expense required by
the process when It Is con-
ducted on an annual basis,
RSA 273-A appears to have had a very
definite effect on the Items
listed under Organizational Benefits
Pertaining to Grievances. There
was a substantial Increase In the
collective bargaining agreements con-
taining a grievance procedure, and as
a result of this Increase all of
the collective bargaining agreements
that were negotiated for 1978-1979
contained a grievance procedure.
Another very Important change
was the
substantial Increase In the grievance
procedures providing for some form
of arbitration.
AS a result of this Increase
the majority of the grievance
204
procedures that were negotiated for 1978-1979 provided for some form
of arbitration. Additionally, the author noted substantial changes
In the clauses providing for class action grievances as well as those
providing teacher associations with representational rights In the
grievance process.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a definite Impact on the
clauses providing for dues deductions, use of facilities, and time
off for association activities as the percentage of these clauses
Increase^ substantially after the enactment of the statute.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a definite effect on the type
of compensation programs that were negotiated as there was an
Increase
In the clauses providing for compensation by preparation
and years
of experience. Tlie Important point to note concerning
this Increase
Is that all of the contracts that were negotiated
for 1978-1979 con-
talned a clause providing for this type of salary
program. None of
the agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979
provided for a
salary schedule by merit. There was also a
decline In the clauses
providing for additional compensation by
merit. Lastly, there was
a moderate increase in the clauses
specifying credit for experience
outside the school district.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had
a very definite impact on
those clauses that provide insurance
fringe benefits to
as there were noticeable Increases
In the clauses providing medical
insurance and life Insurance benefits
and moderate Increases In
those
clauses providing dental Insurance
and disability Insurance
benefits.
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It is very important to note that the increase in the medical insurance
clause was such that all of the collective bargaining agreements that
were negotiated for 1978-1979 contained such a clause. It is also
Important to note the very substantial gains in the amount of money
that school boards pay toward the cost of medical insurance and the
amount of life Insurance coverage that school boards provide for staff
members
.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a very definite effect on those
clauses that provide leave of absence fringe benefits because those
clauses providing for: personal leave, sick leave, sabbatical leave
and maternity leave showed substantial increases and those clauses
providing for bereavement and military leave showed moderate
increases.
It should be noted that the Increase in the clauses
providing personal
leave benefits was such that all of the collective
bargaining agree-
mcnts that were negotiated for 1978-1979 contained
such a clause. It
Is also Important to note that the Increase In
the clauses providing
sick leave benefits was such that all of the
collective bargaining
agreements that were negotiated for 1978-1979
contained such a clause,
and the Increase in the clauses providing
for sick leave cumulative to
more than 60 days per annum was such
that virtually all of the collec
tlve bargaining agreements that were
negotiated for 1978-1979 contained
such a clause. The author noted Chat
the Increase In the clauses pro-
viding for sabbatical and maternity
leave benefits did not Include an
increase In paid sabbatical and
maternity leave clauses. As a
result,
the author concluded that the
increase did provide additional
fringe
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benefits but did not provide additional economic fringe benefits.
It would appear that the effect of RSA 273-A on the items listed
under Certain Other Direct Economic Benefits was not noticeable as
the increase in the clauses providing for course reimbursement as well
as those providing for comprehensive extracurricular pay schedules
was moderate. The increase in the clauses providing for athletic pay
schedules was slight. An important point to note is that as a result
of the increase of the clauses providing for course reimbursement,
only a small percentage of the agreements that were negotiated for
1978-1979 did not contain such a clause.
It would appear that RSA 273-A did not have a definite effect
on the items listed under Certain Policy Matters /Working
Conditions
Pertaining to Instruction as the changes in the various
clauses were
quite mixed and none of them were large. The most
noticeable change
was the decrease In the clauses providing for the
Involvement of staff
members In curriculum development. The decline
In the clauses pro-
viding for staff Involvement In textbook
selection was such that none
of the collective bargaining agreements
that were negotiated lor 1978-
1979 contained such a clause. The clauses
specifying teaching load
and preparation periods showed moderate
Increases while the clauses
specifying class size showed a slight
increase.
It would appear that RSA 273-A
had a definite effect on the
Items listed under Certain Policy
Matters/Uorklng Conditions Pertaining
to Staff as those clauses
providing for: posting of vacancies,
re-
duction in force, professional
requirements for beginning teachers.
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and discipline for just cause showed substantial increases. Those
clauses providing for staff evaluation as well as those clauses pro-
viding for staff transfers showed moderate increases while the clauses
specifying procedures for staff termination showed a slight increase.
It is important to note the increase in the clauses providing for
reduction in force, because in the opinion of the author reduction in
force is considered to be one of the more important issues in col-
lective bargaining.
It would appear that RSA 273-A had a definite effect on the
Items listed under Certain Other Policy Matters/Working Conditions
because the clauses providing for staff development
(Recertification)
showed a substantial Increase while the clauses providing
for staff
Involvement in the determination of the school calendar,
the length
of the school year, and the length of the
school day showed moderate
increases. The clauses providing for restrictions
on faculty meetings
showed a moderate Increase. The only item
that showed a decrease was
Che clause providing funds for staff
development and the author con-
sidered this decrease to be slight.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Introduction
The ultimate goal of the collective bargaining process
Is the
negotiation of a written agreement containing the rules
and regulations
that will gover^i the workplace for a stated
period of time. While the
collective bargaining process has been an Important
part of the
employer-employee relationship In the private
sector for many years.
It has only been since the 1960’s that
It has become an Important force
in public education. There were many
reasons why for so many years
collective bargaining was not a force In
public education. Among
these reasons were the benefits that
were peculiar to public employment,
the reluctance of teachers as
professionals to utilise the collective
bargaining process, and the concept
embraced by the public employer,
that the public employer was
sovereign and did not have to
negotiate
with the public employee. The
devastating effect of post World
War U
Inflation on the purchasing power
of teachers coupled with the
m
favorable wage gains that
employees In the private sector
were winning
with the assistance of collective
bargaining as well as other
factors
helped to develop a greater
sense of militancy amongst
teachers,
begun, the organisation of
teachers was gulte rapid,
and. In fact, the
largest membership gains that
were made by public sector
unions were
made on the local level.
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Along with their desire to improve their economic position,
teachers also wanted to have a greater share in those decisions
pertaining to their working conditions as well as those decisions
pertaining to educational policies. The collective bargaining process
has in fact given teachers a greater share in the decision making
process as it relates to their working conditions; however, their
involvement in decision making as it relates to educational policy
has not been substantial. Thomas Love contended that greater emphasis
would be placed on the negotiation of educational policy as col-
lective bargaining became more sophisticated; however, several years
later Perry and Wildman contended that economics was still the major
concern of the teachers.
In spite of the emphasis that has been placed on the negotiation
of economic benefits, there is question as to whether or
not col-
lective bargaining has had a long term effect on the economic
status
of teachers.^ Moreover, Ronald Fitzgerald contended
that the initial
economic gains that were made by the teachers were
paid out of budget
surpluses, and the subsequent economic gains that
were made by teachers
^Murphy and Hoover. "Negotlat Ions =^r?ZnMoranrCot
Professlonallzation or Reinforced Bureaucracy ,
—Cresswell and
Barealnln v: Readings In Policy sad
Murphy, p. A76; Zack, "Impasses, "The Anatomy
Workers and Public ntl\.mms: Neeotlatlons
of Militant Professionalization,
i
—243* Doherty, "Teacher Bar-
In Educat^n. eds.
^“s^^t^/j^erlence," In The CollecOve
gaining: The Relevance of Private
aec oi. f
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were paid for by cutbacks in the educational program.
While Thomas Love concluded that the negotiation of educational
policy was not significant, he also concluded that the negotiation
process was used by the parties to establish procedures outside of the
collective bargaining process whereby the teachers could be more in-
volved in the development of the educational program. Ronald Fitzgerald
reached the same conclusion. Fitzgerald held that curriculum develop-
ment is not usually discussed at the collective bargaining table because
of its complexity, and in a large number of the school districts
that
he reviewed mechanisms for involving the teachers in curriculum
develop-
4
ment had been established.
Design of the Study
The overall design of the study was directed at
the collection
of useful Information about selected changes
In collective bargaining
before and after the enactment of New
Hampshire RSA 273-A Public
Employee Labor Relations. The main objective of the
study was to
provide information that might be helpful
to the members of the following
groups
:
Dilemma; Negotiation s in Education,
and Perry and Wildman, The Impact_q
Rvidence From the Schools* PP •
eds. Carlton and Goodwin, p. 195;
f Negotiations in Public Education!
162-63 and 152.
^Fitzgerald, "Guidelines for
Negotiating Te;™s Interested In
Facilitating Improvement In Educational
Programs, PP.
rri i4r^fnri^?rair^irzgrra^^^^^^^Decision Making, PP- 71, , Facilitating Improvements in
for Negotiating Teams ^Interested
in l l
Educational Programs," p. 79-
211
1. Local chapters of the New Hampshire Education Association and
the New Hampshire Federation of Teachers
2. Local school boards
3. New Hampshire Education Association
4. New Hampshire Federation of Teachers
5. New Hampshire School Administrators Association
6. New Hampshire School Boards Association
The selected questions found on pages 96-99 were mailed to members
of the aforementioned groups as well as several people Involved in
education In New Hampshire who were not affiliated with any of these
groups. The respondents were asked to select what they considered
to
be the five most Important questions and the five least
Important
questions. The author then selected four questions for the
purposes
of the study. Three of the four questions were
selected In the order
of importance assigned by the respondents as found
in Table 1 (page 101)
The question dealing with the number of collective
bargaining agreements
In effect before and after the enactment of
RSA 273-A was not selected
as one of the five most Important
questions. It was selected by the
author to be Included in the study because
of the importance attached
to this matter by the New Hampshire
Education Association field repre
sentatlves who were Interviewed by the
author.
-In studv were found In the collective
The data that were used In the
y
bargaining agre^nents In effect for
the 1975-1976 school year and
those
that were negotiated for the
1977-1978 and the 1978-1979 school
years
as single year agreements or
the first year of
The collective bargaining
agreements that were
multiple year agreements,
negotiated for the
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1976-1977 school year were not reviewed as the author considered this
to be a transitional year. Though RSA 273-A had been enacted Into
law before the 1976-1977 collective bargaining agreements were negotiated.
Its provisions were such that they did not require the negotiators to
follow the procedures found In the statute until the following year.
Because the negotiators were aware of the provisions of RSA 273-A, but
were not bound by them, the author took the position that the collective
bargaining agreements that were negotiated for 1976—1977 were atypical,
and therefore, did not include them in the study. The author also re-
viewed the records of the New Hampshire State Department of Education
and the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board in compiling
the data that were used in the study.
The author mailed the selected questions to twenty people and
received fourteen responses (70%). One response was received from
at
least one representative of each one of the groups mentioned
on page 211,
The author acquired the collective bargaining agreements
by personally
contacting the various Now Hampshire school district
superintendents,
and received all of the collective bargaining
agreements that were in
effect for 1975-1976, all of the collective
bargaining agreements that
were in effect for 1977-1978, and all but
three of the agreements that
were in effect for 1978-1979. The design
of the study was able to be
followed without difficulty.
Results of the Study
In general the findings of this
study demonstrate that.
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1. there has been a definite increase in the number of collective
bargaining agreements in effect and the number of staff
members who are covered by these agreements;
2. there has been a definite increase in the collective bargaining
agreement clauses that provide fringe benefits;
3. there has been a definite Increase in the collective bargaining
agreement clauses involving various working conditions of the
staff members;
4. there *has been a definite increase in the clauses providing
for a grievance procedure and more importantly some form of
arbitration;
5. there has not been n substantial Increase In the clauses
involving educational policy.
It would appear that RSA 273-A haa had a definite effect on
the aelected
changes in collective bargaining in New Hampshire public
school districts
The four questions upon which this study was based along
with a summary
of the findings relative to each question are
contained in the following
pages.
The first question is, "What has been tbe
change in the number
of collective bargaining agreements in effect
before and after the
enactment of RSA 273-A?" In answering this
question the author tabulated
the number of collective bargaining
agreements that were in effect for
each of the three years that were
studied as well as the number of
staff members who were covered by
the collective bargaining agreements
in each one of the three years.
The results of these tabulations
can
be found in Table 2 (page 117).
The number of collective bargaining
agreements in effect iMtedlately
before the enactment of RSA
273-A in
August 1975. which would be those
in effect for the 1975-1976
school
was 52. This number increased
to 78 for the 1977-1978
school
year,
2IA
year, and further Increased to 86 for the 1978-1979 school year. The
number of staff members who were covered by collective bargaining
agreements in 1975-1976 was 6,158. This number Increased to 8,023 for
the 1977-1978 school year and further Increased to 8,356 for the 1978-
1979 school year. In general it can be said that there are more col-
lective bargaining agreements being negotiated since the enactment of
RSA 2 7 3-A, and they are becoming more complex as they contain more
clauses
.
The next question is, ’*What have been the changes in the composi-
tion of the bargaining units as contained in the recognition clauses of
collective bargaining agreements negotiated before and after the enact-
ment of RSA 273-A?" The data that were used to answer this
question
were taken from the collective bargaining agreements
that were forwarded
to the author by the New Hampshire school
superintendents. The data
analysis Is depicted in Table 3 (page 125). The author
reviewed the
recognition clauses of all of the collective bargaining
agreements that
were in effect for the 1975-1976 school year,
and the recognition
clauses of those collective bargaining
agreements that were negotiated
for the 1977-1978 and the 1978-1979
school years as single year agree-
ments or the first year of multiple
year agreements.
In general the trend found by the
author was toward more specificity
The percentage of collective bargaining
agreements containing a recogni-
tion clause increased to the point
where virtually all of the collective
bargaining agreements that were
negotiated for
a clause. The collective
bargaining agreements
1978-1979 contained such
containing a recognition
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clause including or excluding specific personnel positions increased
and the majority of the collective bargaining agreements that were
negotiated for 1978-1979 contained such a clause. The author did not
find substantial increases in the clauses including or excluding such
positions as department chairman, nurses, etc., nor did he find a
substantial change in the types of positions found in the inclusion or
exclusion section of the recognition clauses.
The next question is, ’’In school districts where collective
bargaining agreements were not finalized prior to the annual school
district meeting, what were the changes between the negotiating position
held by the school boards prior to the annual school district
meetings
and the position that they agreed to in the collective
bargaining
agreement finalized subsequent to the meeting?” The
data that were
utilized to an«er this question were taken from the
collective bargain-
ing agreements that were negotiated for the
1977-1978 year, the con-
versations that the author held with New Hampshire
school superintendent,
relative to the negotiation of these particular
agreements, and the
records of the New Hampshire Public Employee
Labor Relations board. In
general the author found that the teacher
associations did not win any
additional concessions from the school
boards in those collective
bargaining agreements that were settled
after the annual school district
meetings
.
The last question is. "What has
been the change in the scope of
collective bargaining before and
after the enactment of RSA
273 A?
rhe purposes of this study,
the scope of collective
bargaining includes
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those items listed on pages 100-103. The data that were utilized to
answer this question were taken from the collective bargaining agree-
ments that were forwarded to the author by the New Hampshire school
superintendents. The author reviewed all of the collective bargaining
agreements that were negotiated for the 1975-1976 school year, and
the collective* bargaining agreements that were negotiated for the 1977
1978 and the 1978-1979 school years as single year agreements or the
first year of multiple year agreements.
Negotiations procedures and basic parameters . RSA 273-A appears to have
had a mixed effect on the negotiations procedures and basic parameters
listed in Table 4 (page 138) in that three of these items Increased,
two decreased and one showed little change. The most noticeable
increase
involved the number of agreements that were negotiated on a multiple
year basis, and the two items that declined involved the
definition of
scope clauses and no strike clauses. In general it
can be said that the
Increased collective bargaining activity resulted in
more concern for
procedures providing for an orderly negotiations
process.
nrpanizational benefits pertaining to grievance_s.
RSA 273-A appears to
have had a definite effect on the items
listed in Table 5 (page 143)
with all but two of the items showing a
moderate to substantial increase
The most substantial Increase that took
place Involved clauses granting
representational rights In the grievance
process to teacher associations
The two Items that showed a slight
Increase or no Increase at all
were
those providing for the final
determination In the grievance process
by
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an arbitrator or by the superintendent. In general it can be said that
all agreements as of 1978-1979 contained a grievance procedure, and
that the majority of these grievance procedures provided for some form
of arbitration. The grievance procedures that are being negotiated
also tend to provide more clauses such as; representational rights in
«r
grievances, grievances limited to agreement, class action grievances,
and organizational grievances.
Other organizational benefits . RSA 273-A appears to have had a definite
effect on the items listed in Table 6 (page 152) with three of the five
clauses found in this table showing a noticeable increase. In
general
it can be said that the emphasis of the teacher associations
appeared
to be on those clauses that would either help it to
survive as an
organization or help it to better serve its members.
I
ntrect economlr. benefits pertaining to compensation.
RSA 273-A appears
to have had a mixed effect on the Items listed
In Table 7 (page 155)
since two Increased moderately, two did not
change much, and three de-
clined. In general It can be said that
emphasis was placed on salary
schedules based on preparation and years
of experience as all of the
agreements negotiated for 1978-1979 contained
such a salary schedule.
There was also a moderate Increase
In the clauses providing salary
schedule credit for experience outside
of the school district. None
of the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated for 1978-1979
contain-
ed a salary schedule based on
merit, and the collective
bargaining agree-
ments containing a clause providing
for additional compensation
by merit
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declined during the period that was studied. Finally, the collective
bargaining agreements containing a clause providing for longevity pay
or retirement bonus did not change much.
Direct economic benefits pertaining to insurance . RSA 273-A appears
to have had aMeflnlte effect on the items listed in Table 8 (page 161)
vlth the clauses providing medical and life insurance benefits showing
substantial Increases and the clauses providing dental and disability
Insurance benefits showing moderate increases. The monies paid by the
school district toward the cost of the staff members’ medical insurance
program and the amount of life insurance coverage provided to the
staff
members increased substantially.
Direct economic benefits pertaining to leaves of absence.
RSA 273-A
appears to have had a definite effect on the Items
listed In Table 9
(page 171). The trend was to provide more benefits
to the staff member,
as all but one of the Items showed an Increase.
The clauses providing
for personal leave, sick leave, sabbatical
leave, and maternity leave
showed substantial Increases. Additionally,
there were substantial In-
creases in the benefits provided to staff
members within the sick leave
clauses, l.e., the percentage of clauses
providing for. leave of
more days per annum, leave cumulative
to more than 60 days, and a sick
leave bank.
airier economic benefits . It would appear
that RSA 273-A did not
have a definite effect on the Items
listed In Table 10 (page 179).
In
general It can be said that the trend
was to provide course
reimbursement
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as a benefit to more staff members as the percentage of collective
bargaining agreements containing a course reimbursement clause in-
creased. At the same time, the percentage of collective bargaining
agreements containing a maximum amount budgeted or "cap" clause
Increased, thereby restricting the course reimbursement benefit.
Policy matters /working conditions pertaining to instruction . RSA 273-A
appears to have had a mixed effect on the items listed in Table (page
182). There was no set pattern as three items declined, one showed no
change, one showed a slight change, and two showed a moderate change.
In general it can be said that emphasis was not placed on
the negotiation
of educational policies relating to instruction.
Policy matters /working conditions pertaining to staff.
RSA 273 A
appears to have had a definite effect on the items
listed in Table 12
(page 187). Those clauses providing for: posting
of vacancies, reduc-
tion in force, professional requirements for
beginning teachers, and
discipline for Just cause showed substantial
Increases. Those clause,
providing for staff evaluation as well as
those clauses providing for
staff transfers showed moderate Increases
while the clauses specifying
procedures for staff termination showed a
slight Increase. In general
It can be said that those clauses
dealing with the working conditions
and Job security of staff members
increased.
r.prfain other policy matters /working
conditiojis.
have had a definite effect on the
items listed in
RSA 273-A appears to
Table 13 (page 197)
with five of the six clauses
listed in Table 13 showing an
increase
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The clauses providing for staff development (Recertification) showed
a substantial increase while the clauses providing for staff involvement
in the determination of the school calendar, the length of the school
year, and the length of the school day showed moderate increases.
The clauses providing for restrictions on faculty meetings showed a
moderate increase. In general it can be said that those clauses dealing
with the working conditions or professional status of staff members tend
to increase.
Projected Usefulness of the Study
The Information made available in this study to those
groups or
individuals who negotiate collective bargaining
agreements in New
Hampshire public school districts will assist them
in making more
rational decisions during the course of the
process as they will be
more knowledgeable about the status of
collective bargaining in New
Hampshire public school districts. It will
help the negotiator, to
write and defend certain proposals as
they will be able to cite the
extent to which these proposals have
already been accepted in col-
lective bargaining agreements in New
Hampshire public school districts.
Conversely, it will assist them in
arguing against the inclusion of
certain proposals because they will
be able to cite the extent to
which
these proposals have been included
in other collective bargaining
agreements
.
The information made available
in this study will assist
these
collective bargaining into
proper perspective.
organizations in putting
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On the one hand, the evidence clearly demonstrates to school boards
that their fear of losing control of the school district's educational
program as a result of the collective bargaining process is unfounded
as the negotiation of educational policy has been minimal. On the other
hand, the evidence clearly demonstrates to public school staff members
that the collective bargaining process has helped them to resolve scxne
of their concerns, but that it has not helped them to become
involved in
the development of educational policy or the management of
the school
district to the extent that they night like.
In conclusion the study demonstrates that the
enactment of col-
lective bargaining legislation did not bring about
radical changes in
the operation of New Hampshire public school
districts.
Relationship Between the Summary of
Findings
And the Review of the Literature
The primary concern and success of
the negotiators who represent-
ed the teachers In the collective
bargaining process appears to have
been In the areas of economic benefits
and working conditions. The
above conclusion Is based on the
gains In those clauses dealing
with
the fringe benefits provided to
bargaining unit members as well as
Chose clauses dealing with the
working conditions of those same
bargain-
ing unit members.
These findings correlate
closely with those of studies
pertaining
to the results and
Implications of collective
bargaining In other states,
.. T 1- of Teacher Negotiations on School
System
Thomas Love in "The Impact
g
»• A Charles R Perry and Wesley
A. Wildman in The
Decision Making," and
. i'e
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Impact of Negotiations In Public Education concluded that one of the
immediate results of the collective bargaining process was to give
teachers an opportunity to participate in the determination of their
- 5
working conditions.
To date, the negotiation of educational policy in New Hampshire
has been slight. Thomas Love concluded In his study that the
negotiation
of educational policy In school districts has not been substantial.
Ronald Fitzgerald In "Guidelines for Negotiating Teams
Interested In
Facilitating Improvement In Educational Programs," concluded
that the
collective bargaining process is generally not utilized
to negotiate
complex educational policies such as curriculum.
He vent on to state,
however, that In many of the school districts
that he surveyed, the
collective bargaining process was utilized to
develop mechanisms for
the Involvement of staff members in
curriculum development. It
would appear that the collective bargaining
process was not utilized
for this purpose In New Hampshire,
i.e., the percentage decline of
those collective bargaining agreements
containing a curriculum partici-
pation clause. This finding should
not be construed to mean that
the
teachers In Hew Hampshire public
school districts ate not Involve
curriculum development. The finding
indicate, that RSA 273-A and
the
*Love. isy^'^and^ntzgerlld^^uldellnes for
c is ion Making,” PP* ^1, ^ Trunrovements in Educati
^
rFiriiiratlng Improvem
on-
al Programs," p* 79.
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collective bargaining process have not contributed to the involvement
of teachers in curriculum development.
Recommendations for Further Study
On the basis of the research that was conducted, and the findings
that were presented in this study, the author recommends that a
follow-
up study be conducted and that it should consider the
following
questions:
1. Have the gains in the fringe benefits that were
made in the
period that was studied been sustained or Increased
in sub-
sequent collective bargaining agreements?
2. Have the salary schedules that were
negotiated during the
period that was studied brought real economic
gains to the
teachers, and if so have these economic gains
been sustained
or increased in subsequent collective
bargaining agreements?
3 Have the educational programs in the
New Hampshire public
schLl districts been cut back in order to
offset the budget
increases that have been brought about by
the econom c g
4 Has there been an increase in
the negotiation of ^^ucational
policies In the collective bargaining
agreement that h v
Len negotiated subsequent to the period
of time that ua
studied?
5. Has there been an
"Elective bargaining
rg'reem^nL'rtarrave Zen negotiated subsequent
to the
period of time that was studied?
The change In the number and
percentage of the reduction In
force
clauses during the period that
was studied was such that It
was not
Af-tn 1-rpnds The author would
recommend
possible to determine any specific
tre .
, A ^n order to better understand
that a more in-depth analysis
be conducted I
„hv the school boards and
teacher associations are
agreeing
the reasons w y n n ux
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to the various types of reduction in force clauses. As stated above,
the author recommends that the collective bargaining agreements negotia-
ted subsequent «to this study be reviewed to determine whether or not
there has been an increase in the number and percentage of the reduction
in force clauses. Should there once again be a lack of a clear-cut
trend, the author would recommend that an in-depth analysis be
conducted
of those reduction in force clauses negotiated subsequent to the
author's
study.
To the best of this writer’s knowledge, a formal study
of the work
of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations
Board (PELRB) has
not been conducted. The author would recommend
that such a study be
conducted beginning with the establishment of
PELRB In 1975. The study
should review the types of cases that have
been brought before PELRB
with an analysis of the Implications that
the decisions of PELRB have
had on the collective bargaining process
In New Hampshire.
The Inqulrees who responded to the
selected questions were also
asked to suggest questions for the
study. One of these suggestions
was incorporated Into the study
and others have been Included
with the
reco™endatlons listed above. The
following are the remainder of the
suggestions, worded exactly as they
were made by the respondents:
1. Has the f.^rannial schoolrisSct^mleUng®
fernTreaterslLe the adoption of RSA
273-A7
2. An analysis should be
made /^^Jt“rdrb;%re t^acrer'
:ss:c!ariiir:nrttrh:i''u:!onrsubsequent to the
adoption
of RSA 273-A from those
previously made.
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3. Has the Impasse procedure been more effective than procedures
used before its passage?
4. Has the negotiations process been more workable for both
sides since the passage of RSA 273-A?
5. An analysis should be made of the issues relative to
appro-
priating money for an agreement reached subsequent to the
annual meeting.
This writer would recommend that a study be conducted
which would
Include those states where public school districts
have been required
by state statute to negotiate with the organization
representing the
school district's staff members for a period
of ten or more years. The
study would compare the results of the
collective bargaining process
during the first three years Immediately
following the enactment of
the collective bargaining legislation,
and the results of the collective
bargaining process during the three year
period Immediately preceding
the study, and It would consider
the following questions:
1. Did the collective
"f //,°rg”eltret“nrrr''both'o£
securing real economic gains during
the periods studied?
, oKio ^n «?ecure real economic gains,
2. If the teachers were able
to
these economic
ra-Tf^tt rbrs^^hfed:rat^oral^rogramsl
raarai^;:^:;: -rif r^rthe-iroirereniiirat^
the latter period that was
studied?
4. Has there been a ^“^of'^Chose^who participated
rrCt" roTeri:a/of ^tlme suggested for
the study?
in Closing the author
would remind the reader of
the Importance
of research In collective
bargaining. The well-informed
negotiator
„I11 be able to mahe more
rational decisions during
the course of the
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collective bargaining process. There is a much greater likelihood
that the well-informed negotiator will approach the collective bar-
gaining table with a positive attitude toward the collective bargaining
process and a commitment to negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement.
This attitude and commitment will play a very important part in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the collective bargaining sessions and the
resultant collective bargaining agreement.
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